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Learning the IPB process would go a long way to improving Marine Corps intelligence troubles. Here are some practical solutions.
The term "intelligence preparation of the battlefield" (IPB) inspires trepidation among some Marine Corps intelligence professionals. The process conjures images of intelligence analysts frantically preparing innumerable overlays on every possible subject from fog patterns to the enemy's gastronomic preference. For many operators, IPB means turning to the intelligence officer and saying, "Hey Deuce, give me some of that IPB stuff!" not realizing that he is an integral part of a process that can enhance staff coordination and help the commander to best employ his collection, maneuver, and fire support capabilities.
IPB is a systematic approach to battlefield preparation that begins with staff planning and coordination well before friendly forces engage the enemy. IPB integrates the enemy's doctrine and current situation with weather and terrain to determine and evaluate enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and possible courses of action. Although this sounds exactly like an intelligence estimate found in Annex B of any operations order, it is much more. IPB starts with the intelligence officer. However, the commander, operations officer, fire support coordinator, and other staff members have critical roles and responsibilities in order to complete the process. Decisions regarding the employment of collection assets, identification of high-payoff targets (HPTs), assignment of fire support systems, the maneuver of units, and the placement of combat service support (CSS) resources or allocation of CSS will result from the active participation of the entire staff. If the commander and operations officer pay only lip service to the process, it will fail.
In Southwest Asia, IPB was employed with varying degrees of effort and success at the regiment, division, and Marine expeditionary force (MEF) levels. At I MEF, a detachment from the U.S. Army's 513th Military Intelligence Brigade was an integral part of the G-3's future operations section. The detachment, led by an Army captain, used the IPB methodology to facilitate the identification of targets, focus collection planning, and provide input regarding potential Iraqi courses of action. The success of IPB in planning I MEFs deep battle and futare operations raised the question, why aren't our intel guys doing this? Most intelligence officers' responses varied from "I don't have enough...