Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime

Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime. By Eliot A. Cohen. New York: Free Press, 2002. ISBN 0-7432-3049-3. Notes. Index. Pp. xiv, 288. $25.00.

This book is essential reading for anyone concerned with current United States civil-military relations and national strategy. Eliot Cohen believes that our misunderstanding of the lessons of the Vietnam and Gulf Wars created "a version of the 'normal' theory of civil-military relations that ended by weakening the principle of civilian control of the military in the United States; deepening mistrust between senior officers and politicians; and even, in some measure, politicizing the officer corps" (pp. 199-200). The culprit "normal" theory of civil-military relations holds that "Officers are professionals, much like highly trained surgeons; the statesman is in the position of a patient requiring urgent care" (p. 4). The statesman-patient dares not interfere with the professional surgical proceedings. "The result should be a limited degree of civilian control over military affairs" (ibid.).

Cohen argues persuasively that, on the contrary, military affairs, not only at the strategic level but often at the level of tactics and logistics, are so interwoven with politics that the only successful use of military power entails continuous penetration of the military sphere by the civilian leadership. Misunderstanding...