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Abstract: The 2008 Russia-Georgia War over South Ossetia and Abkhazia sparked controversy about whether Russia's grand strategic intentions in the South Caucasus were expansive vis-à-vis Moscow's perceived sphere of interest. This is often based on the assumption that Russia initiated the war with-among other objectives-the intention of regime change in Tbilisi. This article examines Russian decision-making and the course of events leading up to the war through various explanatory models. It concludes that, because the Russian military and civilian leadership in Moscow-namely, that of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev-was disjointed and lacking significant unity of effort, the war itself served as little evidence of a grand strategic shift on Moscow's part. Decision-making by civilians can be explained by a pragmatic response to the unfolding of events, either by Georgia or by Russian military brinksmanship.
Keywords: Georgia, Kremlin, Russia, South Ossetia
Little debate remains as to the outcome of the Russia-Georgia War of August 2008: in the span of five days, the Russian military defeated the Georgian military with conventional force. There is some debate as to how the conflict began. Few now doubt that Georgia was responsible for actually initiating the war by attacking the city of Tskhinvali on the evening of August 7-but Russian presence in the region is thought to be at least a partial catalyst.1 More importantly, however, is the question of whether the war was a product of a broader Russian grand strategy that sought to militarily protect its sphere of interest. Shortly after Russian intelligence discovered that the Georgian Army's 4th Battalion was mounting an offensive in Tskhinvali, Russian 40th Army forces were pre-positioned for a counter-attack.2 Moving through the Roki Tunnel, the confron- tation quickly escalated into all-out war, expanding into greater Georgia and including the second front in Abkhazia. Almost immediately, comparisons were made to the Red Army's 1968 invasion of Prague and its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.3
Outside of Moscow, two general theories have dominated the discussion of Russia's role in the war. The first might be referred to as the historical hegemonic one, which pits a post-Cold War Russia in an ever-compromised regional sphere in which it pursues strong- arm policies against Georgia in order to instill its historical, but lost, dominance...