Abstract: Kindness - perhaps the most important human quality - has not given rise to philosophical research like the other virtues; there is not an ethic of kindness as there is an ethic of duty; it is not a grand concept because it is grandeur itself. What is goodness, in fact? An ethic or a cognitive virtue? Does it play any role in science or in metaphysics? Kindness today is increasingly taken for naivety, weakness, idealism, lack of pragmatism. If we refer to the great behaviors in the history of humanity such as Socrates or Jesus who, knowing the maximum suffering caused by human injustice, gave the spiritual dimension of kindness identified with justice or love, it is difficult to appreciate whether human nature is in moral progress or in a deep crisis. Addressing such an issue stems from the need to raise the awareness for the synergistic role of human kindness in our lives, in creation, from the simplest activities to science and philosophy. Kindness implies rationality, intelligence, self-control, altruism, dedication, spirit of sacrifice, heroism, forgiveness, boundless love. It is a condition of happiness, the very human being's reason to exist.
Keywords: kindness, common sense, good will, happiness, beauty of the soul, God.
"It seems to me, sometimes, that we are not real people. We're a kind of blueprint, a trial for the humanity that ought to have been or that will be, maybe, one day. He who made us thought of another humanity and put even in our hearts the nostalgia for other forms of life, better than the existing ones. It's good to keep in mind that we are only the way to something else"1.
Constantin Noica, Mathesis or the Simple Joys
The idea of the text arose from the consciousness of today's degradation of human nature, in an increasingly unstable and conflict-torn world, sometimes irreconcilable ones, dominated by an exacerbation of the evil, devoid of rationality and genuine faith. It is all a sham, we are witnessing an undesirable mixure of truth and falsehood, of values and non-values; our knowledge has become confused; the unclear differentiation between good and evil, between essential and non-essential grows us apart from a certain understanding of the meaning of life, thus wasting our time in this world. Our article is an invitation to self-knowledge, imperatively necessary, because the cause of man's moral strength diminuation is to be found in his authentic incapacity of self-awareness, of reassessment and self-control. The source of kindness is in ourselves, we need just the desire to get to it and to keep it sheer.
The paradoxes of kindness
Writing about kindness nowadays, in a world that seems to be "the best of all possible worlds"2 is an attempt which seems meaningless at first glance and, yet, so necessary because there is no better time to write about what we are increasingly deprived of. A lot of people think that we can never do anything except out of some sort of self-interest. We always act ultimately for our own sake, they say - for material gain, for prestige, to gain power over others, to avoid suffering some kind of pain. While we may like to think differently, to think we are capable of acting unselfishly or out of a disinterested sense of justice, we are really egoists. That is human nature3. We live in a state of "ontological insecurity"4: we communicate face to face increasingly less, we suffer from a damaging solipsism, we think of ourselves as kind while in reality we tear each other down, we delude ourselves saying that we are virtuous while in reality we are individualistic and selfish, greedy, and full of envy and rancor, "blinded" by vanity; kindness is considered, nowadays, as a prerogative of the weak man, lacking in pragmatism, naive and idealistic and, more often than not, unfortunately, it is even perceived as a proof of stupidity. Thus, the kind man runs the risk of not being able to adapt to a reality of hobbsean type illustrated by the famous phrase: "belum omnium contra omnes"5; the misunderstanding of kindness inevitably leads to eluding it. We draw the attention, in support of these ideas, to a text that we consider enlightening for the analyzed problem: "In vain do we possess it all: intelligence, culture, wit, super-culture, docorates, super-doctorates if we are vilain, wicked, rude and vulgar, fool and stupid, if we are not worth a damn, then all these - intelligence and erudition and super-doctorates go down the drain, just like all the international congresses we take part in and all scholarships that we win by means of severe competitions. Nothing can replace and provide for a bit of kindness, a bit of goodwill, tolerance and understanding. The kindness of the soul is not a subtle and refined virtue, it is a basic attribute of the human being and also an attribute of culture".6 Those who are "rude", "wicked" regardless of the knowledge they possess, their academic position or intellectual level, are not to be excused if they possess an inner malice. Kindness is not only a "mere obsolete and sentimental virtue". Without kindness, Steinhardt had called the intellectuals "information memorizers". The mere reproduction of knowledge at intellectual level does not do much, it is only an attitude of pride and it is finally deprived of any quality. In a profoundly individualistic and moral polluted world as the one we live in today, kindness is repudiated and derided, although we need it. What justifies the current human moral behavior? Why is it so hard to be kind?! What is really kindness? How to express it?! What is the faculty of the soul meant to lead us to kindness?
Kindness encompasses a range of acts and habits that can be most easily described as thoughtful manners and heartfelt courtesy. Such etiquette not only applies to our relationships with other people but also to things, animals, plants and the Earth. Kindness may be simple like saying "please," "thank you," "excuse me," or "I'm sorry."It may be offering a helping hand, patiently waiting your turn, returning a phone call or favor, or even cheerfully responding with a smile. Kindness is also characterized by being generous with your time, money, resources and a willingness to help. "Kindness," as the Greek philosopher Sophocles said, "gives birth to kindness." It is, as American writer Mark Twain notes, "The language which the deaf can hear and the blind can see."
The present condition of the world seems to contradict the notion that the virtue of kindness offers people a sanctuary for peace, safety, comfort and hope. Over two-dozen major armed conflicts consistently take place in the world; over 1.5 billion people live on less than one dollar a day; 2.5 billion people have no access to basic sanitation or clean water; 1 billion people (over half of them women) are illiterate; thousands of acres of forest are logged each day, and dozens of species become endangered or eliminated. Earth's climate is changing: there are increased natural disasters, global warming and desertification. In spite of our planet's vulnerability, humans have long had an ethic of kindness.7 We do not talk about a systematical ethic of kindness, but rather about reflections we find in in the writings of Lao Tzu, who considered it one of the three great treasures of human conduct, or Confucius who taught kindness to be the path of civic responsibility, familial obligations, and courtesy. Buddha taught that kindness/generosity is a primary quality of an awakened mind and Jesus Christ preached the Golden Rule: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you."8
However, in the history of Western philosophy there are ephemeral attempts to deal with this subject, being probably taken for granted as an easy topic whose understanding does not raise insurmountable difficulties.Yet, how can one explain the fact that very few people make a creed, a profession of faith out of kindness? Is it that kindness is associated with suffering, because the best people in the cultural history of mankind like Socrates, Jesus, Confucius, Buddha9, as well as the great geniuses, saints have suffered because of their love, of their kindness? Does man reject kindness in order to not suffer or due to the fact that in a competitive world individualism is associated with personal interests and well-being?!
The philosopher Mary Midgley10 says somewhere that the history of ethical reflection clearly demonstrates how much of our thinking is shaped by what our sages omit to mention. Ethical philosophers like to talk about duties and rights, they like to talk about utility and consequence, they like to talk about virtue and vice, good and evil, responsibility and obligation. These are big and impressive sounding things. But the amount of ink spent writing about kindness is, as far as I can see, rather slight. That is not to say that philosophers have entirely ignored the subject, of course. Aristotle, for example, tackles the subject in his Rhetoric, where he writes that "Kindness - under the influence of which a man is said to "be kind" - may be defined as helpfulness towards some one in need, not in return for anything, nor for the advantage of the helper himself, but for that of the person helped" - perhaps a rather more minimal definition than I myself might favour. However, it would be possible to scour the indexes of a substantial library shelf full of books on ethics, and not come across the word "kindness" mentioned even once. And yet, when it comes to our everyday lives, kindness is something that we seem to care about a great deal. Indeed, for many of us, I suspect, kindness is a more fundamental aspect of ethical reflection than the ideas of duty, rights, consequence and so on. Still, we meet in the specialized literature a relatively recent work, in fact a singular work dedicated to kindness, which demonstrates the actuality of researching this theme. Thus, our analysis could not omit Kindness and the Good Society: Connections of the by William S. Hamrick11 which "is steeped in the language and concerns of Merleau-Ponty, Marcel, Ricoeur, Levinas, Dufrenne, and Werner Marx, but is by no means confined to an exposition-or even an integration-of the theories of others. Instead, the author offers, first, an original phenomenological description of the phenomenon of kindness, supported not only by examples drawn from his own experience and from current social events, but by examples drawn from the arts, notably literature. Next, he complements the descriptive move with a hermeneutics of suspicion designed to reveal how hidden interpretive frameworks covertly shape the ways in which we experience and recognize kindness. Yet he does not merely invoke such suspicion in order to "destabilize" descriptions, undermining their findings by revealing their limits; rather, he assigns the hermeneutic move a positive role, employing it in service of a critique of the social world itself. The result is an original thesis of "critical kindness" as a practical wisdom. Here kindness does indeed function as a regulative ideal. However, it must be constantly tempered with critical questioning, along with a vigilant readiness to rethink social institutions and cultural assumptions. In this way, a life of kindness does not naively accept or reinstate a ready-made world of anesthetized sensitivities, but helps to make community possible by actively creating it, just as an artist creates a work of art-an activity guided by, but irreducible to, inherited rules and frameworks. According to Hamrick, then, kindness itself can thus be understood as a kind of "performance art" requiring the utmost situational sensitivity-a discerning "poetics of the will," guided by the principle of informed respect and sustained by a commitment "to bring goodness into being within what well-founded suspicion reveals as the limits of one's situations". William S. Hamrick's contribution reveals the complexity of the topic approached, prompting us to support the idea that kindness is beneficial both individually and at the community level. It is not is a grand concept although it is greatness itself. It is a moral law to which we can all accede through a certain comprehension of our own reason; it is the chance to prove that man is a rational animal and not a being dominated by emotions: hatred, selfishness, jealousy, pettiness, envy, etc.
Even if there are not systematic studies on kindness, all the moral philosophy from Confucius, Socrates, Kant up to the contemporary ethicists implicitly or explicitly emphasizes that kindness is a cardinal value also involving the other fundamental values of the human condition, being a prerequisite of happiness.
Therefore we argue that kindness is both a concept and a state of mind. Kindness is a corollary of all virtues: wisdom, honesty, selflessness, honesty, courage, intelligence, generosity, modesty, temperance, work, diligence, solidarity, freedom and justice, conduct of a good will guided by reason.
From good sense to good will
Good sense is not only a phrase used to describe what is considered to be widely accepted by most people, but a philosophical idea that has preoccupied ancient or medieval philosophers (Aristotle and Avicenna), who considered that common sense is the way by which the individual becomes aware of the optimal reality. An ancient philosophical term, reintroduced in the 17th century along with the spread of Cartesianism, common sense has acquired a wide variety of meanings from the first definition of Descartes - "the power of judging well and distinguishing truth from falsehood, which is precisely what is called common sense or reason, is naturally equal in all men".12 Good sense is not only a phrase used to describe what is considered to be widely accepted by most people, but a philosophical idea that has preoccupied ancient or medieval philosophers (Aristotle and Avicenna), who considered that common sense is the way by which the individual becomes aware of the optimal reality. An ancient philosophical term, reintroduced in the 17th century along with the spread of Cartesianism, common sense has acquired a wide variety of meanings from the first definition of Descartes - "the power of judging well and distinguishing truth from falsehood, which is precisely what is called common sense or reason, is naturally equal in all men". Or, if all people are equally capable of thinking well ("good sense is the most orderly thing in the world"), they do not think equally well. For this innate faculty does not take place spontaneously in a good way, we must learn to practice it with the method. For it is not enough to have a refined spirit, it is important to use it well.13 More often than not, good sense is confused with common sense,14 the latter involving the idea of a faculty common to all men, that developed inside us during successive, empirical accumulations, of primary truths, which have come to be reduced to the average of a society's values. Good sense is not to be taken for granted, it is not an attribute of the being. Good sense goes further, it is a synthesis of aspirations that implies a whole philosophy of life which combines knowledge with ethical dimension, demanding and promoting an accumulation of moral virtues such as wisdom, honesty, fairness, compassion etc. Good sense always amends intelligence nonsense and infatuation, vanity, egotism, self-sufficiency, intolerance.
There is a paradox of good sense, which Al. Paleologu defined thus: "Good sense is not, as people think, a primary form of intelligence, an inferior succedaneum thereof. There is (and how often) intelligence without good sense, but there is not good sense without intelligence. More often than not, good sense is taken for common sense; it is true that they go along the path together a good part of the way, starting from basic findings. But common sense quickly falls in apories or platitudes, while good sense continues its way attaining sensational discoveries ...". A philosophical and ethical concept of classical culture, good sense sticks together with reason, with which it has already been assimilated. It is therefore normal for good sense not to be considered a norm of conduct in epochs of profound transformations, when the old order is destroyed, but without having established the neww one. Reason is thus devoid of any ethical content, being assimilated with mechanistic thinking, which assumes a good organization of the intellect, but bring excessive specialization, narrowing horizons, being opposite to the intuitive-creative thinking. Leaving aside the moral value of good sense, the interest in this concept in Romanian culture has a practical justification. Unfortunately, this ideal is not part of the domestic ethos, having being received later, along with the French influence, assimilated only superficially, hardly penetrating into the depths of the Romanian society. We often speak about the traditional good sense, of the common human respect towards customs and traditions, the evaluation criteria being reduced only to highlighting the qualities, without mentioning the flaws. But if good sense is understood as a specific and more complex philosophical concept, as presented above, then things are a little different. However, the above mentioned considerations speak about the necessity of assuming the good sense, primarily by the elite as the specter of their ethical and professional failure triggers the confusion of values and, implicitly, of the the assessment criteria in all areas of a country's social life. The ideal is worth being appropriated wholeheartedly, especially since the cultural foundations of good sense point us to the origins of the modern European civilization."15 Good sense makes possible the almost miraculous understanding among people belonging to different cultural groups and apparently so fa. We have a "common kernel" as Plato said and, more than that, our common note is that "we are all dwellers of this world"16, we just have to learn to live our own uniqueness. People are like fortresses. Plato sets forth this explicit parallelism in the Republic 17 where the Greek philosopher made an analogy between the social hierarchy and various parts of the individual soul. Justice brings individual inner harmony and social harmony for the public order. All people are subject to the same universal laws of Logos. All people are countrymen as long as there is a single life and a single order of things for everybody. From this perspective, the man endowed with good sense does not do anyting by mere chance; every action has a purpose circumscribed to a universal one, in other words, the man endowed with good sense is the one who is on the right path, he does what he has to do, he does his duty in relation to himself and with others, thus participating in the universal order. Thus the man who has good sense is free. The freedom to live as if there was no order is not granted to anyone18 appreciates Andrei Plesu in his "small treaty" of morale. Good sense is a prerequisite of knowledge but, in my opinion, sometimes it means more than literacy, it is a divine gift just like wisdom; it can be identified with a balanced, rational conduct, without excesses, characterized by prudence and measure. Our world does not abound in good sense, shame, humility; people rather behave with guts, rudeness, shamelessness. Philosophers like Kant, who believed in the progress of humanity, at a time when others claimed that only the individual can progress, but not the entire mankind, would disarm when confronted with such a reality. Kant put forward the following argument: If we have the duty to work together for the greatest good of humanity, he said, we must have the faith that our efforts are not in vain. Thus, as a corollary of our duty, we must accept the belief in the perfectibility of the genre. And, indeed, it would be meaningless to feel bound by a duty unless we believe in the effectiveness of accomplishing it, even remotely.19 If human reason had not evolved during the centuries which followed Kant, his reflections could still be assigned to the transcendental idealism of his thinking. Indeed, man has evolved intellectually, but the ultimate purpose of reason is to establish a good will in itself20, in Kantian language, we could say that a theoretical, pure reason is fulfilled through a practical reason, which is good will. The Kantinian argument is - good will, not happiness is the only intrinsic good. From what can be thought anywhere in the world, and even beyond it, there is nothing that can be considered good without restriction, except for a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgment power or no matter how the talents of the spirit may be called, or courage, determination, perseverance in making decisions, as traits of the temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but they may also become extremely bad and harmful when the will, which must use these gifts of nature and whose specific constitution is therefore called character, is not good. The same is true regarding the fate's conducive gifts (Glucksgaben). Power, wealth, honours, health itself and the whole welfare and contentment for the situation in which we find ourselves, known as happiness, give rise to boldness and, through it, more often than not to vanity, where there is not a good will to correct their influence on the soul and, along with it, to regulate the whole principle of action and to adjust it universally according to its scope (allgemein-zweckmassing mache); needless to mention that an impartial rational spectator can never be satisfied seeing the continuous prosperity of a being who bears none of the ornaments of pure and good will, so it seems that good will is a prerequisite for the very dignity of being happy.21.
We appreciate the good will in the Kantian meaning as being a developed form of good sense fulfilled through knowledge, education and self-education. The morally significant documents which make proof of unconditioned human goodness are out of duty, which means the obligation to perform our actions in accordance with the moral law. They stem from an independent will, unconditioned sentimentally, which gives itselfs laws, is self-determining. Of course, in the world we live moral perfection cannot be conceivable, because we have interests, inclinations, temptations, cravings hard to stave off; but doing one's your duty towards oneself and towards the others is a form of perfection. To be good, to love, to work for the others' happiness and for one's own improvement are actions stemming from duty with a high moral content. If we were able to obey the moral law or the categorical Kantinian imperative, then we would all be saints; I would no longer need law, state, as all our actions would be moral. In reality, our world is dominated by what might be called antropical entropy, where the one who does his duty is out of tune, being marginalized or even humiliated. It is hard to talk about the Kantian moral in a world where the individualis are deprived of an interior will, lacking authentic landmarks and being unable of self-knowledge.22 Man keeps being an open being. We love and hate, we are selfless and selfish, good or bad, without being able, more often than not, to explain and control our own behavior, and much less the collective behaviors. And as time passes and we become more aware of ourselves we realize the unfathomable depths and the darkness of the human soul.23
Kindness is the beauty of the soul
Kindness is a character trait which is a prerogative of education and self-education; we do not share the idea that some people are born good and others bad; man is ambivalent, he is a combination of good and evil, entropy-negentropy, subjective-objective, rational-irrational, sacred-profane. The way in which we manage to harmonize these antinomies in our person is also reflected in our spiritual physiognomy, in our way of being, in other words, in our our character. "Being a man of character is that feature of the will which determines the subject to make a convenant against certain practical principles, which he sets once and for all by his reason. It does not matter here what nature makes out of man, but what he makes out of himself"24. The fact that virtue can be acquired (it's not innate), can be inferred from its notion, without having to relate to anthropological knowledge from experience. As human moral faculty would not be virtue, unless it triumphed through the power of principle in fighting the strong contrary inclinations. It is the product of pure practical reason, as the latter, being aware of its superiority, due to its freedom, gains ground predominantly over the inclinations.25 Moral theories which, like those of Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas, give a central place to the virtues, tend to assume that as traits of character the virtues are mutually compatible so that it is possible for one and the same person to possess them all. This assumption-let us call it the compatibility thesis-does not deny the existence of painful moral dilemmas: it allows that the virtues may conflict in particular situations when considerations associated with different virtues favour incompatible courses of action, but holds that these conflicts occur only at the level of individual actions. Thus while it may not always be possible to do both what would be just and what would be kind or to act both loyally and honestly, it is possible to be both a kind and a just person and to have both the virtue of loyalty and the virtue of honesty26. 'Virtue and Character' A.D.M. Walker claims that kindness and justice are incompatible in certain important ways and that a person can be kind or just without possessing the other virtue. Walker argues that virtues must lead to 'effective and intelligent action' and that a virtue ceases to exist if 'it leads to violation of the minimal requirements of any other virtue'. On this view kindness and justice function independently to produce effective action. Kindness requires a direct caring for the individual in particular circumstances, while justice involves a commitment to impartiality that abstracts from an individual's situation. Walker argues that, as long as the minimal requirements of other virtues are met, one can be kind without weighing considerations of justice. He cites with approval kind behaviour which human beings learn as young children. Such behaviour may be a deeply engrained personality trait, and the individual passing through different situations in life may have no need to consider questions of justice. 'He will merely need to be able to recognize and respond to certain types of considerations as overriding the values promoted by kindness'he trait of modesty has received significant philosophical attention in recent years27. This is due, in part, to Julia Driver's claim that modesty is able to act as a counter-example to intellectualist accounts of the nature of virtue. 'Modesty as kindness' states that the trait of modesty ought to be considered as intimately connected with the more fundamental virtue of kindness. I set out the account, explain its benefits and defend it against possible objections. I then ask whether or not the intense focus on the trait of modesty has actually furthered our understanding of the nature of virtue more generally, and suggest that alternative approaches ought to be considered28. Julia Driver argues that modesty essentially involves ignorance (underestimation) of one's self-worth. Intuitively, modesty is a virtue. So this would count against traditional accounts of virtue (as involving moral perception or an internal orientation towards the good), and in favour of her instrumental account. But there are reasons to doubt whether modesty essentially involves ignorance after all.29 We could equate modesty with human kindness and man's moral personality. Given this dual dimnesion, modesty is a moral value of personality that belongs to one's attitude towards the others and towards oneself by virtue of which man assesses himself properly, to the actual value of his work and conduct, without ascribing to himself any further merit or right, without ignoring the will and needs of others. Here, there is the intrinsic link between modesty and kindness, which can lead to the understanding that no man should be underestimated, because each man, as Socrates said, "was born with the wisdom of man". It is necessary in this context of our analysis to recall that for the ancient Greeks the educational ideal was kalokatheia: a handsome (kalos) and good (agathos) man. For Plato, human nature is not accomplished by the unleashing of force and passions, but by a life lived rationally according to Justice and Good that can lead to happiness. People who live only according to the unbridled desires of their body are not only ignorant and bad, but, equally, unhappy. The happy life is the life of the soul which has become acquainted with good, beauty and kindness, every faculty of the soul fulfilling their role in a hierarchical structure that ensures the supremacy of reason. Conversely, the soul domination by passions leads to dissatisfaction, to the incessant repetition of desires impossible to appease and therefore to unhappiness. Although most people do not want this unhappiness because nobody wants "his own evil", the tragedy is that they refuse their spiritual liberation, the therapy through the philosophy of soul, a therapy that could heal his ills and sufferings. Man realizes his essence of a "rational animal not in a life of pleasure in which his passions triumph, but in an activity of the soul consistent with virtue.30. In his eudemic Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of virtuous people - the "good man" (agathos), who acts virtuously in order to acquire naturally good things, such as wealth and dignity, and the "noble and good man" (kaloskagathos), who accomplishes the virtuous actions for their own sake, because they are noble. Being moral towards other people stems from and helps increase the personal value or have a good character. Having a good character means acquiring virtues. Being virtuous means behaving properly. For example, shame, inclinations for pity or compassion, in contrast with insolence, selfishness, cruelty and malice are positive character traits or virtues that provide a rule of altruistic behavior, guided by justice and charity. Such a behavior leads to the moral good of a true solidarity with others, with all living beings.31 When there is a moral action, mercy is always its generating feeling. Moral life means solidarity, and it is based on the feeling of pity. "A boundless compassion that unites us to all the living things, here it is the strongest and safest guarantor of morality.32 The previous arguments converge on the idea that human goodness is a synergistic attitude emanating from inside the harmony in which all faculties of the soul endowed with qualities take part - it is the beauty of the soul that depends on free, rational will which can be educated and cultured.
Kindness is the condition of happiness
The happiness we can achieve always remains at the level of the human and of the uncertain world he lives in. If gods are self-sufficient, man is dependent on external things. Virtue itself is not possible under some circumstances which are beyond man's mastery. Happiness involves a maximum independence from the material constraints that the individual is unable to obtainby himself. People are, essentially, social beings, so that the good emotions, wishes and actions of a person will also include a good attitude and behavior towards the others. To be moral towards the other people stems from and helps increase the personal value or have a good character.
Goodness of character is neither natural nor unnatural for man. Man has from the very beginning a willingness for it, but it must be developed through practice. The thing that is accomplished must be the right thing that needs to be done under certain circumstances and this should be carried out starting from a good motivation. Aristotle wants man to have a permanent spiritual and moral self-improvement will. Man must want to highlight all that is best in him. This is the noble sense in which Aristotelian happiness can be truly accessible to any man.33 The man of spiritual grandeur is the one whoc, assessing himself as worthy of great things, is truly worthy of them. The greatness of the soul manifests itself in big things. The man of spiritual grandeur represents the fair conduct in relation to whatis appropriate for him. Individual welfare also promotes the welfare of the community, because individuals always live in and are partially defined by the societiesthey live in. The more virtuous its members, the better the community. Kindness is another name of the definition Aristotle gave man: social being.34 Without kindness we cannot cohabitate but in conditions of terror, justifying the bitter and well-known statement: "others, here is hell." There is an elementary altruism expressed through kindness, which is an axiom of public life.
We do not have in mind here the apparent kindness - emanation of a doubtful character or false generosity hiding some mean personal interests. In fact, here we refer rather to the resentful man, envious, cunning or simply evil, the vilain man who has not yet reached the level of "social contract"35 whose "happiness" is fueled by the pleasure of doing harm, thereby trying to conceal certain frustrations and complexes that tear his inner being. When such a man does charitable deeds he acts in a Nietzschian style showing off his greatness and by no means his grandeur of mind. Genuine kindnes emerges only from a genuinely honest character and our appreciation envisages the nobility of soul, the untainted conscience of a pure soul. Such kindness cannot be converted into anything bad, even in extreme situations of maximum suffering because it springs from self-determining good will, from free will. We want to illustrate this bringing into discussion the Socratic case. What is true and good, and what is false and infamous is not allowed to be hidden in a tragic vision. A reconcilliation with the death sentence of Socrates is possible only through Socrates himself. He died without bitterness and without accusing anyone: "I am not at all angry with those who voted against me or those who accused me" - this was his last word. Socrates was convinced that for the honest man there is no evil, and that gods will not leave his cause at the mercy of chance. Either ways, for the good man there is no harm in life or in death. Our argumentation would be incomplete if we did not bring to attention, even ephemerously, Jesus' behavior who on the cross, in a state of maximum suffering, had the moral strength to say: Lord forgive them for they know not what they do!
We naturally ask ourselves the question: How can genuine kindness generate happiness?
The evil man is never happy because his soul cannot enjoy inner peace even in the midst of his riches. Therefore, happiness on earth consists in our own work onto ourselves and on our peers to make us all better. The evil man is never happy because his soul cannot enjoy inner peace even in the midst of his riches. Therefore, happiness on earth consists in our own work onto ourselves and on our peers to make us all better. Before Kant, the representatives of the eudaemonistic-emipiriste concepts had asserted that the purpose of life was the promotion of personal well-being (happiness) in a general prosperity, without specifying where the first ends and where the second begins, and the rationalist representatives of the concepts who had supported perfection as the purpose of life lay emphasis on personal perfection, without considering its social aspect. Kant reconciles the theses of this opposite points of views, reducing them to their true value, by stating the following moral command "Set as goal of your actions your own perfection and foreign happiness."36 Your own perfection and not the others' perfection, for others, if they do not possess it, cannot be inoculated with a good conscience, as it the personal work of each of us. Foreign happiness and not personal happiness because we tend instinctively to personal happiness and we do not need anyone's instigation and competition. Kant admits that people tend to happiness by virtue of their nature of finite and rational beings, the pursuit of happiness thus being a necessary endeavor of their nature. But perfection, which is the same as holiness, is not destined for any rational human beings here on earth. It can be approached only through progress, which, because it cannot achieve its purpose in this world, must be admitted to extend itself in the other world, by the continuance of our personality in that world, that is we must admit the immortality of the soul, not as a certainty, for the immortality of the soul is not subject to knowledge that can be demonstrated theoretically, but as a "comforting" hope.37 Thus, only by postulating the immortality of the soul through hope that we will continue to exist as a moral personality after death, morality becomes reality. For our moral conscience, virtue on this superior moral stage is not only worthy of happiness, but makes even part of it, opening prospects for the sovereign Good, a notion that has always played an important role in ancient ethics, for the Epicureans, and which we continuously approach, but we will not never reach, comforting ourselves just with the hope that we will still manage.
But since we are not sure that the sovereign Good could be accomplished even in an eternal life, for it is beyond human powers to achieve it, we must admit a moral world order, where the change in nature is subject to a superior order, whose ultimate purpose is to lead to unity between the sensible world and the intelligible one , to unify, as Kant also stated "the empire of nature with the empire of mores" and to achieve a perfect agreement between virtue (morality) and happiness or, as the Greeks said, the moral Good. But such unification is conceivable only by postulating the existence of a moral omnipotent and absolute being, of God. And thus the faith in God's existence is, in Kant's view, according to the faith in the sovereign Good.
Human kindness and divine kindness
There is in each of us a "pit of selfishness", there is much duplicity, false altruism, apparent generosity, but there is, indisputably, kindness. If it weren't for the virtue, then there would not be anything good in this world, the human creation could not be explained. In every age, in all societies, there have been people capable of love, dedication, selfless kindness, people who sacrificed themselves, who sometimes made even the supreme sacrifice on behalf of certain values, beliefs, ideals. "For this reason, I would venture to say that even in this life the good things outperform by far the evil ones, our comforts outweigh our inconveniences and that Mr. Descartes was right to write (vol. I, letter 9) that the natural reason teaches us, in this life, that we experience more good things than bad ones"38. These are arguments we rely on when we argue that teleological kindness is the creed of the human condition. By means of kindness stemming from love, from good conscience, we can connect to a noumenal world where we feel free and happy. We cannot fail to remind in our analysis maybe the most beautiful ideas that have ever been written about divine kindmess. "Love is that affection that makes us enjoy the perfections of what we love, and nothing is perfect and more charming than God. In order to love Him it is enough to think of his perfections and this not hard work, as we find these ideas inside ourselves. Perfections of God are those of our souls, but he possesses a boundless ocean from which we received only mere drops - there is inside us some power, knowledge, kindness but all of these, as a whole, are inside God. Order, proportion, harmony delight us, painting and music prove it. God is sheer order, He always keeps the fair proportions, produces universal harmony - the entire beauty is an outpouring of His rays ...39
Good nature, appropriate education, meeting with pious and virtuous persons can greatly contribute to put souls in this beautiful posture .... we need to combine light and ardor, it it is necessary that intellectual perfections lead to improving those of the will. We always learn at school that as truth is the object of truth, goodness is the object of the will and as the intellect can never assert than what is shown under the desguise/appearance of truth, the will never like but what seems good to it. The will contains a natural determination for good in general. There is in us enough willpower, only that we are unaware of it. We are the masters of our homes, in the sense that we have free will, but not like God who is the Master of the world. The kindness of the infinitely perfect Being is infinite and it would not be infinite if we could conceive a greater kindnes than His. But when we say that only kindness led God to create this universe, we must add that KINDNESS led Him antecedently to create and produce any possible goodness, but WISDOM is the one that made the selection and was the reason why he chose the greatest goodness consistently and, finally, it was POWER that gave him the means of carrying out the great plan which he made up. As God is good, goodness itself created the man good and righteous, but also changeable, being able to by his free will. It is precisely this duplicity of man to be both sensitive and intelligible that makes him capable of morality. Besides, morale starts with this choice - each will decide what he will be. Thus, we understand so that we can achieve good will but not in the nick of time or through a simple act of will. We have yet to remark that troubles and sorrows that accompany the victory over the passions turns into pleasure for some, due to the satisfaction thay find in the intense feeling of the force of their spirit and of the divine grace. This happy state can be reached, and this is one of the principal means the soul can use to strengthen its dominion.40
1 Constantin Noica, Mathesis or the Simple Joys, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1992, p.84.
2 Leibniz, Essays on Theodicity. On the Kindness of God, the freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil, First Book, translated by Diana Morarasu and Ingrid Ilinca, Polirom, Iasi, 1997, p.93.
3 Tony Skillen, Kindness in the Cold, has an attack of altruism in Philosophy Now, 1991. Tony Skillen is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Kent.
4 C. Noica, Becoming within Being. Trial on traditional philosophy. Treaty of Ontology, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, p.291.
5 Th. Hobbes, Leviathan, Paris, Sirey, 1971, Romanian transl. Leviathan, XIII, The Scientific Printing House, Bucharest, 1957.
6 N. Steinhardt, On the Kindness of the Soul in The Danger of Confession Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 1998, p. 41.
7 C. Forrest McDowell, The Virtue of Kindness, on www.onesanctuary.com/peace/peacevirtues/ virtueofkindness.pd, Excerpted from forthcoming book, Peace of Heart, Peace of Mind, 2007.
8 (Bible, Luke 6:31)
9 K. Jaspers, Crucial People from the History of Mankind: Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus, Paideia Publishing House, Bucharest, 1996.
10 Mary Midgley, Kindness and Philosophy, article online, thinkBuddha.org:WillBuckingham@DMU, 2008.
11 William S. Hamrick, Kindness and the Good Society: Connections of the Heart, SUNY Press Publishing House, 2002, pag. 253.
12 R. Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking the Truth in Sciences, transl. by Daniela Reventa Frumusanu and Alexandra Boboc, notes, commentary and bibliography by Al. Boboc, Academiei Publishing House, Bucharest, 1990, p.113.
13 Ibidem, p. 114.
14 Elena Buzatu, On Good Sense, www.universulromanesc.com; Prof. at "Butte College" Faculty. Oroville / California / USA
15 Al. Paleologu, Good Sense as Paradox, https: //books,google.ro, books?isbn=9734620568
16 M. Heidegger, Letter on Humanism in the Originof the Art Work, The Universe Publishing House, Bucharest, 1982, p.148.
17 Platon, The Republic, in Works 5th vol., The Scientific and Encyclopaedic Publsihing House, Bucharest, 1986, p.81-411.
18 A. Plesu, Minima Moralia, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002, p.47.
19 Giorgio DelVecchio, Lessons of Legal Philosophy, Europa Nova Publishing House, 1995, p.116-117.
20 Imm. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Humanitas Publihing House, Bucharest, 2006, p.31.
21 Ibidem, p.29.
22 Gabriela Pohoata, Confucius and Kant or the Ethics of Duty, Cogito. Multidisciplinary Research Journal", vol. II no. 1/ March, 2010, "Dimitrie Cantemir" Christian University, Pro Universitaria Publihing House, Bucharest, 2010, p.50-57.
23 Nicolae Sacalis-Calata, Philosophy aand Pedagogy of Culture. From Homer to Plato and Zamolxis, Pro Universitaria Publihing House, Bucharest, 2012, p.20.
24 Imm. Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, apud. N. Bagdasar, Virgil Bogdan, C. Narly, Philosophical Antology, Foreign Philosophers, Casa Scoalelor Publihing House, 1943, p.457.
25 Idem, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, ibidem. p. 457.
26 A.D.M. Walker, Virtue and Character - Research Gate. Available from: http://www.researchgate.net/publication/231933987
27 Daniel Putman, The Compatibility of Justice and Kindness, Philosophy 65(254):516-517(1990).
28 Alan T. Wilson, Modesty as Kindness, Ratio 28(2), 2014.
29 Julia Driver, Are there virtues of Ignorance, http://www.philosophyetc.net/2009/09/are-there-virtues-of-ignorance.html
30 Aristotel, The Nicomachean Ethics, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1988, p.28.
31 Vladimir Soloviov, Justification of Goodness, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1988, p.137.
32 Ah. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representaion , apud. Ion Petrovici Ethics of Renonciation in Schopenhauer, Historical and Philosophical Monography, Eurosong & Book, 1997, p.125.
33 Aristotle, cited works, 30.
34 Aristotle, Politics, IRI Publishing House, Bucharest, 2001, p.37.
35 J.J. Rousseau, Du contract social, GF Flamarion, presentation, notes, bibliographie et chronologie par Bruno Biernardi, GF Flamarion, Paris, 2001.
36 Imm. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, IRI Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999, p.21.
37 Ibidem, p.22.
38 Leibniz, cited works, p.228.
39 Ibidem, p.27.
40 Ibidem, p.266.
REFERENCES
Aristotle, (1988), Nicomachean Ethics, Bucharest, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing.
Aristotle, (2001), Politics, Bucharest, IRI Publishing House.
Bagdasar, N. Bogdan ,Virgil, Narly, C., (1943), Anthology Philosophical Anthology, Foreign Philosophers, Casa Scoalelor Publishing House.
Buzatu, Elena, On Good Sense, www.universulromanesc.com, Prof. at "Butte College" Faculty. Oroville / California / USA.
DelVecchio, Georgio, (1995), Lessons of Legal Philopsophy, Europa Nova Publishing House.
Descartes, R., (1990), Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking the Truth in Sciences, transl. by Daniela Reventa Frumusanu and Alexandra Boboc, notes, commentary and bibliography by Al.Boboc, Bucharest, Academiei Publishing House.
Driver, Julia Are there virtues of Ignorance, http://www.philosophyetc.net/2009/09, are-there-virtues-of-ignorance.html;
Forrest McDowell C., (2007), The Virtue of Kindness, on www.onesanctuary.com/ peace/peacevirtues/ virtueofkindness.pd, Excerpted from forthcoming book, Peace of Heart, Peace of Mind;
Hamrick, William S., (2002), Kindness and the Good Society: Connections of the Heart, SUNY Press Publishing House;
Heidegger, M., (1982), Letter on Humanism in the Originof the Art Work, Bucharest, The Universe Publishing House.
Hobbes, Leviathan, Paris, Sirey, 1971, Romanian transl., Leviathan, XIII, Bucharest, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, 1957;
Jaspers, K., (1996), Crucial People from theHistory of Mankind: Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus, Bucharest, Paideia Publishing House.
Kant, Imm., (2006), The Metaphysics of Morals, Bucharest, Humanitas Publihing House.
Kant, Imm., (1999), Critique of Practical Reason, IRI Publishing House, Bucharest;
Midgley, Mary, (2008), Kindness and Philosophy, article online, thinkBuddha.org:WillBuckingham@DMU.
Leibniz, G.W., (1997), Essays on Theodicity. On the Kindness of God, the freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil, First Book, translated by Diana Morarasu and Ingrid Ilinca, Iasi, Polirom.
Noica, C., (1998), Becoming within Being. Trial on traditional philosophy. Treaty of Ontology, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House.
Paleologu, Al., Good Sense as a Paradox, https://books,google.ro, books?isbn=9734620568.
Petrovici, Ion, (1997), Ethics of Renonciation in Schopenhauer, Historical and Philosophical Monography, Eurosong & Book.
Plato, (1998), Socrate's Apology, in Dialogues, Bucharest, IRI Publishing House.
Platon, (1986), The Republic, in Works, 5th vol. V, Bucharest, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House.
Plesu, A., (2002), Minima Moralia, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House.
Pohoata, Gabriela, (2010), Confucius and Kant or the Ethics of Duty, Cogito. Multidisciplinary Research Journal", vol. II no. 1/ March, 2010, "Dimitrie Cantemir" Christian University, Bucharest, Pro Universitaria.
Putman, Daniel, (1990), The Compatibility of Justice and Kindness, Philosophy 65(254):516-517.
Rousseau, J.J., (2001), Du contract social, GF Flamarion, presentation, notes, bibliographie et chronologie par Bruno Biernardi, GF Flamarion, Paris.
Sacalis-Calata, Nicolae, (2012), Philosophy aand Pedagogy of Culture. From Homer to Plato and Zamolxis, Bucharest, Pro Universitaria Publihing House.
Skillen, Tony, (1991), Kindness in the Cold, has an attack of altruism in Philosophy Now, Tony Skillen is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Kent.
Soloviov, Vladimir, (1988), Justification of Goodness, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House.
Steinhardt, N., (1998), On the Kindness of the Soul in The Danger of Confession Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca.
Walker, A.D.M., Virtue and Character - ResearchGate. Available from: http://www.researchgate.net/publication/231933987.
Wilson, Alan, T. (2014), Modesty as Kindness, Ratio 28(2).
Gabriela Pohoata* *
*Prof. PhD. Hab., Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University, Bucharest.
*Translated by Lect. PhD. Mihaela Mocanu, Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University, Bucharest.
You have requested "on-the-fly" machine translation of selected content from our databases. This functionality is provided solely for your convenience and is in no way intended to replace human translation. Show full disclaimer
Neither ProQuest nor its licensors make any representations or warranties with respect to the translations. The translations are automatically generated "AS IS" and "AS AVAILABLE" and are not retained in our systems. PROQUEST AND ITS LICENSORS SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES FOR AVAILABILITY, ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, COMPLETENESS, NON-INFRINGMENT, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Your use of the translations is subject to all use restrictions contained in your Electronic Products License Agreement and by using the translation functionality you agree to forgo any and all claims against ProQuest or its licensors for your use of the translation functionality and any output derived there from. Hide full disclaimer
Copyright Christian University Dimitrie Cantemir, Department of Education Jun 2015
Abstract
Kindness - perhaps the most important human quality - has not given rise to philosophical research like the other virtues; there is not an ethic of kindness as there is an ethic of duty; it is not a grand concept because it is grandeur itself. What is goodness, in fact? An ethic or a cognitive virtue? Does it play any role in science or in metaphysics? Kindness today is increasingly taken for naivety, weakness, idealism, lack of pragmatism. If we refer to the great behaviors in the history of humanity such as Socrates or Jesus who, knowing the maximum suffering caused by human injustice, gave the spiritual dimension of kindness identified with justice or love, it is difficult to appreciate whether human nature is in moral progress or in a deep crisis. Addressing such an issue stems from the need to raise the awareness for the synergistic role of human kindness in our lives, in creation, from the simplest activities to science and philosophy. Kindness implies rationality, intelligence, self-control, altruism, dedication, spirit of sacrifice, heroism, forgiveness, boundless love. It is a condition of happiness, the very human being's reason to exist.
You have requested "on-the-fly" machine translation of selected content from our databases. This functionality is provided solely for your convenience and is in no way intended to replace human translation. Show full disclaimer
Neither ProQuest nor its licensors make any representations or warranties with respect to the translations. The translations are automatically generated "AS IS" and "AS AVAILABLE" and are not retained in our systems. PROQUEST AND ITS LICENSORS SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES FOR AVAILABILITY, ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, COMPLETENESS, NON-INFRINGMENT, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Your use of the translations is subject to all use restrictions contained in your Electronic Products License Agreement and by using the translation functionality you agree to forgo any and all claims against ProQuest or its licensors for your use of the translation functionality and any output derived there from. Hide full disclaimer