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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three papers related to the differences in power (power gap) and policy preferences (alignment gap) between states in the international system. The alignment gap represents the difference in preferred international policy outcomes while the power gap represents the neorealist perspective of relative capabilities that enable nations to pursue their interests. Examining these dynamics between potential allies and potential enemies reveals incentives that drive individual state behaviors and helps explain the conditions that determine international system structure. The chapters herein explore these dynamics and generate findings that contribute to international relations literature on asymmetric alliances, international system structure, and the impact of system structure on policy alignment within asymmetric alliances. It also addresses potential international policy issues, such as alliance commitments and agreements.
The first chapter addresses how the power gap and alignment gap create potential risks for the stronger ally in an asymmetric alliance and proposes how the ally may incentivize its protégé to act with greater restraint. In an asymmetric alliance, where the stronger ally provides a security guarantee and the weaker ally agrees to surrender autonomy in the way of policy concessions, the weaker state is inherently incentivized to act with greater boldness in pursuing its own interests, creating a potential moral hazard problem. This paper examines how the stronger ally can manage such an alliance to restrain its protégé’s behavior. I propose that the stronger ally can induce a cost conditional on conflict initiation, comparable to a deductible in insurance terms. I use a formal model to demonstrate that the stronger ally, by limiting its initial protective measures, can incentivize the protégé to act with restraint. Therefore, the stronger state reduces the risk of moral hazard by avoiding over-insuring its protégé. The model also suggests that as the states grow in alignment regarding policy preferences, the stronger ally can lower the deductible and provide greater protection, enhancing the protégé’s bargaining power and deterring the challenger from making excessive demands. I use the alliance between the US and South Korea as a case study to demonstrate how the theory explains changes in alliance behaviors over time. This theory provides a novel mechanism for restraining moral hazard and demonstrates how a stronger power can vary the protection of its ally to pursue its own policy objectives.
