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Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War. By SERGEI N. GONCHAROV, JOHN W. LEWIS, and LITAI XUE. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. 393 pp. $45.00.
This book is a major contribution to our understanding of the relationship between Stalin and Mao and their involvement in the Korean War. The three scholars from Russia, the United States, and China collaborated to answer many questions whose answers have been shrouded in mystery. The sources they utilized are impressive: unpublished Mao materials (his manuscripts, speeches, and articles), personal archives of Stalin's representative to Mao between 1948 and 1950, and memoirs of and interviews with former high-level Chinese, North Korean, and Soviet officials, including the two leaders' interpreters (eighty-two translated documents are appended at the end of the book). The authors also had access to some of the Soviet archival materials. Materials that will become available in the future may still surprise us, but the authors have opened up a new vista for us.
Stalin's main concern was to preserve the Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Xinjiang, and he was intent on preserving the provisions of the 1945 treaty he had signed with the Chiang Kai-shek government. At the same time, he was wary of Chiang's success because it would bring Americans to Manchuria. The latter concern dictated his support for Mao's forces in Manchuria immediately after the Japanese surrender, but Stalin did not trust Mao, particularly when he appeared to court Americans. The authors argue that Stalin threw in "his lot with Mao" only in October 1947.
But Stalin was not a man to compromise his...