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Synthese (2011) 181:241253
DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9800-9
Received: 3 December 2009 / Accepted: 26 July 2010 / Published online: 4 September 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
Abstract On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and(ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justied (or absolutely warranted),i.e., justied to a degree that entails their truth and precludes their falsity. Though rationalist infallibilism is indisputably running its course, adherence to at least one of the two species of infallible a priori justication refuses to disappear from mainstream epistemology. Among others, Putnam (1978) still professes the a priori infallibility of some category (i) propositions, while Burge (1986, 1988, 1996) and Lewis (1996) have recently afrmed the a priori infallibility of some category (ii) propositions. In this paper, I take aim at rationalist infallibilism by calling into question the a priori infallibility of both analytic and synthetic propositions. The upshot will be twofold: rst, rationalist infallibilism unsurprisingly emerges as a defective epistemological doctrine, and second, more importantly, the case for the a priori infallibility of one or both categories of propositions turns out to lack cogency.
Keywords Rationalism Infallibilism Analyticity Syntheticity A Priori
Defeasibility Self knowledge Descartes Burge
1 Introduction: rationalist infallibilism
On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly or absolutely justied, i.e., justied to a degree that entails their truth and precludes their falsity.1 In particular, on this doctrine, at least
1 The second clause of this definition (viz. the exclusion of falsity) is intended to avoid explicit commitment to the law of non-contradiction according to which for all statements X, it is not the case that X& X.
G. Hoffmann (B)
Department of Philosophy, Ryerson University, 350 Victoria Street, Toronto, ON M5B 2K3, Canada e-mail: [email protected]
Two kinds of a priori infallibility
Glen Hoffmann
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242 Synthese (2011) 181:241253
two main classes of a priori propositions are susceptible of infallible justication:(i) logical, conceptual and mathematical propositions, and (ii) so-called self justifying propositions. Though rationalist infallibilism is undoubtedly running its course, adherence to at least one of the two species of infallible a priori justication refuses to disappear from mainstream epistemology. Among others, Putnam (1978) still professes the a priori infallibility of some...