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It is generally argued that white-collar criminal will be particularly influenced by punishment policies. White-collar crime seen as a highly rational form of criminality, in which the risks and rewards are carefully evaluated by potential offenders, and white-collar criminal are assumed to have much more to lose through sanctions than more common law violators. In the article we examine the impact of sanctions on the criminal careers of 742 offenders convicted of white-collar crimes in seven U.S. district courts between fiscal years 1976 and 1978. Utilizing data on court-imposed sanctions originally compiled by Wheeler et al. (1988b), as well as information on subsequent criminal behavior provided by the Identification Bureau of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, we assess the effect of improvement upon the official criminal record of people convicted of white-collar crimes. Comparing prison and no-prison groups that were marched in terms of factors that led to their receipt of a prison sanction, we find that prison does not have a specific deterrent impact upon the likelihood of rearrest over a 126-month follow-up period
Although scholars have focused increasing attention upon the criminal careers of street criminals, they have largely overlooked those of white-collar offenders. Behind this neglect lies a common assumption about the nature of white-collar criminality. In contrast to street criminals who are assumed to be highly likely to recidivate, those convicted of white-collar crimes are generally thought to be "one shot" offenders unlikely to be processed in the justice system after their initial brush with the law (see Benson, 1985; Edelhertz and Overcast, 1982; Wheeler et al., 1988a).
Studies of people who are prosecuted for white-collar crimes contradict this common assumption about, white-collar criminals. In two major investigations examining offenders convicted under white-collar crime statutes in the U.S. Federal Courts in the 1970s, a substantial number of defendants were found to have prior arrests. Berrson and Moore (1992), for example, report that almost 40% of their sample, which included those convicted of bribery, bank embezzlement, income tax evasion, false claims, and mail fraud, had at least one prior arrest. Weisburd et al. (1990b), studying these crimes and securities violations, antitrust violations, and credit fraud, found that more than 40% of their sample evidenced at least one prior arrest and more than...