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In this article, I examine the state-supported "modernization" (xiandaihua) of Confucianism in China and argue that behind this revival is an intention to institutionalize Confucianism in order to consolidate the leadership and ideological control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, while the CCP-led government has pragmatically adopted Confucianism to maintain the current power structure, there is no evidence that Confucianism will become the theoretical heart of the party. Confucianism has not acquired, nor will it acquire, a political position equal to Marxism. Many Chinese intellectuals have confirmed this tendency. KEYWORDS: Chinese politics, Confucianism, modernization, ideology, institutionalization.
ALONG WITH THE REVIVAL OF CONFUCIANISM IN THE FIRST DECADE of the twenty-first century in China, the Chinese government has emphasized its "modernization" (xiandaihua). Confucianism has become a hot topic of research and discussion among Chinese intellectuals. However, not much research has been conducted thus far to examine the content of this modernization and the intentions behind it. Questions regarding what the modernization of Confucianism means for Confucianism itself, as well as the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) attitude and motivation, remain unanswered. In this article, I argue that the modernization of Confucianism has the political purpose of institutionalizing Confucianism and integrating it into the party's political strategy as an ideological tool.
Background
Marxism's Decline, Nationalism's Reemergence
The decline of Marxism and the surge of nationalism in China provide the background for the rise of Confucianism. The collapse of the Soviet Union as well as the demise of the other Soviet-type communist states in Eastern Europe initiated the worldwide decline of Marxism. The decline of Marxism in China, however, can be traced to the Deng Xiaoping era in the early 1980s. Deng launched a campaign to "reassess" Maoism with the original intention of eradicating all the ideological and psychological obstacles to economic reform. This campaign unexpectedly resulted in the demise of the official ideology, which was accompanied by the profound "three belief crises" (san xin weiji): crisis of faith in socialism, crisis of belief in Marxism, and crisis of trust in the party (Chen 1995; Zhao 1998). When the official ideology lost credibility, the regime faced a crisis of legitimacy and difficulties in enlisting mass support for its vision of the future (Zhao 1998).
Although China did not...