ROMANIA'S NATIONAL DEFENCE STRATEGY - BETWEEN OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM

Abstract

The frailty of strategies was highlighted when the reality of our century overlapped the national patterns of security and defence planning. Constrained by the decrease of expenses and affected by the evolutions of the security in the last two years, states (especially NATO members) successively reconfigured the national approach related to security planning. The redistribution of resources in order to increase the security level gained more and more strict and justified importance (for example optimizing the use of capabilities in NATO). In this context, the article has aims to present the results of a SWOT analysis referring to Romania's National Defence Strategy for 2015-2019. The analysis performed highlights some of the results which can improve the process of elaborating the strategy at the national level. In its quest between optimism and pessimism, the analysis sketches the national progress, as well as the problems which should draw the attention of the political leadership. Not last, in the conclusions of the article, I underlined the need of inserting some modern and sustainable approaches in the security planning process, such as evidence-based policies, benchmarking1 and identification and capitalization of security opportunities.

Headnote

The frailty of strategies was highlighted when the reality of our century overlapped the national patterns of security and defence planning. Constrained by the decrease of expenses and affected by the evolutions of the security in the last two years, states (especially NATO members) successively reconfigured the national approach related to security planning. The redistribution of resources in order to increase the security level gained more and more strict and justified importance (for example optimizing the use of capabilities in NATO). In this context, the article has aims to present the results of a SWOT analysis referring to Romania's National Defence Strategy for 2015-2019. The analysis performed highlights some of the results which can improve the process of elaborating the strategy at the national level. In its quest between optimism and pessimism, the analysis sketches the national progress, as well as the problems which should draw the attention of the political leadership. Not last, in the conclusions of the article, I underlined the need of inserting some modern and sustainable approaches in the security planning process, such as evidence-based policies, benchmarking1 and identification and capitalization of security opportunities.

Keywords: security, defence strategy, SWOT analysis, opportunities, risks.

Introduction

At the beginning of 2016, debates are still flourishing about the way in which the concept of security should be understood (if the solution is empowerment and human security, if the method of approach should be a problem solving2 one or if securing is the answer to a society with less conflicts). The expansion of the concept depending on the object of reference - namely if it should be the men, the global vision, the women, the society or the environment - is also subject to discussion. Not last, security theoreticians and practitioners analyse mechanism of developing it - if it is influenced by threats and risks or if the implementation of routine bureaucratic measures may increase the state's security level.

At this stage, we notice that when analysing the need of security, the problem of establishing certain strategic directions to guide the future of a state to "more" security is fundamental for the political leadership. Amid wide international dynamics, each state implemented a specific pattern to elaborate national strategies, consisting of tools which are as objective and accurate as possible and completely structured. For most of the states, such a sectorial strategy has as purpose the management of possible future conditions, by creating a dependency link between the fulfilment of its own aspiration levels, objectives and resources.

We also notice that, at present, in the practice of states, the fundamental document dealing with security can be met under various forms, in absence of a clear cut between security and defence. This is mainly due to legislation specific to member states of the international community, each nation managing this problem in a different manner. For example, The United Kingdom, The US and The Russian Federation opted for a document of national security strategy type. France created the French White Paper on Defence and National Security (Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale)3 while Spain developed The National Defence Directive4. At the same time, Finland prepared a Security Policy as well as a Security Strategy for Society5. At the national level, Romania opted, after the end of the Cold War, initially for a security strategy6 and later on (after 2004) for a defence strategy7.

The intensity of international events, but also the succession of political cycles made that the last years bring us novelties in the area of security planning and reconsider the national strategies. Thus, the US President undertook a new Security Strategy in February 2015, after France previously reiterated the White Paper in 2013 and Poland rebuilt its Strategy in 2014. In November 2015, The United Kingdom launched a new Security Strategy and upon December 31st 2015 the pleiad ended - not coincidentally - with the Russian Federation. Romania is also part of this trend, in June 2015 it brought to light a new document, namely: Romania's National Defence Strategy for 2015-2019 - A Strong Romania in Europe and the World (NDS 2015).

The recent events overlapped on the estimates of NDS 2015 and Romania's dealing with a new balance of regional powers forces us to conduct a more thorough analysis of the algorithm of strategic planning of security and defence, at national level. For such reasons, we set out to conduct, in this article, a balanced analysis of the positive elements, as well as the negative ones which characterise NDS 2015 and its process of production. The de facto situation of the year 2016 brings to discussion the analysis of the real progress of planning, as well as its weak points.

1. Frame of analysis

Far from trying to untangle the events which lay at the basis of the current form of NDS 2015, this article sets out - as mentioned above - to create a relevant analysis of Romania's strategy and the process on which this document was based. The presentation of the analysis frame used to this starts from the premises that such a strategic document fulfils the role of connector between present, past and future, as well as that of junction between future possible states, desired states and their resources. In this context, there is the need to identify the strong and weak points, the opportunities and threats specific to strategy. We consider that a SWOT8 analysis represents one of the most adequate instruments to assess the strategy because it highlights the weak and strong points of the document, as well as the possibilities to improve the planning process. Upon conducting this SWOT analysis, I identified the following lines of study:

y Reflecting the risks, threats and vulnerabilities related to national security in the area of NDS 2015;

y Reflecting the security opportunities in the international environment in NDS 2015;

y Reflecting the predictability of Romania in the international environment;

y The functions of the strategy;

y The strength of the objectives and the outcomes set;

y Correlation between objectives, outcomes and resources;

y Sustainability, acceptability and feasibility of the strategy;

y The continuity of strategies and the connection to the previous strategy;

y The process of consultation regarding the adoption of the strategy;

y The process of regular review of the strategy.

The lines of study resulted from the intersection of four areas of interest, such as (1) legislation, (2) functions of strategy, (3) distribution of resources and (4) process of adoption and review.

1.1. Legislation

The legal ground is the basis of our analysis, because it insures the frame for the preparation of the document and sets out its guidelines. To this end, at the national level, NDS 2015 was adopted based on Law of Defence Planning no. 473, from November 4th 2004. After adopting the NDS 2015, the Law of Defence Planning was amended9. Based on Law 473/2004, the strategy had to contain the following elements10:

y Setting out the national security interests and objectives;

y Assessment of international security environment;

y Identification of prospective risks, threats and vulnerabilities;

y Courses of action and main methods to insure Romania's national security.

In this area, the purpose of our analysis was to identify the convergence points of NDS 2015 with Law 473/2004 and to measure their impact on substantiating the national security.

1.2. Functions of a strategy

The functions which a strategy can fulfil in relation to the security of a state represent a highly-debated subject at the international level11. By analysing the literature, it results that some researchers and practitioners give an increased importance to the role which the changes of strategy have on stating the intentions in relation to the challenges in the international environment, emphasizing the importance of predictability12. For example, RAND Corporation underlined, in a study made for the US Defence Department, that the strategy represents an element of declaratory answer - "comes in response to external developments such as crises, international realignments, or the rise or fall of adversaries13". To this end, a strategy must have an anticipatory role for the other states as well and it must become a tool of communication for them.

In trying to depict as broadly as possible the roles which the strategy plays in reality, identified the following three functions which we focused on in the analysis:

y The cognitive function - in the sense in which NDS relies on certain scientifically- based analysis;

y The prospective function - in the sense in which NDS is based on the features of the future security environment and reflects the predictability of the state at the international level;

y Organisational function - in the sense in which NDS offers the courses of action, to protect the national interests.

1.3. Distribution of resources

A major importance for our endeavour has also the identification of the courses of action and the strategic resources of the state. In the context in which the international community and, implicitly, the practice impose a more and more efficient use of resources to insure the security, their distribution becomes the leitmotif of our analysis14. In order to capture the ideas mentioned, we applied, in this case, Art Lykke's analysis pattern of security strategies. He believes that an analysis of the strategies can be made by tracing the relations which are set between the following components of a strategy15:

y Objectives (outcomes) - and namely the actions which shall be fulfilled;

y Means of fulfilment (strategic concepts) - and namely how the objectives shall be fulfilled by using the resources;

y Resources - which are the specific resources involved in fulfilling the objectives

y Risks - seen as a window between objectives, means of fulfilment and resources.

Following the connections set between outcomes, resources and the roadmap chosen by the political leadership, I investigated to see whether NDS is the right strategy, convenient16, feasible17 and acceptable and admissible18 at national level.

1.4. Adoption and review process

At the international community level, the states perfected, in a personalized manner, the process of regular review of sectorial strategies. The practice and also the scientific research emphasize the democratic control of forces in the area of security and defence.

Various organisations (for example Transparency International) and think-tanks (such as RAND Corporation) bring to discussion the ample consultancy process for adopting the strategies, underlining the need of certain lines of talks, in view of adapting the planning to the volatile realities of the 21st century. In the context of such analysis, the concept of evidence-based policies gains a robust and necessary regular and transparent revitalisation of strategies. The enforcement of concept becomes a request for strategic planning as an informed public policy. The role of this policy is to highlight the fulfilment of objectives previously set. The concept of evidence-based policies initiates the process of planning based on realities and failures of previous strategy. The permanent connection with the reality and the stage of fulfilment of objectives makes of this tool a benchmark of strategic planning. Given the importance character of the interest area, we set out to identify the manner in which the adoption and review of NDS 2015 is made in Romania. Also, we intend to draw the conclusion if, at the national level, tools such as evidence-based policies are being applied.

2. The results of the SWOT analysis

The performance of SWOT analysis represented a theoretical and also practical challenge, because its results placed us between optimism and pessimism. Thus, we found out significant progress of the strategy that we detailed as strong points, but also problems that need urgent approach, in view of solving them. In Table no. 1 we resumed the main points identified with the help of SWOT analysis:

We hereinafter broadly present the results obtained by the four main components of the analysis:

2.1. Strong points

y In NDS, the risks and menaces to the national security were assessed by an extended approach, where there can be found, outside military elements, those of economic, social, political, technological and environmental nature. This frame used by the defence strategy places Romania in line with the practice and research in the area of security. At the international level, the security as attribute of the entire society, not only as result of the military deterrence, was promoted ever since the end of the Cold War.19

y NDS presents a coherent analysis of the main risks, threats and vulnerabilities, in straight line with the evolutions and dynamics of the regional security environment (consisting of the impact of events in the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Black Sea region)20.

y The strategy sets out coherent and comprehensive landmarks regarding defining the risks. The most important risks are the ones which underline regional instability and nonfulfillment of Romania's objectives of development21.

y The strategy identifies 7 categories of political-military menaces, such as de-stabilizing actions in the Eastern Neighbourhood and perpetuation of frozen conflicts in the Black Sea region22.

y Applying the concept of wider security leads to structured and diverse identification of vulnerabilities, among which the absorption of EU funds, the use of public money, energy, critical infrastructure, agriculture, environment protection, justice, health, education and scientific research23.

y NDS provides the predictability of Romania in the international environment, by insuring its allies (especially USA) as well as by observing the external menaces (prospective function).

y NDS was built on the national law. Thus, it includes the elements required by Law 473/2004. The strategy (1) sweeps through the interests and national security objectives; (2) assesses the international security environment, connecting Romania to the reality of 2015; (3) identifies possible risks, threats and vulnerabilities; (4) identifies courses of action;

2.2. Weak points

y Unclear definition of the concepts of "security" and "defence".

I mentioned, in the beginning of the article, that the states related in a different manner to the problem of security and defence and that they have different views about the national integration document. In the current frame of security, the strategic documents that focus on national security prove the progressive overlapping between the dimension of defence and that of security and create difficulties in separating the two concepts. We believe that the Romanian specific approach must make the difference between security and defence strategy, defence being a concept that is included in security. We believe that a state's security represents a melting pot, much more suitable for asserting the national interests, being based on the multitude of specific theories and schools of thought. The term security shall allow us, thus, to be positioned in a systemic frame, where defence shall be seen as a component and arm of security. For such reasons, we believe that the national option reiterated in 2015 by Law 203 referring to Romania's Defence Strategy gives limited possibilities, from the point of view of undertaking some ambitious objectives. More than that, it can induce the erroneous opinion that the security is only in the charge of the Ministry of National Defence and the Supreme Council of National Defence, being able to create confusion in relation to undertaking specific roles in securing the state through the institutions involved.

y NDS does not make an analysis of the impact which the previous sectorial strategies (of security and defence) had in relation to the de facto state of Romania in 2015. Consequently, the political management cannot assess which was the influence of previous measures upon national security. Namely, it would have been useful to have an analysis of fulfilment of objectives of the previous strategy in order to channel future efforts, but also to establish new strategic post of Romania. The absence of a balance such as how much we have accomplished from what we set out and undertook24 makes it impossible to know objectively the factors which led to today's state. Not last, we cannot even determine if the current position of Romania is the result of a judicious planning or simply the result of an accidental and involuntary circumstance. Examples of best practices in the area are UK's National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 201525, as well as Sweden's Defence Policy26.

y The lack of a primary continuity of the strategies' objectives is also a weak point which results from the analysis of the strategy's text, as well as from the analysis of the adoption process. A prosperous Romania cannot be the result of a sole strategy, but of multiple successive strategies. For the same reason, the constancy of defining the analysis frame of risks also receives a major importance. This is translated in a pre-emptive approach, different and contrary to the reactive one, practised so far. Although NDS is, essentially, a reflection of the political leadership, it must also present the continuity of some measures and development of objectives on the medium and long run, introducing the social sustainable development into practice.

y The lack of analysis on previous strategies, as well as their continuity, leads to the conclusion that, at national level, there is no process of evidence-based policies type, where NDS results from. The lack of such process has vital consequences on the future of Romania, the need of an informed practice, from where it results that the regular review of NDS is vital for fulfilling our country's development objectives.

y The correlation between objectives, outcomes and resources: a strategy must be, avant la lettre, a tool of transforming the objectives into outcomes, with the use of resources. From the point of view of practice of the document, it must reflect the way in which the decision-makers intend to fulfil the courses of action set by the resource distribution. Unfortunately, NDS 2015 does not make the analysis of resources available (including the financial ones)27. The process of enforcing the NDS is also lacking certain techniques and comparative analysis of benchmarking28 type. To this purpose, NDS becomes a declaratory document and not one based on action. Part of the best practice examples regarding the correlation between objectives, outcomes and resources are The United Kingdom (National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015) and Finland (Security Strategy for Society - 2010)29.

y The lack of a transparent presentation of the staff who prepared it and the competences of persons involved in the process of creating the strategy leads to creating a negative opinion about Romania and the democratic control on the national security. Romania has a negative score in the analysis related to transparency in relation to defence and security, conducted by Transparency International, one of the reasons being also this one.

2.3. Opportunities

y The political support that NDS 2015 enjoyed upon the moment of its adoption gives it legitimacy in the public area30. This is a sine-quo-non condition of the success of a strategy. It is important that all factors involved in security and defence of the state understand and approve the measures proposed as strategy.

y I mentioned, at the beginning of this article, the need to find an intersection between possible future states of the country and the states desired by the political leadership. By connecting the two components, the Strategy makes nothing but to show the level of ambition of the state. When the political leadership undertakes this document, then the state not only can transform the objectives into actions, but it also becomes credible at the international level. The defining character of accepting the political leadership for the courses of action in view of increasing the intensity of security is also observed in the evolution (involution) of planning of defence during the period 2000-2014. Thus, in the context of political misunderstandings and sterility of the political speech, in the aforementioned period, Romania had a Military Strategy approved in 2000, a White Charter of Defence approved in 2004, a National Security Strategy endorsed by the National Supreme Council of Defence in 2007 and a National Defence Strategy approved by the Parliament in 2008.

y The strategy identifies the courses of action specific to multiple dimensions, as consequence of enforcing the concept of wider security31. These dimensions - among which also education, health, diplomacy and economy - reflect a new strategic position of Romania and the importance that the state gives to the non-military dimensions of security. In the practice of security, the states with at least an average level of development focus regularly on the economic development and diplomacy, enrolling in this approach. The shift of the attention also towards other security directions can bring more security to Romania, by the social sustainable development.

y Promoting the predictability of Romania on the external level represents a crucial element for NDS. By reminding the importance that Romania gives to the EU membership and also to the US partnership, as well as the situation from the Black Sea region and Ukraine, NDS becomes the melting pot for presenting the priorities of foreign policy. Thus, it manages to offer a credible and predictable character to the allies, as well as to the hostile elements.

y The correlation of national security objectives with Romania's mandate to hold the Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2019. This idea appears at paragraph 19 of NDS and offers the strategy's raison d'être, acting as a catalyst for the political leadership, in the sense of justifying the high importance which NDS has in the European trajectory of Romania.

2.4. Threats

y The sustainability, acceptability and feasibility of NDS 2015 represent the neuralgic points of the approach of security planning and defence in Romania. To this end, it is ascertained the existence of the declaratory character of the strategy which, unfortunately, is not backed by the organisational function. Thus, NDS does not make the transition from the practical level to the correlation of courses of actions with the consequence of fulfilling the effects. Also, we cannot find out if the defence strategy can be fulfilled by the means available and neither which are the costs necessary to implement the courses of action. The lack of connecting the costs with the courses of action makes it impossible to continuously assess them, in order to highlight the opportunities, lacks, constrains or limitations. Also, the connection of defence with resources only from the competent ministry downwards32 represents an insufficient perspective for the national security. This happens because the security is not only in the charge of Ministry of National Defence, but in the charge of other institutions as well.

y The process of consultation regarding the adoption of the strategy has various minuses. The transparency and permanent character of security analysis do not seem to be regular, in the practice of adopting the strategy. They proceed artificially and time- limitedly to the adoption of a new strategy. The call for a specialized know-how, non-affiliated politically, could offer a fertile expertise in the process of preparing the NDS. The resources and their complex analyses can support the identification of possible future states of Romania and they can assess the impact of possible security measures. The United Kingdom is a good example of best practices in this area. It organizes various debates and public consultations on the subject of security strategy33.

y The regular review process of the strategy is also absent. The lack of a regular assessment mechanism for the implementation of objectives of NDS 2015 turns it into a document without power of action, far from being undertaken by the political leadership. The lack of a review process entails also allegations about the imperfections of a real democratic control on defence and security, which affects Romania's international position. In this regard, UK has a very well structured system regarding the annual review of the security strategy (British Defence and Strategic Review)34.

y The absence of a hierarchy system in relation to the seriousness of risks, threats and vulnerabilities makes it impossible to set the priorities of action, in order to address them and fight against them. The lack of hierarchy would be felt more widely if there was a correlation between the courses of action and the resources provided. Thus, the limitation of resources automatically leads to their distribution of priority courses of action.

y Presenting the vulnerabilities of national security can turn into a menace for the Romanian state. If the vulnerability represents a given, negative internal characteristic of Romania, then it must be spread only based on the principle of the need of knowledge. Analysing the sectorial strategies of the US and the Russian Federation, we ascertain that they use the term at general level and not at particular level, with the purpose of identifying a specific feature. Consequently, although the risks and threats are necessary for creating an international predictability of the Romanian state, publishing vulnerabilities in NDS 2015 becomes a potential menace to national security.

y Another element that fills in the field of SWOT analysis is the lack of identification and capitalization of security opportunities in the external and internal environment. In our opinion, opportunity represents using the potential of the security environment specific to a system, an entity (environment characterized by specific risks, vulnerabilities and threats) for its own purpose, with the aim of decreasing the intensity of the vector "less" security and augmenting the vector "more" security. Security opportunities are identified in relation to security features, risks, vulnerabilities and threats. The importance of opportunity is vital, because it offers a proactive character to the strategies and it eliminates the reactive character. Unfortunately, NDS 2015 makes no reference - as, for example, the Security Strategies from 2015 of US and the Russian Federation - to capitalizing security opportunities.

Conclusions and proposals

By overlapping international security environment's dynamics with the process of regenerating security strategies, it is ascertained that the last years forced the world's states to re-think their method of security planning. With obstacles coming from the world's economic crisis, security planning forced political leadership to decrease the budget and to re-think defence as a multi-size component, which can be insured by approaches such as pooling and sharing resources.

The evolutions of security in the last two years re-ascertained the need of successive reconfigurations to approach security planning, especially in the North-Atlantic Alliance. The re-distribution of resources for the increase of state's security gained more and more strict and justified values (for example optimizing the use of NATO capabilities).

In this context, the SWOT analysis that we conducted in reference to NDS 2015 represents a useful frame for security practitioners. Following the analysis, we ascertained the progresses that Romania made in the area of security (the concept wider security, the new law on defence planning, political support of NDS 2015). The SWOT analysis highlighted the elements which we must focus on. Thus, lack of transparency regarding consultations and the failure to mention the staff who prepared the strategy can bring criticism to Romania. Also, the absence of an initial analysis process of prior strategies' results influences in a negative way strategic planning. In this case, the political leadership cannot guess what was the influence of previous measures on national security. It would have been useful to have the analysis of objectives' fulfilment in channelling future efforts, but also in setting out new strategic posts for Romania. We can thus identify the need of a very well informed practice, from which there results the regular review of NDS and obviously the implementation of a process of evidence-based policies. At the same time, lack of an analysis on provided resources (including financial ones) is likely to transform the strategy in a declaratory document, without organisational power.

Taking into consideration also the progress made by Romania in the area of security and defence planning, we consider necessary to stimulate the insertion of certain modern and sustainable approaches in this area. From our point of view, a pattern of approach adapted to the needs of 2016 can be identified at the intersection between (1) implementing some evidence-based policies that would connect NDS to decisional transparency and regular assessment of elements of analysis; (2) making the correlation between objectives, outcomes and resources by use of the comparative analyses; (3) setting an hierarchy system of the risks, vulnerabilities and threats to the national security and identifying the opportunities which our country has, both internally and externally.

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research, CNCS - UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-0849.

Footnote

1 Benchmarking (comparative analysis) represents a method which aims at measuring the quality of policies, products, programs and strategies of an organisation, with the purpose of determining methods to increase their performances. A broad description of this method is done by Fifer (1989).

2 The concept of problem solving (critical analysis for problem settlement) is applied to multiple disciplines, each analysing it from various perspectives. The common feature in all cases is the focus on details specific to problem solving in order to reach a solution.

3 Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale , France, http://www.defence.gouv.fr/actualites/la-reforme/livre-blanc-2013, accessed on 10.02.2016.

4 The National Defence Directive of Spain, http://www. defensa.gob.es/defensa/politicadefensa/directivadefensa/, accessed on 10.02.2016.

5 Security Strategy for Society , Finland, http://www.defmin. fi/en/topical/press_releases/2011/the_security_ strategy_ for_society_now_available_for_download _in_english.4724.news, accessed on 10.02.2016.

6 The first Post-Communist attempt to prepare a strategy was registered in 1994. The project called The Integrated Concept regarding Romania's National Security - although publicly debated - was not turned into an official document. It was blocked by the cleavage within the National Salvation Front [Fondului Salvarii Nationale (FSN)] as consequence of mineriads and the resignation of the Prime-Minister of that time - Petre Roman. The text of the strategy was endorsed by The National Supreme Council for Defence [CSAT] in April 1994, later on not being adopted by the Parliament. The strategy resumed the principle of "strategic sufficiency", favoured the defensive role of the army, as well as the classical vision of UN for peace-keeping. Despite the non-approval of this document in the Parliament, the political leadership initiated - in a prudent and defensive tone - certain guiding lines for the increase of national security, by being open towards NATO and EU.

7 In 2004, there was issued the new Law No. 473 on Defence Planning, occasion on which the term for elaborating the strategy was extended by six months and it was decided the change of the name from Security Strategy to Defence Strategy, for a simple reason: the term security had been long time associated in the Romanian consciousness with the former Communist political police. Out of the same reasons, no amendment was accepted in reference to the change of the name from The Supreme Council for Defence into that of the National Security Council.

8 SWOT analysis focuses on strong points, weak points, opportunities and threats.

9 Law 203/2015 on Defence Planning, published in the Official Journal, 1st Part no. 555 from July 27th 2015, accessed on 14.02.2016.

10 These elements are adjusted by Law 203/2015. Article 4 of the law mentions that "The national strategy of the country's defence contains: (1) values, interests and national security objectives; (2) assessment of the international security environment; (3) potential military risks, menaces and vulnerabilities identified; (4) strategic objectives and priorities in the area of defence; (5) courses of action and main methods to insure Romania's national security in the area of defence."

11 The endeavours of Decourten, J. (1997) for the identification of the triad of acceptance, deterrence and protection; of Ole Waever and Barry Buzan (2006) regarding the evolutions and future challenges of strategies; of Rasmussen (2010) and Petersen (2012) regarding the interference of risk- related theories and observing them in strategies, are representative.

12 David C. Gompert, Paul K. Davis, Stuart E. Johnson, Duncan Long, Analysis of Strategy and Strategies of Analysis, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2008, pp. 10-25.

13 Ibidem, p. 23.

14 See the concepts of Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing used at the level of North-Atlantic Alliance.

15 H. Richard Yarger, Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model, http:// www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/stratpap.htm, website accessed on 08.02.2016.

16 Will the accomplishment of the strategy have consequences on the fulfilment of the desired effects?

17 Can the strategy be fulfilled with the means available to it?

18 Are the costs of the strategy justified in relation to the importance of the desired effects?

19 The studies of the Copenhagen school, Paris school, Welsh school, Frankfurt school and Manchester school are representative, offering fertile interpretations of security, starting from the critical image of security and reaching the critical studies of human security and securitization.

20 The Presidential Administration (2015), Romania's National Defence Strategy for 2015-2019 - A Strong Romania in Europe and the World, pp.14-16, www. presidency.ro, website accessed on 10.01.2016.

21 Ibidem.

22 Ibidem.

23 Ibidem.

24 This can be valid even for strategies belonging to other Presidential Administrations; some authors consider it a sine-quo-non condition of the strategy's success (for example Martinescu A.L. - 2015).

25 CM 9161 - National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, www.gov.uk/government/ publications, website accessed on 01.03.2016.

26 Sweden's Defence Policy 2016-2020, http://www. government.se/information-material/2015/06/swedens-defence-policy-2016-to-2020/, website accessed on 01.03.2016.

27 At paragraph 81 of NDS it is reminded the fact that "the fulfilment of its objectives (NDS) involves unified efforts at the level of the political class and the civil society and the efficient use of human, material and financial resources that our country possesses". NDS makes no distribution of resources depending on objectives.

28 RAND Corporation in the study Analysis of Strategy and Strategies of Analysis from 2008 made for The US Department of Defence underlines the importance that the benchmarking has next to other comparative analyses and next to the import of policies for the sectors of security where there is no know-how regarding the efficient use of resources and the fulfilment of strategic objectives.

29 Security Strategy for Society, www.defmin.fi, website accessed on 01.03.2016.

30 NDS 2015 was adopted with 282 positive votes, one against and one abstention, in six months since the appointment of the President. The lack of some majority decisions accepted in the political area led, in the previous President's mandate, to the situation in which NDS 2006 was adopted by The Supreme Council of National Defence on April 17th 2006 and the joint plenum of the Parliament approved it only on October 14th 2008. It is worth mentioning that Romania had, in 2007, a National Security Strategy approved by The Supreme Council of National Defence. Later on, in 2010, The Supreme Council of National Defence approved a new Defence Strategy caught in the seriousness of political debates.

31 Presidential Administration (2015), Op. cit., pp. 14-18.

32 According to Article 3 of Law 203/2015 on Defence planning.

33 The Report of the Session 2014-2015 related to the next National Security Strategy (2015) prepared by the Joint Committee of National Security Strategy is representative, available at http://www.parliament.uk/ business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/national-security-strategy/

34 In 2015, it was published together with the National Security Strategy.

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