The decision to establish Polish Special Forces Command within Polish Armed Forces was not hasty or dictated by an impulse or a significant event. After taking this step, all political authorities accountable for defining strategy and military authorities responsible for setting directions for Polish Armed Forces development cooperated, as they understood the idea, the role and the tasks of Special Operations Forces within the country's security system.
It is worth underlining that training of the Special Operations Forces Command used the philosophy of gradually achieving the final concept, which is supposed to reorganize the structures and create modular task structures in the prospect of several years or more. It is assumed that completing the plans and tasks to reorganize and modernize Special Operations Forces between 2009 - 2018 will allow increasing the number of Special Operations Forces combat components and significantly improving their combat capabilities and modern battle space effectiveness. The strength of Polish Special Operations Forces will consist of approximately 3% of all military personnel of Polish Armed Forces. Nowadays, the role of politicians is to create the proper environment to accomplish the plans for development, as well as the constant funding. The funding is much lower compared to the "conventional" Armed Forces, which seem so important in the age of the global, financial austerity.
Key-words: Polish Armed Forces (PAF), Special Operation Forces (SOF), security, capabilities, transformation, doctrine.
Introduction
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the elite of the modern armed forces in every country. Their legend is based upon exceptional effectiveness, together with the air of mystery and inaccessibility for an ordinary person. The rise of this legend results not only from their perfect technique and equipment, but mostly from the way the Special Operations Forces are deployed in due place and time.
In his book "On war", Carl von Clausewitz suggests using small troops to seize points decisive for the outcome of the conflict by quick marches and bold assaults1. Polish military theorist and commander, general Franciszek Skibinski adds: "wage a war so as to incur the smallest loss while inflicting the greatest"2.
1. Polish SOF - from the Second World War to 2005
Polish Special Operations Forces reach back to the times of the Second World War and the glorious traditions of a famous "Cichociemni" formation. It was in Great Britain where the Polish Armed Forces (PAF) had been established. "Cichociemni" were the specially trained soldiers, who conducted special tasks ordered by Staffof the Commander in Chief of the Polish Army and Special Operations Executive (SOE). They were deployed to Poland and other countries occupied by the Nazis, where they had conducted various combat missions. It was Great Britain Prime Minister Winston Churchil who first called this branch - Special Operations Forces. It was also in Great Britain where another unit of this kind was formed - 1stIndependent Commando Company. The unit was formed on 20th September, 1942 in the Scottish town of Cupar. The first and only commander was Captain Wladyslaw Smrokowski. Commando Company became a part of 10th International Commando. After training at the British commando centre in Achnaccary, Polish members of Commando took part in operations in Algeria and Italy. They also fought at Monte Cassino.
The special units were deployed on the Eastern Front. In October 1943, Polish Independent Special Battalion was formed. The Polish scouts were tasked to conduct sabotage and reconnaissance (recce) operations behind the enemy lines. The Battalion trained and later deployed 67 sabotage-recce groups. Polish Independent Special Battalion scouts joined Polish People's Army until battalion's disbanding. In occupied Poland there were also units such as "Parasol" and "Zoska" Home Army Battalions, which became a part of special operations tradition. Battalion "Parasol" was created in the summer of 1943 under an order of chief of KEDYW (Home Army Diversion Directorate), gen. Emil Fieldorf-Nil. Parasol soldiers became special operations experts. Between 1943 and 1944, they conducted 13 military actions. The best-known PARASOL operations include killing the commander of the prison at Pawiak Franz Bürckel and killing of Franz Kutschera, the Highest SS and Police Commander of the Warsaw District. "Zoska" battalion had its roots in the assault scout groups "Szare Szeregi". It was formed on 1st September 1943.
After the end of the Second World War, there were special companies in Polish People's Army as well as special companies in recce battalions on a division level. Among the most famous units from that time are 56th Special Company, 62ndSpecial Company and 1st Assault Battalion. It is also worth mentioning that in the mid-1970s, Polish Navy created Divers Research Team, which was restructured into Special Naval Frogmen Groups, better known as Formoza.
The changes taken place in the 1990s in the Polish Armed Forces influenced special operations units, too. After disbanding special companies and assault battalion, in 1993 Land Forces Command formed 1stSpecial Commando Regiment. Whereas in response to growing threat for the safety of Polish citizens Ministry of Internal Affairs had established Military Unit GROM in 1990.
In conclusion, in 2005 in Poland there were three special units - i.e. Military Unit GROM, 1st Special Commando Regiment, Special Naval Frogmen Groups subordinate to different commands, using different equipment and armament, with various levels of training and readiness for conducting special operations.
2. From 2005 onwards - adjusting to the new security environment
New challenges at the turn of the 21st century, which influenced the shape of the Polish Armed Forces resulted from the political, economic and military transformations in Europe and all over the world. After joining NATO in 1999 and European Union in 2004, Poland changed the way of thinking about national security. These matters were further complicated by global threats connected with tensions and instability caused by international terrorism, weapon of mass destruction proliferation and unpredictable policy of autocratic regimes. Those challenges also resulted from the deep differences in the development and the living standard between rich and poor societies, as well as uncontrolled migrations and ethnic tensions. Another aspect was the influence of negative environmental factors, such as water resources decline, desertification, increasing number of natural disasters and natural resources depletion.
These changes obviously influenced all Polish state institutions dealing with the security, comprising the Polish Armed Forces, Special Operations Forces included. Provisions made during the NATO summit in Prague in 2002 and NATO Summit in Riga in 2006 could not have been leftunanswered. Year 2006 seems to be of special importance, due to issuing of two alliance documents: amended policy of NATO Military Committee on special operations (Military Committee MC-437/1) and publication of so called NATO Special Operations Forces Transformation Initiative (NSTI). Thorough analysis of these documents influenced changes introduced from 2005 to 2007 in the Polish Special Operations Forces, regarding improvements in planning and coordination system and improvement of special units' combat capabilities. As a result of these changes, following Minister of National Defence decision from 10thAugust 2005, Special Operations Department in the StaffGeneral of Polish Armed Forces was transformed into Special Forces Directorate. Major General Jan Kempara became its first chief. The formation of Special Forces Directorate facilitated to a large extent coordination of training and operational activity of Special Operations Forces units. Immediate superiority of the Chief of StaffGeneral of Polish Armed Forces made the decision process shorter and limited access to restricted information for unauthorized people. The process of operational and specialized training for Special Operations Forces personnel was also initiated, both in the country and abroad. The number of course participants increased and so did the level of operational capabilities of Special Operations Forces officers. Thanks to the suitable structure and properly trained personnel Special Operations Forces Directorate could play a part of "catalyst" and "liaison" among various special units subordinate to different military branches commanders. However, it is fair to admit that Special Forces Directorate was too small (only 20 permanent posts) to perform a "managing" or "commanding" role for the special units. That is why, from the very beginning of its existence, Special Force Directorate attached particular importance to planning and analysis, which would lead to establishing Special Forces Command. Presentation of these efforts became possible while defining main directions for Special Operations Forces development within the framework of defence program for years 2007 - 2012 (Armed Forces planning system worked in six year planning periods then). Regarding the future threats and challenges, the recommendation for this program was the establishment of Special Operations Forces Command. Planning team recommendations were accepted by Minister of National Defence who, on 25thOctober 2006, issued a decision on founding Special Operations Forces Command on 1stJanuary 2007. This way, the efforts of many Special Operations Forces soldiers at all levels of command were rewarded.
3. Polish SOF Command - single Service of the Polish Armed Forces
Looking from today's perspective, the formation of Special Operations Forces Command was the beginning of a long and hard way to achieve capabilities to command Special Operations Forces units and conduct special operations. At first, Special Forces Command was deployed to the Bydgoszcz garrison. At that time (January 2007), Special Forces Command had a really diminutive number of posts (about 40 posts). Major General Edward Gruszka (from 2010 Operational Commander of the Polish Armed Forces) was appointed as its first commander.
It is worth mentioning that, although the formation of the new command brought significant changes into the Polish Armed Forces, the most revolutionary change was approving the Command as a new branch of Armed Forces Command on equal terms with Land Forces, Air Force and Navy Commands (as a new single service command). Not less revolutionary provisions concerned the way operational forces being deployed. Only the Special Operations Forces Commander is Force Provider, as well as Force User for conducted operations.
These provisions were also repeated in the National Security Strategy for the Republic of Poland from 24th May 2007 (articles 3 and 13a). Provisions in the act mentioned above concerning Special Operations Forces, were repeated in the National Security Strategy for the Republic of Poland. These provisions confirmed the status of Special Operations Forces within the Polish Armed Forces command system and defined tasks for them. One of the main goals was counteracting asymmetric threats and the necessity to cooperate with other public security institutions. It was also stressed that supporting the development of these forces is crucial in order to employ them in the most effective way3.
The next step was taken in 2009 by releasing sector strategy for National Security Strategy RP (i.e. Republic of Poland Defence Strategy), where the role and position of Special Operations Forces were strongly emphasized. However, one of the most important issues is to determine scope of operations - both in the country and abroad, in times of peace, crisis or war4. As far as year 2007 is concerned, it should be stressed that the key objective for the Special Forces Command was taking command over special units. The process was not easy, as it required a number of organizational and administrative changes in previous special units functioning in times of peace and was completed in October 2007, when all special units became subordinate to Special Operations Forces Command. It should be indicated that Polish Special Forces were concurrently involved in conducting special operations in Iraq. From the moment Special Forces Command was founded, it encountered many problems resulting from its weak structure and lack of dedicated command support (including information support) and logistics support elements. These were two main problems identified as future requirements for the operational capabilities for years 2007 - 2012. As a reaction to these problems, a new Special Operations Forces unit was formed on 2nd December 2008 - Special Operations Forces Support Unit. Its main tasks comprise information support, command and communication support, logistic support, armament and equipment purchases. Special Forces Command formation and appointing MG Wlodzimierz Potasinski as its commander resulted in establishing widespread international contacts, including those with American Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). It considerably extended the scope of mutual exercises and trainings at the tactical level (Special Operations Forces Units). However, even more important factor, considering education in the field of planning special operations on the modern operations theatre, was training personnel to plan and conduct such operations by Polish Special Operations Forces. The consequence of this cooperation was the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2009 between Polish Ministry of National Defence and United States Department of Defence concerning establishment of partnership between US SOCOM and Polish Special Operations Forces Command. At the same time, further Polish Special Operations Forces development had been forged internationally. Poland declared its willingness to join the elite of NATO countries having special operations command capability by forming Special Operations Component Command (SOCC). Initially, the deadline to achieve this capability was set on 2012; later, however, due to numerous operational factors, it had been postponed until 2014. It was entailed with further challenges for the Special Operations Forces, such as transfer from the tactical level (section/groups/ teams), i.e. executors to the planning level, i.e. decision makers. It was also meaningful for the development of Special Operations Forces and achieving special air operations capability. Due to the character and small size of Polish Special Operations Forces, a decision was made to place this capability within Polish Air Force as a squadron capable of conducting special air operations by means of both fixed and rotary wing aircraft. The first elements of the Special Operations Squadron (Special Operations Air Task Group - SOATG) are supposed to achieve combat readiness in 2013.
Another challenge, related to attaining allied forces command capability and national level special operations, was the need to provide combat support and force protection. These functions were performed by the Land Forces dedicated subunits, usually airborne or airmobile ones. However, it was necessary to keep the conducted operations secret as well as increase Special Operations Forces combat capabilities thus another combat unit, subordinate to Special Forces Command, had to be formed. Consequently, in June 2011, Military Unit Agat was established. Upon reaching full combat readiness, it will become the substantial reinforcement for the units already in use, taking from their shoulders the burden of tasks connected with combat support, base protection and units' security.
All in all, it is worth noticing that in 2011 Polish Special Operations Forces acquired its final structure, consisting of: three combat components - Military Units GROM, Commando and Formoza and two support components units - combat support Military Unit AGAT and combat service support Military Unit NIL. Special Operations Forces Commander also performs operational command over Special Operation Squadron (SOATG). It must be emphasized that Polish Special Operations Forces development was defined in details during the process of planning Polish Armed Forces development for 2009 - 2018 (in ten-year planning period, according to the new planning policy as well as allied mediumterm planning policy). As a result, "Plan of Special Operations Forces development 2009 - 2018" was prepared. It was accepted by Chief of the General Staffof the Polish Armed Forces and then by the Minister of National Defence.
4. The future of Special Operations Forces
The analysis of trends in Special Operations Forces development in other countries and publication of allied doctrinal documents, especially the latest edition of so called "Capability Codes and Statements" indicates leaving the traditional way of estimating combat capabilities by means of quantity. Nowadays, Special Operations Forces development planners' attention is drawn to acquiring capabilities, which are necessary to accomplish tasks in a modern, non-linear battle environment and facing asymmetric threats. The same situation applies to Polish Special Operations Forces, which are at the beginning of a long and tedious process of achieving full combat capabilities within the functional areas defined in both allied and national documents. This trend appears to match perfectly one of SOF truths: quality is better than quantity. Especially, if we consider Special Operations Forces ability to maintain the highest level of readiness and to accomplish the highest priority and most difficult tasks, their high mobility and flexibility.
It must be also stressed that "capability" approach will not interfere in any possible way with undertaking tasks defined in "Plan of Special Operations Forces development 2009 - 2018", but it will allow to maintain the leading role in the field of special operations in the Central and Eastern Europe region. It is seems obvious, though, that Special Operations Forces will remain "the Polish specialty" in NATO and the Polish way of development will set trends for other countries building their special operations capabilities. Polish Special Operations Forces can also become a perfect tool in the hands of political and military decision makers to ensure a place by the negotiating table during modern NATO operations. One of the consequences of such an approach might be obtaining NATO SOF Framework Nation status (NATO SOF FN) and acquiring special operations combat capabilities by assigning Special Operations Component Command (SOCC). This trend resulted in signing in 2009 a strategic cooperation memorandum between Polish Special Operations Forces Command and United States Special Operations Command. In 2011, Polish Special Forces Command signed a memorandum and became strategic partner for Croatian Special Operations Forces in their development, which confirmed the key role of Polish Special Operations Forces.
Conclusions
It is worth remembering that the Polish way of creating Special Operations Forces combat capabilities not only allows for successful conduct of international operations, but also facilitates increasing Special Operations Forces capabilities for carrying out independent special operations. The scope of these operations is: strategic defence operations to maintain territorial integrity and independence, Polish citizens' evacuation from conflict areas, hostage rescue in Poland and abroad, preventing the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and terrorist threat response.
The key to success was not only planning the development, but first of all close and welltimed accomplishment of all connected tasks. At the present stage of Special Operations Forces development, it must be underlined that there are no plans to form new special units. On the other hand, the focal point of changes will move towards obtaining new capabilities in the field of planning and conducting special operations as well as improving combat capabilities of existing units. Probably such trend will be drafted in "Plan of Special Operations Forces development 2013 - 2022".
NOTES:
1 C. von CLAUSEWITZ, On War, Polish Ed., Warszawa 1958, p. 32.
2 F. SKIBINSKI, Rozwazania o sztuce wojennej, Warszawa 1990, p. 24.
3National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2007, p. 25
4Defence Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2009, p. 22
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
1. CLAUSEWITZ von, Carl, On War, Polish Ed., Warszawa 1958.
2. Defence Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2009.
3. DRECKI, Miroslaw, Na sciezkach polskich komandosów, Wydawnictwo LTW, 1999.
4. KRÓLIKOWSKI, Hubert, 1 Samodzielna Kompania Commando, Wydawnictwo Bellona, 2011.
5. LESKI, Kazimierz, Zycie niewlasciwie urzomaicone, Finna Ofificyna Wydawnicza, 2009.
6. National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2007.
7. OLTON, Michal, Zanim uderzyl GROM. Historia jednostek specjalnych i wojsk powietrznodesantowych Wojska Polskiego, Wydawnictwo ZP, 2011.
8. RYBAK, Jaroslaw, Lubliniec.pl. Cicho i skutecznie. Tajemnice najstarszej jednostki specjalnej Wojska Polskiego, Wydawnictwo CreatioPR, 2011.
9. SKIBINSKI, Franciszek, Rozwazania o sztuce wojennej, Warszawa 1990.
10.SLEDZINSKI, Kacper, Cichociemni Elita Polskiej Dywersji, Wydawnictwo Znak, 2012.
11. TUCHOLSKI, Jedrzej, Cichociemni. Historia legendarnych spadochroniarzy, Wydawnictwo Dolnoslaskie, 2010.
Boguslaw PACEK, PhD*
* Major General Bogus3aw PACEK, PhD, associate professor, is Rector-Commandant of National Defence University in Warsaw, Poland. E-mail: [email protected]
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Copyright "Carol I" National Defence University 2012
Abstract
The decision to establish Polish Special Forces Command within Polish Armed Forces was not hasty or dictated by an impulse or a significant event. After taking this step, all political authorities accountable for defining strategy and military authorities responsible for setting directions for Polish Armed Forces development cooperated, as they understood the idea, the role and the tasks of Special Operations Forces within the country's security system. It is worth underlining that training of the Special Operations Forces Command used the philosophy of gradually achieving the final concept, which is supposed to reorganize the structures and create modular task structures in the prospect of several years or more. It is assumed that completing the plans and tasks to reorganize and modernize Special Operations Forces between 2009 - 2018 will allow increasing the number of Special Operations Forces combat components and significantly improving their combat capabilities and modern battle space effectiveness. The strength of Polish Special Operations Forces will consist of approximately 3% of all military personnel of Polish Armed Forces. Nowadays, the role of politicians is to create the proper environment to accomplish the plans for development, as well as the constant funding. The funding is much lower compared to the "conventional" Armed Forces, which seem so important in the age of the global, financial austerity. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
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Neither ProQuest nor its licensors make any representations or warranties with respect to the translations. The translations are automatically generated "AS IS" and "AS AVAILABLE" and are not retained in our systems. PROQUEST AND ITS LICENSORS SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES FOR AVAILABILITY, ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, COMPLETENESS, NON-INFRINGMENT, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Your use of the translations is subject to all use restrictions contained in your Electronic Products License Agreement and by using the translation functionality you agree to forgo any and all claims against ProQuest or its licensors for your use of the translation functionality and any output derived there from. Hide full disclaimer