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In the introduction to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism (here- after PLP), published in 1996, John Rawls says that one of the require- ments for stability is "[sjociety as an employer of last resort" (PLP, lix).1 He explains: "[t]he lack of ... the opportunity for meaningful work and occupation is destructive ... of citizens' self-respect" (PLP, lix). The rela- tively obscure provenance of these claims might make one doubt how strongly Rawls believes them. But he repeats them verbatim three years later, in the text of The Law of Peoples (LP, 50). Rawls implies in these claims that the opportunity for meaningful work is a social basis of self- respect. This constitutes a significant shift in his account of self-respect, one that has been overlooked.2 In this paper, I examine it. I begin by clarifying Rawls's account of self-respect in A Theory of Justice (hereafter Theory), then consider some post-Theory developments in it. After exploring the nature of Rawls's commitment to the opportunity for meaningful work, I ask why he comes to think it is a social basis of selfrespect. I extract a partial answer from his writings, then speculate about his full reasoning. Finally, I consider whether Rawls is right that the opportunity for meaningful work is a social basis of self-respect. I give some reason to believe that he is.
While a principal purpose of this paper is to clarify and understand Rawls's account of self-respect, it is not of interest solely to those concerned about the proper interpretation of Rawls. It is of particular interest to Marxians: I show how Rawls's theory of justice evolved in a way that they long ago complained it should evolve. And it is of interest to political philosophers generally, as I make progress toward evaluating the claim that meaningful work is important for self-respect.
1. Rawls on the Nature of Self-Respect
According to Rawls, self-respect has two elements. The first is a sense of one's "value" or "worth" (TJ, 440 and TJ, 256, respectively), and in particular, the conviction that one's "conception of the good ... is worth carrying out" (TJ, 440). The second is "a confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's power, to fulfill one's intentions" (ibid.). In other...