PEACE CONFERENCE IN BUCHAREST IN 1913 AND THE POLICY OF THE GREAT POWERS (II)

Abstract

Peace Conference in Bucharest in 1913 has usually been analyzed in the Romanian historiography, in terms of conducting negotiations between former belligerents, so that the peace treaty concluded on this occasion was often presented as an act of South-East European states that had been involved in the conflict, done without any involvement of the Great Powers. The author of this study provides a new perspective approach, analyzing the policy of the Great Powers, located in opposite political-military groups, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Agreement, in order to influence decision making in line with their own interests in the region. In this context, the author highlights the unique role of Romania in restoring peace in an area that was seen by the contemporaries of the events as "the powder keg of Europe".

Headnote

Abstract: Peace Conference in Bucharest in 1913 has usually been analyzed in the Romanian historiography, in terms of conducting negotiations between former belligerents, so that the peace treaty concluded on this occasion was often presented as an act of South-East European states that had been involved in the conflict, done without any involvement of the Great Powers. The author of this study provides a new perspective approach, analyzing the policy of the Great Powers, located in opposite political-military groups, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Agreement, in order to influence decision making in line with their own interests in the region. In this context, the author highlights the unique role of Romania in restoring peace in an area that was seen by the contemporaries of the events as "the powder keg of Europe".

Keywords: the interests of the warring states, the interests of the Great Powers, "Knight problem", "Adrianopol problem", the problem of peace treaty revision, the problem of organizing a conference of the Great Powers, the issue of balance of power in the Southeastern Europe, the role of Romania in restoring peace.

On August 6, 1913 Blondel informed Pichon that "the agreement on all points is established and peace is concluded. Serbia gave up Stroumitza and keeps Ichtip, Kotchana and Radvichta. Greece keeps Cavala and Drama"1. The next day, Sir Edward Grey, having been previously informed of this fact, transmitted the following telegram to Sir G. Barclay: "Without expressing any opinion on the merits of the terms of peace [...] you should congratulate the Romanian government that peace was signed in Bucharest"2.

On August 7, 1913, in Paris Panafieu transmitted the following telegram on behalf of the Bulgarian government: "Driven by the desire to finally see peace restored in the Balkans, the desire which had been expressed several times by the Great Powers, the royal government just gave its delegates at the conference in Bucharest the necessary instructions in order to sign the difficult peace treaty that was imposed. At the same time, giving a new proof of his love of peace, the Royal Government has decided to proceed immediately after signing to demobilize its army, despite the danger, the more threatening today than ever, of the Turkish invasion in southern Bulgaria. The royal government decision is determined by deep conviction that the Great Powers, who, as mediator, have called for the establishment Enos-Midia line border and will soon appreciate the true worth of the peaceful feelings of Bulgaria, and will impose Turkey to observe the Treaty of London, spoke under their auspices ...".3

The same day, Blondel informed Paris that "yesterday, Minister of Russia, following the example of the Austrian minister, notified the Romanian Government that the Russian Government reserves the right to revise the treaty regarding Cavala". The French diplomat added that "it is shown generally less satisfaction with this measure and the newspapers this morning consider it as an unfriendly proceeding".4

Noting the intentions of Austrian-Hungary and Russia to submit the peace treaty to be revised by the Great Powers, the French and English diplomacy have felt the need for consultation. In this regard, a meeting took place between Sir Edward Grey and Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London on August 7, 1913. The French Ambassador reported the content of the discussion in a report to Pichon: "I asked the Secretary of Foreign state if the British government has set views on this subject. Sir Edward Grey replied that he spoke in a general way about choosing a meeting place in case the conference will become necessary and that he himself indicated Paris, but it did not foresee any need for this meeting. As for now, he said, we must maintain the Treaty of Bucharest as valid, we reserve the examination and approval, but this test does not entail a complete overhaul, it must only aim to allow the Powers to make observations, on the issues of detail that they may believe that their interests are harmed. The natural shape of these observations is a communication to the Powers that will change their views on that issue through diplomatic channels. I remarked to Sir Edward Grey that his opinion is consistent with that of the German government and that, moreover, if Austria would insist on a conference we could oppose the precedent set by itself during the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it rejected any proposal of a conference when she claimed an endorsement by way of exchange of views between governments."5 Thus, Britain and France agreed to drop the idea of a conference of the Great Powers, to revise the Treaty of Bucharest.

The reasons for which Russia demanded the revision of the peace treaty of Bucharest were presented by Russian Ambassador N. Schebeko to his French counterpart, Blondel, who in turn told them to Pichon "My Russian colleague explained to me his approach as follows: "We have to give satisfaction to our very excited public opinion, showing them that we will protest against the decision of the Conference that awards Cavala to Greece and reduces considerably the length and importance of the Mediterranean coastline claimed by Bulgaria. Even if our intervention would remain futile, we were forced to do so. We think alike to let Bulgaria to accept the treaty leaving them the hope of a review." Besides these domestic political reasons and general policy that do not justify the zeal shown by the Russian Minister to act even before being formally ordered, continued Blondel, there are other reasons of more personal nature. Mr. Schebeko is longing to be appointed ambassador to Vienna; he received the promise and his influence for several weeks had to be exercised in Petersburg for the purposes of an agreement with Austria (author's underlignment), which would prepare a warm welcome to Ballplatz. Secondly, my Russian colleague has often let me guess the explanation of his attitude in the sense that manifests in Petersburg and that he felt himself to see Romania managed to settle a matter that Russia tried in vain to settle (author's underlignment). He has several times expressed his fears about the influence that Romania may seek to pursue successfully upon the Slavic peoples! These are - concluded Blondel - the genuine motives that inspired my colleague's feverish activity with which he was reproached bitterly by some newspapers in Bucharest and political figures who had known him." In this sense Blondel cites an article "quite violent" appeared in the official newspaper of the Liberal Party, signed by former Minister of Finance Costinescu, "the most considerable man in the party after Mr Br?tianu" criticizing "foreign interference in matters of interest for all independent nations." It was equally concerned in that Article, the Austrian approach, "this friend who is shirking in critical moments and is thinking more about his own interests than those of Romania".

In the same report, Blondel notes that the press was "unanimous" in determining the outcome of peace negotiations and "the skillful manner in which Mr. Maiorescu led the Conference discussions." Also Blondel stated that "all the logs in Bucharest highlight the moral support that France brought to Romania and note that in the critical moments of history it was by the side of Romania". The Romanian Prime Minister - specified Blondel - wanted to thank him personally for "the friendly and disinterested support" which he had offered "without officially interfering in the peace negotiations that had just ended."6

If in Romania France's attitude during the Peace Conference brought satisfaction, in Russia it brought more annoyance. Delcassé advised Pichon that "the Russian press presented the assignment of Cavalia to Greece as a failure for Russia", largely due to the support given by France to Greece. France was accused also of having prevented Russia "to compel the Turks, by quick action, to recoil Enos-Midia line." Sazonov himself, said Delcassé, criticized France that while he supported the idea of financial pressure on Turkey, by refusing any credit, "Turkey has achieved in France new resources".7

In response, Pichon denied the intervention of the French government in the development of some private agreements, regarding an alleged aid of France to Turkey8 and then he clarified the attitude of France in "Cavalia problem," not to Petersburg accredit the idea that the position of Paris would question the alliance between the two countries. Thus, on August 9, 1913, the French foreign minister wrote to Delcassé: "The imperial government (of Russia - author's note) has never notified us with any suggestion regarding Cavala. It has never invited us to examine our common behavior that we might have in this business. We did not intervene at all. On the contrary, we gave Mr. Blondel precise instructions to not interfere and let the belligerents to treat conditions of peace between them without any interference from us. It is true that responding to government requests of Athens, the Government of the Republic confidentiality let him know that he will not make any objections to the assignment of Cavala to Greece and I have never kept secret to the imperial government this manner of interpretation, justified by our traditional policy, by careful Mediterranean balance, by the conditions of war between Bulgaria and Greece, by the victories and sacrifices of the latter, by the attitude towards Germany, and finally and especially by the certainty that I had about the resumption of hostilities in the event of failure of an attempted settlement of the dispute. But our alliance was never called into question (author's underlignment) on this subject by Mr. Sazonov and only in very recent conversations with Mr. Izvolski it made me foresee a possible divergence in the policy of the two allied countries. [...] I have no doubt that a very complete explanation that you will give to Mr. Sazonov will dissipate this misunderstanding"9.

England's position in "Cavalia problem" and hence a revision of the peace treaty was more nuanced and, therefore, gave the possibility of confusion in interpretation. Sir Edward Grey, therefore, wished to clarify his point of view during a discussion he had with the French ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, on August 8, 1913. The French ambassador reported thus in a report to Pichon: "Contrary to what was announced in several newspapers, the British government did not instruct the Minister of Bulgaria to declare that the decisions of the Balkan states should be subjected to review of the Powers; he has not ruled on this issue put in a general manner, but only on the proposal of Mr. Maiorescu on August 1, reserving the final approval of the Powers for the assignment of Cavala, and, at the suggestion of the Romanian minister, the cabinet of London responded in the same way as Your Excellency (France - author's note): Minister of England in Bucharest, Sir G. Barclay, was authorized to rally to the proposal of Mr. Maiorescu, if all Powers accepted it. After receiving these instructions, it seems that Sir G. Barclay met with all his colleagues, except the minister of France, and that, in conversations with them, he concluded that their governments accepted the proposal of Mr. Maiorescu, to which he thought he could join on behalf of the government of Britain. This was the approach that was interpreted as a British statement that tended to review all the stipulations of the future treaty in Bucharest. The King of Greece was informed and he directly instructed his minister in London to express his vineyard wonder to the attitude of Sir Edward Grey; he replied to Mr Gennadios that he did not decide the review of the Treaty of Bucharest by the Powers and telegraphed to the Ministry of England in Romania to ask for explanations. I read the reply of Sir Barclay; it is very confusing and leaves the impression that he misunderstood the very clear instructions Foreign Office".10

Indeed, the answer may create such an impression. Instead, the report by Sir G. Barclay, on August 8, 1913, and perhaps for this reason is of impeccable clarity. This document is a detailed overview of all meetings of the Peace Conference, including discussions behind the scenes, which undoubtedly influenced the decisions contained in the Treaty. From this point of view we consider the document as a historical source of the utmost importance for the historical research of the issue of Peace Conference in Bucharest. In accordance with the subject of this paper, we will refer only to aspects of "Cavalia problem" and hence, that of the revision of the peace treaty, not only to bring further clarifications on the position of England, but also to highlight the attitude and role of ambassadors of the Great Powers in Bucharest, which were important undoubtedly for making decisions regarding the treaty of peace, but, especially, to highlight the exceptional contribution of the Romanian delegation to the conclusion of peace. We believe, we can prove that in fact belligerents shaped their attitudes during the talks according to the reactions of the Great Powers, and in our opinion, the idea historiography accredited, that the peace in Bucharest was exclusively peace of small states, without any interference from the Great Powers, was exaggerated. 11 From this document it is clear that in fact the whole dispute over the issue of the review, regarding the port statement about Cavala, was based on diplomatic maneuvering imagined by Take Ionescu. Basically, fueling the intention of submitting the treaty revision of the Great Powers, but in one issue (of course, Cavala), Venizelos softened his intransigence, but this gave the Bulgarians the illusion of a possible revision. In this way it could overcome a deadlock that could disrupt the conference and the resumption of hostilities.

"Since the first time - told Sir G. Barclay in his report to Sir Edward Grey -it seemed that the issue of Cavala and of the district will prove to be the most dangerous obstacle. Cavala is desired by both countries, not only as a harbor, but also because of tobacco revenues without rival nurseries in the district and both sides seemed that they would not succumb till the decisive meeting of August 6, when the concession had been made easier for the Bulgarian delegation, in that the two Great Powers most directly interested in the Balkan problem made each of them a special reserve to Maiorescu regarding the right of Powers to review any decision taken at the Conference on the fate of Cavala.

The circumstances leading to the action of the Austrian and Russian ministers are briefly as follows: in the second day of the conference had become obvious that the problem of Cavalia will create many difficulties. Bulgarian delegation proved to be stubborn in this regard and Mr Venizelos has proven to not be willing to compromise. His Excellency told the Romanian delegates and some of my colleagues that although he will not succumb to the Conference, Greece will succumb to pressure of the Great Powers, if they were united in their insistence that Bulgaria should have Cavala. Under these circumstances, Mr. Take Ionescu suggested during a visit to the Russian Legation (author's underlignment), on July 31, 1913, that in order to prevent an interruption of the conference, the representatives of the Great Powers should be authorized to declare to Mr. Maiorescu that whatever decision that will reach the Conference on Cavala, the Great Powers reserve the right to revise the decision. At a meeting the same evening at the Russian Legation at which there were present all the representatives of the Powers, except the French Minister, it was decided that each should ask his permission to government to make the proposed declaration. French Minister telegraphed also to his government the next morning. Governments' responses to the proposal of the ministers were varied. German Minister had not received any authorization until that statement might be needed, and the French Minister was authorized to do so only if it is asked specifically from Mr. Maiorescu as President of the Conference. Both the French government and the German government are obviously keen to avoid any possible review of the arrangements reached in Bucharest. You, Sir, you were kind enough to authorize me [...] to join the proposed declaration, if all my colleagues will receive similar instructions, namely that the statement about Cavala could not hinder the Powers to review other points if they thought it was necessary. I informed Mr Maiorescu on this telegram dated August 3, leaving an aide-mémoire containing them. Italian minister had to make the declaration only if his colleagues did the same thing. Russian Minister had no instructions, but he received a telegram stating that his government was in favor of a declaration in a form similar to that which I have been authorized to use. Austrian minister was the only one of my colleagues who was unconditionally authorized to make the statement and did so on August 4 and the Russian minister followed on 6 August. The latter did not yet receive clear instructions, but since the most critical meeting of the Conference was to be held that afternoon, he assumed the responsibility and his action was subsequently approved.

The story that I told on the circumstances in which the proposal was made that the situation of Cavala to be reserved to the Powers makes me say - continued Barclay - a few words about the roles played by the representatives of the Great Powers in Bucharest during the Conference. German minister and I were just spectators, although, as I explained above, I joined the proposal on Cavala, in belief that, even if it were partially adopted, as the case was, it would facilitate the conclusion of peace by making it easier for Bulgarian delegation concessions that otherwise would have been very hard for them (author's underlignment). The attitude of my French colleague was neutral and he frequently expressed his regret to me that this was not the attitude of all his colleagues. His opinion was that, in the interests of general peace, the states of the Conference should be able to solve problems without the interference of the Great Powers; he sincerely condemned the proposal to the Romanian government that any arrangement regarding the distribution of territories should be ratified by the Great Powers. As it has already been said, the attitude of Mr. Blondel was a neutral one, but I should mention that he seized an opportunity that arose during the decisive meeting of the Conference in the afternoon of August 6th of this month to impose the need for conciliation to the Greek Prime Minister. Mr. Blondel went to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at 18 hours, when the meeting is expected to be finished, in order to learn the outcome of the meeting. He learned that a deadlock occured between Greeks and Bulgarians regarding a certain strategic position. The official meeting was adjourned to give both parties the opportunity to reach an agreement. By chance, they agreed. Mr. Venizelos met Mr. Blondel in one of the rooms. There were present Mr. Maiorescu and Mr. Blondel joined the latter in his attempts to make Mr. Venizelos to give up (author's underlignment), so that Mr. Venizelos agreed on condition that General Coanda, the head of the Romanian military delegation, to give assurances as a man of honor and military expert, that the Greeks will not be at a military disadvantage, if they accepted, instead of the disputed standpoint, an alternative that was suggested by Bulgaria. It was an assurance given by General Coanda and the Greeks and Bulgarians came to an understanding.

The remaining three representatives were all active, the Russian Minister by direct pressure on Serbs, and the Austrian Minister by using his influence on the Romanian government to moderate, with his help, the claims of the allies (author's underlignment). Both, as we have already reported, made statements regarding Cavala, and the Austrian Minister had similar reservations about Kochana, the problem of the situation of a city, also seemed to be an obstacle at a time. The Italian minister proved to be active in supporting Bulgaria, which infuriated not only Mr. Blondel, but even Mr. Schebekoy. I heard from reliable sources that at one point, he supported so much the Bulgarians that he urged on the Romanian representatives to threaten the Allies, that if they do not give up their demands, Romania will separate from their cause, and that later, on the eve of the decisive meeting on August 6th, he advised the Bulgarian delegation to continue to be stubborn for a period of time regarding Cavala in the hope that all the representatives of the Great Powers will soon be able to join in their reservations about that place - a dangerous advice given the fact that the suspension of hostilities was to expire in less than two days.

In conclusion - completed Sir G. Barclay his report to Sir Edward Grey - I would add a few words regarding the position of Romania. Through its participation in the recent war, it not only won the frontier it had wanted, but it frustrated Bulgaria's claims of hegemony in the Balkans, and despite a harsh criticism of a part of the British press, I think that, in light of recent events, a more fair verdict would be that Romania deserved all the best from Europe (author's underlignment). There is no doubt that Bulgaria's appetite for conquest was increased by the success against Turkey. It made no secret that it wanted new victories and wanted to get all the territories inhabited by ethnic Bulgarians which remained in possession of the neighboring states. It might be claimed that the current understanding that stopped Bulgaria to become stronger than its neighbors ensured a lasting peace, but either way it were, the Romania's intervention had in any case the effect to shorten the current war or to facilitate the conclusion of peace. And as I ventured to remark [...], it had the role to reduce the risk of an active intervention from Austria. Romania did not take advantage of its favorable position to demand exorbitant concessions, and its influence at the conference was used to moderate the demands of the allies and to prevent an excessive rise of Bulgaria, a course in strict accordance with the principle that it aimed to keep - namely, the principle of balance of powers in the Balkans. Its intervention seems to me that it excluded a project as dangerous as a general review of the arrangement reached now (author's underlignment). I understand that Austria and Russia are the only Great Powers which are willing to insist on a review, but whatever language would be used by the media in Austria and Russia in this moment, I feel it is a reasonable assumption that the softness against Romania and the desire that each of the Powers has for closer relations with this country will make the two governments to give up to insist on a course that would be regarded by Romania as an affront to its sovereign and of itself (author's underlignment). In this connection, I should mention that the Russian minister, though bothered by decisions taken at the Conference on Cavala and on the Serbian border, it doesn't seem to anticipate that its government will insist on reviewing the reached decision by the Great Powers".12

The desire shown by the government in Vienna to review the Bucharest peace treaty caused great discontent in Romanian public opinion. It was proved that the Dual Monarchy was losing more and more of its political influence in the Romanian capital, and it was increasingly emphasized the anti-Austrian mood. Basically, at the level of the public opinion, there was prolonged, with a lower intensity, however, the trend expressed during mobilization of the Romanian army. It turned out that there were developments in the mood of Romanians entered on a course which became irreversible and dominated by a significant anti-Habsburg component. Blondel recorded in this regard on August 8th, 1913: "The Austro-Hungarian Government committed another mistake by taking a position in favor of a revision of the Treaty in Bucharest, which welcome all opponents of the old Romanian policy to take advantage of it." Reporting on anti-Austrian media campaign in the Romanian capital, Blondel also noted that "other newspapers, in a less brutal form, perhaps, but just as compelling, happily welcoming the signing of the peace treaty, begin a campaign in favor of an alliance between Romania, Serbia and Greece, an alliance in which, by the force of things, Bulgaria might be later interested, overcoming the disastrous situation that it had passed, and perhaps even the resigned Turkey. [...] Many Romanian statesmen are ready to pursue these efforts." If Austro-Hungary lost the sympathies of the Romanians, there were amplified instead the positive ones for France. "Thanks to its attitude during the recent events - continued Blondel - and especially during the discussions of the Conference in Bucharest, France saw a more fortified influence which the countries it had morally supported and defended were ready to recognize it, and for now, in Romania, as well as in Serbia, Greece and Montenegro, there existed sincere gratitude, that was confessed to me unanimously". Instead, Blondel recorded a decrease in the influence of France in Bulgaria, which "does not ignore the opinion of the Government of the Republic concerning the award of Cavala to Greece"13

Germany was definitely against the revision of the peace treaty. Manneville, French charge d'affaires in Berlin advised Pichon that the under-Secretary of State Zimmermann assured him that "in the German government thinking, Europe will have to accept the division of territories which the Balkan powers had already made between them." Zimmermann believed that "the review desired by Russia and Austria would not be possible unless the Powers could agree on the manner in which the review would be done. However, this cannot be determined on the basis of unanimity, as the review desired by Russia is not the one desired by Austria. All that Europe will have to do will be to take note of the decisions adopted in Bucharest". Zimmermann enjoyed the point of view of the German government coincided with that of the French government, and he hoped that Paris will be able to convince Petersburg to adopt the same position, as the German government will act in the same sense in Vienna. 14 Regarding the problem of evacuation of Adrianople by the Turks, Zimmermann came up with a new idea that he communicated, personally, to the same French diplomat: "If nobody wants to embark on a military expedition, he doesn't see what could Europe do and he assured me -Manneville told Pichon this opinion - that he is inclined to think that Europe simply let the Turks and Bulgarians to make an agreement between them."15

The point of view of the French government on the issue of treaty revision practically coincided with the one of the British government. Pichon, the French foreign minister, was asking the French ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, Sir Edward Grey to transmit his consent in relation to the position expressed by the Foreign Office on August 7, 1913. In this way the two countries agreed that it was not necessary to undergo the peace treaty to a general revision "by way of a European conference or otherwise." According to the concept of the two Great Powers of the Entente Cordiale, "it would be sufficient that the Powers examined and changed their points of view, depending on which they deserved to make observations."16

On August 10th, 1913 the peace treaty was signed in Bucharest. In its preamble there was specified: "Their Royal Majesties of Romania, the King of Greece, the King of Montenegro and the Serbian king, on the one hand, and His Majesty the King of Bulgaria, on the other hand, inspired by the desire to end the state of war that existed in present between their respective countries, willing, out of a sense of order to establish peace between their peoples, which were so far tested, they decided to conclude a final peace treaty (author's underlignment)".17 In his closing of the Conference, Titu Maiorescu, reached the pinnacle of his political career, said: "We can split being conscious that we have endeavored to defend the interests of the states which we represent, and with the feeling that the personal connections we created during our joint work will be the forerunner of the good relations to be established between our countries".18

The same day, Delcassé informed Pichon that he met Tsar Nicholas II who declared him the following: "Finally, peace has been concluded. It will last as long as it will be possible. three years, four years. It is always like this. Let's take advantage of it". The French diplomat asked in reply: "Does Your Majesty therefore consider the treaty in Bucharest as definitive". "Yes, replied the Tsar, but now it must act to implement the Treaty of London. We did accept the unpleasant parts, such as Albania. The other parts should not remain a dead letter." Recounting this question the head of French diplomacy, Delcassé showed that "this allusion to the reoccupation of Adrianople by the Turks is significant. Here it is another fact which shows that Russia does not think to resign."19

Delcassé explained in another report on August 10th, 1913 that Berchtold informed Petersburg that "the Treaty in Bucharest should be reviewed, especially in the Serbian-Bulgarian frontier side. He noted the points on which the review should be done. In reply, to divert Austria from this project, however, to prevent its success, Sazono had the intention not to protest the award of Cavala to Greece". Delcassé encouraged Sazonov in this attitude, but he was skeptical about attracting Greece with the Triple Agreement. He said that "in the case of Greece, far away to consider it in the future as a friend of the Triple Entente, it will switch to the Triple Alliance camp, especially after Italy under pressure manifested by Germany gave up supporting the claims of Bulgaria uppon Cavalia." 20 Such lack of insight is forthcoming revision of the peace treaty. However, it is evident that diplomatic chancelleries of the Great Powers, began to develop projects based on new realities and political state in Southeastern Europe, established by the end of the Second Balkan War and Peace Treaty in Bucharest.

Pressure from Germany and other foreign policy considerations have led the government in Vienna to give up the idea of revision of the peace treaty. It was basically accepted by all the Great Powers. Their agreement was expressed, inter alia, in the telegrams sent from the European capitals addressed either to King Carol I, or to the Prime Minister Titu Maiorescu. The Emperor Franz Joseph of Austro-Hungary, the German Emperor Wilhelm II, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, French President Raymond Poincaré and others They sent messages to King Carol

I.21 The Head of Government, Titu Maiorescu, was congratulated by S. Sazonov, Russian Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, the Head of the Viennese diplomacy, the Marquis of San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, the Head of Foreign Office, prince Bülow and others.22

Political circles and public opinion in European countries, following closely what happened in Bucharest appreciated particularly, with certain exceptions, which are explainable, in the case of Austro-Hungary and partly in Russia, the position and role of Romania, which had been credited mainly for the quick conclusion of hostilities and for establishing of peace that was meant to be a right and lasting one.

In Romania, the peace laid down in Bucharest was received generally positive, even enthusiastic, both by public opinion and political circles. There were also present dissenting opinions, which was natural if we consider that the politicians of the time expressed their opinions, then or later, in connection with the Treaty in Bucharest, according to the interests of political parties to which they belonged and had distinct and different visions about the way they analyzed the activity of the government during the two Balkan wars, but also in relation to the Romanian foreign policy outlook.23

Towards the end of 1913, when the passing of time made possible a more lucid perspective in assessment of the activity of the government during the Balkan Wars and of the results of the Peace Treaty in Bucharest, parliamentary debates were held on this topic.24 Although there were present critical speeches appealing to the government, especially from the opposition, especially the Liberals, led by I.I.C. Br?tianu, the Parliament approved the activity of the Government and of the Prime Minister Titu Maiorescu. The Romanian Prime Minister, on the verge of withdrawing from power and politics, endowed with exceptional oratorical talent, as the great erudite man of culture that otherwise reflected his true vocation25, delivered a speech that remained famous in the annals of Romanian parliamentary life.26 Justifying the government's overall activity during the Balkan Wars, and being preoccupied by drafting the Green Book, Maiorescu highlighted a realistic policy pursued by the Romanian state in accordance with the great national interests. Responding to criticism from opposition Maiorescu said, among other things, with legitimate pride: "Whatever you would interpret and misinterpret from the acts against our action, the reality is that it has brought as result the Peace of Bucharest. Naturally, as the French proverb, many roads lead to Rome, perhaps it would have been other means of success. But what would have been, if it had not been what it was? What would it have been, if it had been what it wasn't? This leads to endless human possibilities. Reality exposure limits what it is and not what it could have been; reality is Peace of Bucharest, reality is that we have reached this result without having exposed the country to dangers and we lifted the prestige of Romania, as you all admitted that it is exalted."27

Footnote

1 Documents diplomatiques français (1871-1914), Paris, 1929-1959, 3e série, tome VII, doc. No. 554, p 593. Blondel to Pichon, August 6, 1913. It will be cited D.D.F.

2 British Documents on the Origins of the War (1898-1914), 11 volumes in 13 tomes, London, 1926-1938 (It will be cited B.D.O.W), tome IX, II part, doc. No. 1214, p.963, Sir Edward Grey to G. Barclay, August 7, 1913.

3 D.D.F., 3e serie, tome VII, doc. No. 557, p. 597, Panafieu to Pichon, August 7, 1913.

4 Ibidem, doc. No.562, p. 601, Blondel to Pichon, August, 7, 1913.

5 Ibidem, doc. No.571, p. 607-608. Paul Cambon to Pichon, August 7, 1913.

6 Ibidem, doc. No.572, p. 608-610. Blondel to Pichon, August 7, 1913.

7 Ibidem, doc. No.574, p. 611-612. Delcassé to Pichon, August 8, 1913.

8 Ibidem, doc. No.575, p. 612. Pichon to Delcassé, August 8, 1913.

9 Ibidem, doc. No.584, p.625-626. Pichon to Delcassé, August 9, 1913.

10 Ibidem, doc. No.580, p.622. Paul Cambon to Pichon, August 8, 1913.

11 See the opinion of Eliza Campus: "Everything ran so fast that the peace negotiations in Bucharest took place only between the belligerent states, with no interference. The Great Powers faced the following situation: the small states that were at war, concluded peace, which should be a long lasting peace, because all signed the treaty of peace with no pressure from abroad." Eliza Campus, Small and middle states in central and southeast part of Europe in international relationships. First half of XX century, Ed. Politica, Bucuresti, 1988, p. 58.

12 B.D.O.W., tome IX, part II, doc. no. 1225, p. 970-975. Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, August 8, 1913.

13 D.D.F., 3 e série, tome VII, doc. no. 581, p. 623-624. Blondel to Pichon, August 8, 1913.

14 Ibidem, doc. no. 586, p. 627. Manneville to Pichon, August 9, 1913.

15 Ibidem, doc. no. 587, p. 627-628. Manneville to Pichon, August 9, 1913.

16 Ibidem, doc. no. 592, p. 631. Pichon to Paul Cambon, August 9, 1913.

17 Green Book, in tome Titu Maiorescu, Romania, the Balkan wars and the Cadrilater, tome published by Stelian Neagoe, Machialvelli Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995, p. 232. It will be cited Green Book. For the text of the treaty, see Ibidem, p. 232-239.

18 Green Book, p. 231.

19 D.D.F., 3 e série, tome VII, doc. no. 597, p. 634-635. Delcassé to Pichon, August 10th, 1913.

20 Ibidem, doc. no. 598, p. 635, Delcassé to Pichon, August 10th, 1913.

21 Central Historical National Archives, Fond Royal House, dossier 40/1913.

22 Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dossier 71/B/13.

23 A very good review of the main points of view of personalities of political or cultural life regarding the Treaty in Bucharest see in Gh. Zbuchea, Romania and Balkan wars. 1912-1913. South-Eastern European Historical pages, Ed. Albatros, Bucharest, 1999, p. 307-330.

24 See the Debates of the Meeting of the Deputies, 1913-1914, no. 1-16, meetings in November-December 1913; see also the Debates of Senate, 1913-1914, no. 5-6.

25 About the personality of Titu Maiorescu see the excellent monographic study Z. Ornea, Life of Titu Maiorescu, tome I-II, Bucharest, 1987.

26 See the text of speech in Titu Maiorescu, Romania, Balkan wars and Cadrilater, p. 241-254.

27 Ibidem, p. 247.

References

REFERENCE

I. ARCHIVAL RESOURCES:

· Central Historical National Archives. Bucharest, Romania.

· Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bucharest, Romania.

· NOVEL DOCUMENTS:

· British Documents on the Origins of the War (1898-1914), 11 volum in 13 tomes, vol. IX, 2nd part, London, 1926-1938.

· Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette. 1871-1914. Sammlung der Diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes, vol. 35 Berlin, 1922-1926.

· Documents diplomatiques français (1871-1914), 3esérie, tome VII, Paris, 1929-1959.

· Maiorescu, Titu, Romania, The Balkan Wars and and the Cadrilater, volume published by Stelian Neagoe, Machiavelli Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995.

· Osterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914. Diplomatische Aktenstücke des Österreichisch-Ungarischen Ministeriums des Aussern, vol. VI, Viena ?i Leipzig, 1930.

II. GENERAL WORKS:

· Bu??, Daniela, Political and Territorial Changes in South-Eastern Europe between the Congress of Berlin and the first World War, Paideia Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003, p. 237-284.

· Campus, Eliza, Small and Medium States from Central and South-Eastern Europe in International Relations. The First Half of the 20th Century, Political Publishing House, Bucharest, 1988.

· Cristian, V., Independent Romania's Foreign Policy (1878-1914), in vol. History of Romanians, vol. VII/2, coord. Gh. Platon, Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003, p. 233-292.

III.SPECIAL WORKS:

· Iordache, Anastasie, The Political Crisis Romania and the Balkan Wars 1911-1913, Paideia Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998.

· Iorga, N., The History of the Balkan Wars, Bucharest, 1915.

· Pohoa??, Nicu, Romania's Foreign Policy during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). Romania and the politico-military groups of the Great Powers, Pro Universitaria Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010.

· Topor, Claudiu-Lucian, Germany, Romania and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), "Al. I. Cuza" University Publishing House, Ia?i, 2008.

· Zbuchea, Gheorghe, Romania and the Balkan Wars. 1912-1913. South-Eastern European Historica Pages, Albatros Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999.