Pure Aretaic Ethics and Character

The Journal of Value Inquiry (2004) 38: 473484

DOI: 10.1007/s10790-005-7253-z CPure Aretaic Ethics and CharacterROBERT F. CARDPiez Hall, Department of Philosophy, State University of New York, Oswego,

Oswego, New York 13126, USA; e-mail: [email protected], there have been popular books that advocate placing a serious emphasis on character education such as The Book of Virtues by William J.

Bennett.1 More substantially, there have been various philosophical works

which call for a revival of what might be called character or virtue ethics.

For instance, Alasdair MacIntyre maintains in After Virtue that moving away

from thinking about ethics in the way it was approached by the Greeks, with

a central concern on cultivating virtue and excellence in action, was a serious

mistake.2Virtue ethics possesses deep historical importance and its roots are directly traceable in Western philosophy to Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics.

MacIntyres call for a renewed interest in virtue ethics has been taken up by a

number of other contemporary philosophers, and virtue ethics is considered

one of the main competitors among philosophical theories of ethics. Regarding

this trend, Charles Larmore recently makes the following observation: Virtue

is back. During most of the last century, the word had an archaic ring. It suggested little more than chastity in women, and it was about as popular. Today,

virtue enjoys a new prestige, and owing to its long eclipse it seems a notion

full of promise, unlike the all-too-familiar language of rights and duties.3The topic of the proper role for virtue within morality possesses contemporary relevance as well. One specific way that virtue ethics is relevant to

contemporary philosophy concerns the familiar objection that consequentialist theories are overly demanding. This objection was suggested by Bernard

Williams in recent times and extended by him to deontological theories as

well.4 Given their commitment to impartial morality, such theorists cannot

allegedly allow firmness of purpose and character the pride of place that they

deserve within morality. With his reliance upon moral assessment in terms

of thick concepts, Williams is a virtue ethicist.5 He uses the demandingness

criticism of consequentialism and deontology to motivate virtue ethics as the

natural successor to the dominant impartial moral theories. The development

of virtue ethics as the main rival of impartial moral theories makes a thorough

assessment of...