Content area
Full Text
In many countries there are laws prohibiting the use of cloning and genetic engineering as methods of human reproduction. These laws are controversial. Commentators agree that coercive and state-directed uses of these reproductive technologies should be avoided. The controversy is about whether would-be parents should be allowed to use such technologies as tools (among others) for satisfying their reproductive desires.
Whether, when and how to reproduce are among people's most deeply held desires. They often have a central role in a person's self-conception, and the satisfaction or frustration of these desires has an important effect on our views about the quality and meaning of our life. Some authors have argued that we have a right to choose not only whether to have children or not but also when and by which method to have them, and that we should be allowed to use cloning and genetic engineering as reproductive methods if we wish to do so. 1- 4 Other authors claim that the extension of reproductive freedom to the use of these technologies is problematic, as it may interfere with the rights of those conceived through such methods. 5
One popular argument against the human use of cloning and genetic engineering for reproduction is that these procedures are not "safe" and may result in the birth of children with severe developmental abnormalities. This argument shows (at most) that these biotechnologies should not be used for reproductive purposes until (through, say, experimentation on non-human animals and other experimental procedures) they become as reliable as other accepted reproductive methods. But some commentators maintain that would-be parents should not be allowed to use cloning and genetic engineering even when these procedures become developmentally safe. In their view, these technologies undermine the autonomy of the resulting child. Many versions of this objection exist and I shall discuss two different versions. According to the first version, the autonomy of cloned and genetically engineered people is undermined because knowledge of the method by which these people have been conceived make them unable to assume full responsibility for their actions. 6 According to the second version, these biotechnologies undermine the autonomy of those conceived through such methods because they violate what Feinberg 7 calls their right to an open future. 8, 9