Content area

Abstract

Bulow and Klemperer [1] have provided an upper bound on the value of bargaining power for a seller of an indivisible object. Specifically, negotiating optimally with N buyers yields lower revenue than an English auction with N + 1 buyers. In this paper, a short and intuitive proof of this result is presented. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

Details

Title
A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result
Author
Kirkegaard, René
Pages
449-452
Publication year
2006
Publication date
Jun 2006
Publisher
Springer Nature B.V.
ISSN
09382259
e-ISSN
1432-0479
Source type
Scholarly Journal
Language of publication
English
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0593-2
ProQuest document ID
224158378
Copyright
Springer-Verlag 2006