IRANIAN INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THEIR CONTRADICTORY CHARACTER

Abstract

The long common history of Iran and Afghanistan is linked with their cultural vicinity and interconnection. Afghanistan and Iran are partially connected, due to the similarity of languages and Shia religion. Furthermore, both countries are linked also, due to a large number of Afghan refugees that emigrated to Iran after 1979, when the war started. Furthermore, there are also Iranian political, ideological, economic and security interests in their eastern neighbouring country, which Iran demonstrates in various ways. On one hand, they fuel with weapons the Sunni Taliban, on the other hand, they belong to the group of countries that spend enormous investment for the recovery of Afghanistan, especially to its western part. This contradictory tactic of Iran gives the impression that they are not clear about their strategic interests in Afghanistan. Iranian engagement in Afghanistan does not have the same stimulus as their activities in neighbouring Iraq. Iran fears the collapsing state in their neighbourhood and the effect it may have on Iran's domestic policy.

Headnote

The long common history of Iran and Afghanistan is linked with their cultural vicinity and interconnection. Afghanistan and Iran are partially connected, due to the similarity of languages and Shia religion. Furthermore, both countries are linked also due to a large number of Afghan refugees that emigrated to Iran after 1979, when the war started. Furthermore, there are also Iranian political, ideological, economic and security interests in their eastern neighbouring country, which Iran demonstrates in various ways. One can notice a certain contradiction. On one hand, they fuel with weapons the Sunni Taliban, on the other hand, they belong to the group of countries that spend enormous investment for the recovery of Afghanistan, especially to its western part. This contradictory tactic of Iran gives the impression that they are not clear about their strategic interests in Afghanistan. Iranian engagement in Afghanistan does not have the same stimulus as their activities in neighbouring Iraq. Iran fears the collapsing state in their neighbourhood and the effect it may have on Iran's domestic policy. Based on the historical background of the relations, the article reflects the nature of Iranian "whip and sugar" policy towards their eastern neighbour. A policy which can hardly be considered balanced.

Keywords: national interests, bilateral relations, common historical heritage, unequal status, unstable neighbouring state, infiltration, Talib.

Introduction

Persia (as the predecessor of Iran, after 1935) has boasted in the past several times with its powerful status. In the modern history, it acts rather as a country that has to deal with multiple threats towards its stability and security. At present, Iran (officially Islamic Republic of Iran - Domhúri-je eslámí-je Írán) claims its status of regional power, while its policy is orientated in four directions: Turkey and Southern Caucasus, the Middle East and Persian Gulf, Central Asia - Afghanistan, South Asia (Pakistan and India).

This study particularly focuses on the third direction, which has acquired significance especially after the end of Cold War and when it was necessary to deal with the question of defining the relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and their neighbouring countries in the north and east. However, their relations with Afghanistan are rather peculiar, as will be shown throughout the paper.

The presence of American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq in the first ten years of the new millennium was perceived in Tehran with a certain amount of nervousness. It has been interpreted as a threat towards the Islamic Republic of Iran1, which, in my opinion, can, in certain situations, result in a military conflict. The United States have not been hiding that Iran is in the centre of their foreign policy interests. Iran neighbours upon Pakistan and Afghanistan, i.e. according to the USA, with states forming the main front of the so-called "war on terrorism".

In general, it is not a secret that Tehran educates, supplies and trains Shia fighters for actions in Iraq. We suppose they have lately been using the same tactic also in Pakistan and Afghanistan. A strange situation of seemingly contradictory activities has occurred: on one hand, they were supplying arms channels directed to the Sunni Taliban2 (tying American forces in Afghanistan), on the other hand, the Iranians contribute with large investments into economic development and reconstruction of Afghanistan3, particularly in its western part, which they border upon.

The seemingly contradictory policy of Iran makes us think that it has not so obvious important strategic interests in Afghanistan. However, Iranian engagement in Afghanistan and their activities in Iraq do not have a common stimulus. If Iranian strategy towards Iraq is motivated by the efforts to complicate the plans of the USA and the West, then Iran is worried because of the collapsing Afghanistan and the effect of the impact on Iran's domestic policy. Iran's neighbourhood policy can be summed up by the words of the Russian academician Leonid erbain: "Iranians are pragmatics... used to cheat on their partners. They care about their own interests rather than about the interests of the international society or the suffering humankind."4

Based on the historical background of the relations, the aim of this study is to present the reader Iranian activities in Afghanistan, define their goals and show the nature of Iranian "whip and sugar" policy towards their eastern neighbour.

1. Historical Background of Relations

Iranian interests in Afghanistan are more than 2000 years old. They result not just from the centuries during which today's Afghanistan was under the dominion of Persia (with an emphasis on the strategic location of the town of Herat in western Afghanistan), but also from the continuous identifying of present-day Iranians with the achieved power and influence of the ancient Persian empire5.

During the reign of Cyrus the Great in Persia (Achaemenian dynasty, 559 - 530 B.C.), many Iranian tribes were united along with neighbouring countries6. The large empire spread from Greece and Egypt to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Its fame faded away in 331 B.C., when it was defeated by the forces of Alexander the Great within his huge eastern campaign.

During the next centuries, in the Persian territory various state structures arose and fell - some of them including the territory of today's Afghanistan. Parthian empire, as well as Sassanid rule included parts of Near East (from Mediterranean Sea) to Central Asia and today's India. The Persian dominion in the region lasted until the Arab raid. Until 644 A.D., Arab forces conquered major part of Iran and Islam gradually gained in the region dominant position.

Further on, both domestic and foreign dynasties reigned in Persia. Iranians began to gain influence in the country during the Abbasid caliphate in the 8th century A.D. From the 9th to 10th centuries, the Samanid dynasty ruled in Afghanistan and brought Persian rule to the Afghan territory. In the 11th century, a Turkish dynasty took over the rule and two centuries later, the Mongols from the east came. In the 15th century, the town of Herat was the capital city of Jahan Shah - ruler of the Turkish dynasty Quara Qojunlu. At the beginning of the 16th century, Ismail I. - the grounder of the Safavid dynasty - became the Shah. He converted Persians to shiitism. After his death, Tahmasp I. took over the rule at the age of just 10 years.

In spite of the fact that Persians had lost several eastern territories due to Uzbek raids, Tahmasp managed to repel the aggressor and gain control over Herat for some time. Later, between the 16th and 17th centuries, Shah Abbas reformed Persian army and continued in the war against Uzbeks with the aim to extend the reign of Safavids to the whole West Afghanistan. At the beginning of the 18th century, the reign of the Safavid dynasty declined. Influential Ghilzai and Abdali tribes in Afghanistan rebelled against Persian power.

The takeover by Qajar dynasty at the turn of the 18th and 19th century is connected with the rise of Iranian nationalism. When Iran started building institutions and structure typical for a national state, Shah Muhammad more and more claimed Herat. This was a completely different strategic situation in Central Asia, where particularly European colonial powers have for a longer time been struggling for their influence. British rulers of India were afraid of Russian imperial interests in India as well as the possible Iranian - Russian alliance in Afghanistan. As a result of British pressure, Shah Muhammad retreated from Afghan territory.

However, Qajar dynasty members did not give up their interest in Herat, which had strategic importance for them. The ruling dynasty was convinced that the acquirement of the town and its surrounding would grant them the advantage of the Massif, which would make it easier to protect Chorasan (an important agricultural area), holy town of Mashhad as well as surrounding centres from more and more destructive raids of Turkmen tribes. In October 1856, Iranian forces of Naser al-Din Shah conquered Herat. British reaction was immediate: 6000 British soldiers disembarked in Iranian port Bushehr. The surprised Iranians agreed with the conditions of Parisian pact from 1857 and retreated from the Afghan territory.

Iran still claims Herat, considering it to be part of its historical and cultural heritage. The interconnection of Iran with their eastern neighbour is not just of historical character. Most Afghan people are connected with Persians both by blood and ethnolinguistic point of view, too. The biggest ethnic group in Afghanistan are Pasthuns (cca 45%) - sometimes incorrectly considered the only genuine Afghans. But there are also other ethnic groups having bloodlines with Iranian Persians. The biggest are Tadjiks (cca 38%) and Hazaras (cca 10%). There are also some smaller groups such as Baloch people and Nuristanis. Approximately 50% of all Afghan people speak Dari - Afghan Persian language, which is one of the two official languages in Afghanistan (the other one being Pastho).

Since the unfortunate British - Iranian war at the middle of XIXth century, there were no more attempts of Teheran to gain control over the western Afghan territory. Until the victory of Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, both countries had similar interests, allowing them to cooperate.

2. Situation after Iranian Islamic Revolution

More significant engagement of present-day Iranian regime in Afghanistan can be noticed at the beginning of the 80s, when the Islamic Republic of Iran supported the anti-taliban revolt and religious and ethnically close minorities against Sunni radicalism. The tension between the two states escalated in 1998, when Taliban after conquering the town of Mazar i-Sharif in the north of Afghanistan murdered several Iranian diplomats. Iranian reaction to this event was a large military exercise with almost 300 000 soldiers participating and this situation almost resulted in war7.

After the 9/11 events in the USA and the consequent allied invasion in 2001, Iran maintained its contacts with a number of armed groups and even started supporting other groups that began to occur. This strategy served Iran to maintain their influence in Afghanistan, and at the same time, it was a tool of activities against the United States. Iran's worries about the American military presence in the West (Iraq) and in the East (Afghanistan) gave rise, in my opinion, to considerable frustration. Because of the fear that proamerican Afghanistan could offer Americans important military and strategic opportunities, Tehenran applied the strategy of supporting practically all significant anti-American armed groups in Afghanistan. Even though the ethnic and religious factor plays an important role in Iranian support, it turned out not the most important one. According to the American report on terrorism, Iran is willing to supply guns, ammunition and other military equipment to Sunni radical Pasthuns and to Taliban, who were former enemies regarding ideologic aspects8.

The most important way of supporting the anti- American rebels are primarily gun supplies and financial support. Since the 90s, in international politics, Iran in considered a pragmatic state, willing to sponsor any military or political structure who could serve their regional interest, especially regarding the limitation of external influence, primarily American, at their frontiers.

This is particularly the case of Taliban and Pasthun groups connected to them. Paradoxically, US allies - Saudi Arabia9 and Pakistan - are among their supporters. Pakistan, with their secret service ISI, in the mid 90s, helped train Taliban in the Pakistani refugee camps10. Iranian activities are thus some form of compensation for the Saudi Arabian and Pakistani force within the competition for regional leadership.

At the beginning, not much has been known about the origin of guns that emerged in Afghanistan. However, it was obvious that the guns got there via Iran. Those were handguns, rocket- propelled grenade launchers and plastic explosives. The reactions and commentaries of American military representatives were at the beginning very careful - the comments implied that "the guns might have been manufactured in Iran". Later, the comments referred to the Taliban leaders who reportedly admitted these guns supplies, including heavy guns. Some information on Iranian gun supplies was later confirmed due to the serial numbers of guns and their parts. In spite of that, the gun supplies for Taliban are not as huge as the supplies for other groups (ethnically and religiously closer). It is largely affected also by logistic problems that occur when it is necessary to transport goods through the whole territory of Afghanistan to areas controlled by Taliban. The far more convenient route for Taliban supplies leads right from Pakistan, which is easier, due to the strong mutual ties and ethnic identity of Pasthuns on both sides of the border11. Iran is cautious about supplying Taliban, which is partially influenced by the fact that Iran does not want Taliban become the strongest and best equipped group in Afghanistan again. From Iran's point of view, it seems best to maintain power of Taliban just to allow them to effectively weaken American position in country. It is definitely not for Iran's sake to reestablish Taliban regime12. According to this idea, we can assume that as soon as western forces retreat from Afghanistan, Iranian support for Sunni Pasthuns will be interrupted and this support will be even more focused on other preferred powers in the country.

There is a similar case of supporting Galbuddin Hekmatyar13, who has had good relations with Iran. In 1997, Hekmatyar fled from Taliban to the neighbouring country - Iran, where in Teheran he found a safe refuge. Iranian government has since then considered him a "useful Pasthun", who returned to Afghanistan in 2002 and joined the active fight against the United States10. His group is an important receiver of Iranian support, but Hekmatyar, as well as Taliban, is a pragmatic player, more Pakistan-oriented and acting far from Iranian - Afghan border. His position and activities are far more dependent on grants from the Pakistani side than from Iranian side. In this case, we can likewise assume that after the retreat of coalition forces from Afghanistan, his cooperation with Iran will significantly decline. Hekmatyar has been cooperating with Iran on guns supplies, ammunition and other military equipment, but unlike other Afghan warlords, he has not been participating in the active drug dealing14.

Iran has been supporting also other groups, networks and individuals in Afghanistan. These are especially Tadjik and Hazar community, due to their religious and ethnic closeness. Iran has had the biggest influence in the long term in Herat province, but we should not underestimate its influence also in the centre in Kabul. Iranians have been building loyalty and cooperation with high government officials, particularly by means of financial stimuli. For example, officials from the Afghan president's Office receive, according to Iranian sources, 2 million euro per year. It is obvious that this financial stimulus affects (directly or indirectly) the president himself in his decision-making process and approach15.

Another means of Iranian influence in Afghanistan was also one of the Iranian allies, Burhanuddin Rabbani, ethnic Tadjik, former Afghan president, fighter against Taliban and a frequent visitor to Iran. He had strong ties to Iranian regime and his Office in the centre of Teheran was paid and even protected by Iranian government. His murder in 2011 caused a big fuss there and meant a significant loss for the power of Iran in Afghanistan. In this context, there were many speculations that Rabbani's death could have been a product of Iranian - Pakistani rivalry in Afghanistan.

A more significant penetration of Iran in Afghanistan occurred after the fall of Taliban, however, since then Iran has been cooperating with several organizations: with the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan - an organization fighting against Taliban, with Shiite guerrillas Harakt-i-Islami (Islamic movement), Hezb-i- Wahdat, Hezb-i-Wahdat-e Islami, Shura-e-Itehad (Union of Islamic Front), Sazman-e Nasr (Victory Organization) and Sepah-i-Pasdaran (Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution), with Jumbesh- i-Melli Islami (National Islamic Movement) representing Uzbek and Turkmeni minority, but also with Sunni guerrillas from Pakistan Hezb-i-Islami (Islamic Party).

Influential receivers of Iranian financial support and important allies in Afghan policy of Teheran are Ismail Khan, Mohammad Mohaqiq, Sayed Hussain Anwari, Daud Saba or Muhammad Asif Muhsini. Ismail Khan is, at present, probably the most important ally of Iran in Afghanistan. This ethnic Tajik and former commander of anti-taliban Northern alliance has been taking Iranian support for a longer time. He is the head warlord in the Herat Province and Minister of Water and Energy of the Kabul central government at the same time. He is often nicknamed Iranian president in relation to his strong orientation towards his western neighbour16. In our opinion, is more than probable that Khan himself is going to be the most important man in Afghanistan after the retreat of coalition forces from the country.

Another mentioned ally is Mohammad Mohaqiq, currently a Member of Parliament, the founder and chairman of the People's Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan. He is the unofficial leader of the Hazara people. When he held the post of Vice-president, he significantly represented Iran's interests, which was one of the reasons of the tension between him and president Karzai.

Sayed Hussain Anwari is Shi'ite Hazara, currently a Member of Parliament and former governor of Herat province. His ties to Iran rose in the course of the civil war, when he was the commander of the Northern Alliance. As the governor of Herat in the years 2005 to 200817 he became an important tool of Iranian activities in the province, as well as in the rest of the country. He allowed many Iranian companies to make business and invest in Herat. The same applies for Daud Saba, Anwari's follower on the post of the governor of Herat. He is, in my opinion, an important ally of Tehran, with which cooperates closely, also trading with Iranian companies.

In the religious field, Asif Muhsini has been an important Iranian tool in Afghanistan. Muhammad Asif Muhsini, Tajik shi'a marja, Ayattolah, who, despite his arguments with the Ayattolah Khomeini in the 80s, was the key pro-Iranian religious authority. Religion plays an important role in Afghanistan, in which Iran strengthen their power. The main Iranian religious organization acting in Afghanistan is the Imam Khomeini Emdad Committee (or Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation), which supports financially Shia advocates all over the world, providing they are willing to be loyal to Teheran. The Committee has its own sources to finance cultural and religious activities in Afghanistan - support for celebration of the Day of Assura18, building Shia mosques, religious schools and culture centres, teaching Farsi (Afghan Persian - second official language in the country) and Arabic or the printing and distribution of Quran. While Afghan religious representatives teach in these mosques and schools, they themselves have been educated in Iranian centres of Shia Islam in Qom or Mashad. Thus, they embody the will of Iranian religious representatives in Afghanistan19.

3. Iranian Economic Support for Afghanistan

Iran has participated in reconstruction of Afghanistan and enhanced the economic and cultural diversity within the investments in their Eastern neighbour. The investments flew into Afghan public administration, infrastructure, power engineering, agriculture, healthcare and communication.20 According to the American Congressional Research Service, the government in Tehran offered Afghanistan in 2001 humanitarian aid also in form of fuel and transport totalling 500 million dollars.21

In 2009, Iran was the fourth biggest source of direct foreign investments in Afghanistan. Iran belongs to the main business partners of the country (along with the USA, Pakistan, India, Russia and Germany)22. The value of the official Iranian - Afghan trade exchange has been persistently growing. In 2001, it was just 10 million USD, while in 2006 up to 500 million USD.23 Sales of goods grow largely due to 90% reduction of import duty, which was suggested by the government in Tehran. The activities of Tehran within the reconstruction of one of the poorest countries in the world is supposed to prevent the collapse of Afghanistan as a state. A neighbour like that would for Iran (coping with their own economic and social problems) be the source of even bigger wave of refugees and threat in form of organized crime and drugs.

It is worth mentioning that most of the Iranian investments in Afghanistan is in three border provinces - Herat, Farah and Nimroz and includes infrastructural projects, roads and bridges construction, education, power engineering and telecommunication. Iran has been building 176km section of railway to Herat, modernizing custom- houses, interconnection of Iranian docks Chabahr with Kandahar and Kabul24.The biggest Iranian car factory Iran Khodro has announced investments up to 20 million for the construction of car factory in Herat. Moreover, Iran has opened Chamber of Commerce for faster and easier business contacts. A new branch of Firdausi University of Mashhad will soon be opened in Herat 25.

Tehran's goal is not just the reconstruction, but also integration of border provinces of Afghanistan into the infrastructure and trade of Iran. When the planned projects in Herat, Farah and Nimroz provinces are finished, this Afghan territory will be more integrated with the Western neighbour than the rest of Afghanistan26.

Economic development of these border areas of Iran is also supposed to enhance the security situation in this area. First, there is supposed to be a new buffer zone to divide Iran from unstable Afghan provinces. Thus, the protection of borders with Afghanistan is strengthened and, due to the war on drugs, a concrete wall along the 936 km long border with Afghanistan is being built. Finally, development assistance and investments are perfect coverage for Iranian secret service activities in the area which the strategic enemy of Iran - the United States of America - are interested in.

4. Herat Province in the Centre of Attention

As stated above, the biggest Iranian interest in Afghanistan is geographically focused on provinces bordering with Iran. Particular attention is paid to Herat province, which is closely connected to Iran (historically, ethnically, linguistically and religiously) and many Iranians even today consider it a part of Iran, which was annexed to Afghanistan only because of historical circumstances. Citizens of Herat speak modern Persian - Farsi, the form of which is almost identical with common everyday language anywhere in Iran. They differ this way from the rest of Afghanistan, since Dari is, in many ways, different from Persian. The closeness of Herat province with Iranian province Khorasan is affected also by hundreds of years of migration, settling down and trade between both areas. People from Herat often work in Iran, study, trade, start families in the Iranian Mashad and send the earned money to their relatives in Afghanistan. Herat is, in general, considered one of the most democratic, most liberal and most suitable provinces for life in the whole Afghanistan. Iran has a big influence here due to money transfer and direct or indirect investments. They influence construction of schools, mosques, hospitals and administrative buildings. Finances are supplied from Tehran and projects are completed by Afghan engineers, who studied at Iranian technical universities.

Iran invests into the transport infrastructure of the province, too. They build road network, e.g. the route from Eslam Qal'eh at the Iranian border to the town of Herat, or they build roads heading to the South to an important Iranian port Chabahar. Recently, they have also built roads heading to the North and providing connection between Iran and Turkmenistan and especially with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan via Afghan territory. Large investments are spent in the development of railroads, while rail between Afghanistan and Iran represents a thoroughfare reaching as far as Persian Gulf and also the connection to European, Russian and Middle Asian railroad system. It is necessary to emphasize that everything is under control of Tehran27.

Except direct investments in infrastructure and constructions, Iran exports to Afghanistan large amounts of building material. In Herat province, they are the exclusive supplier of asphalt. Thanks to this, they participate not only in development of infrastructure, but they also have significant control over planning and execution.

Concerning Iran, it is a general fact that export of any kind of goods is very important. Without Iran, Herat and other areas would lack consumables, energy, machines and grocery. On a large scale, Iran supplies vehicles (such as the production of the car factory Iran Khodro and SAIPA), petrol, oil, grocery and medicines. Thanks to these supplies, Iran is very popular in Herat. They especially enjoy the favor of local governments, mayors, local elders, whom they regularly "reward" with a respective amount of money and thus gain their loyalty and goodwill, as well as the space for their own investments in the country. Another Iranian tool in the country are consulates. Their main official mission is to issue visas to common Afghan people and businessmen. However, regarding the combination of two factors - big fluctuation of people from one state to another and permeability of borders - it is not a very popular service. Official issuance of visas lags behind the unofficial issuance or simple crossing the borders without any official permission. A far more important role of Iranian consulates in Afghanistan (especially in border provinces Herat and Nimroz) is what all consulates and embassies do - gaining information.

Similarly to other Muslim countries, another Iranian source of influence in Afghanistan are foundations (wakf). The two largest ones - Bonyad-e Shahid and Bonyade-e Mostazafan28 directly or indirectly participate in investments in infrastructure, building material supplies and energy. They are linked to many businessmen who create new companies with names and ownership structure independent from Iranian foundations, i.e. it is very difficult to prove their interconnection or participation of Iranian funds in the trade. This is how hundreds of companies act in Herat and other provinces. They participate in government (Afghan and Iranian) contracts, which are, in fact, run by Iranian foundations.29

5. Afghan Refugees Issue

Afghan refugees and seasonal workers present a problem which influences the relations between Tehran and Kabul in a negative way. The estimated number is 2.500.000 people30. Ministry of Interior of the Islamic Republic of Iran sees the main cause for this in the security and economic situation of Afghanistan31. Migration is made easier due to similar languages (Dari - Afghan Persian language) and common religion (Shiism), which is practised by groups of Afghan citizens.

In the past, especially in the 60s and 70s, migration was officially controlled. During the following two decades there were masses of Afghan war refugees running to Iran. However, since they did not have the official status of a refugee, any movement across the border was, at that time, considered a flow of illegal workers.

After the fall of Taliban in 2001, the phase of repatriation started. Yet, there were many burdens. From April to July 2007 approximately 130 000 Afghans were expelled from Iran. Because of international criticism, Iranian officials later reduced the speed of forced expulsions and in July 2007 they finally stopped32.

It is obvious that deportation policy regarding Afghan refugees was abused for propaganda and justifying homeland issues. The negative attitude of Iranian society towards Afghan refugees can still be seen in Tehran. The populist government of president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad blamed the unstable neighbour for the economic crisis in Iran. The big noise about the issue of mass deportations of Afghan refugees was supposed to distract the public from the homeland economic problems33.

The policy of Afghan refugees deportations predominantly serves to create pressure on Afghan government, since Iran is well aware of the fact, that Afghanistan is not able to accept 2.5 million people. Accepting a bigger number of refugees would destabilize the situation of the Eastern neighbour of Iran. Tehran thus indicates that the key to security in the Western part of Afghanistan is in hands of Iran and not Washington. The tough policy towards refugees was supposed to get public support for the administration of Ahmadinejad. Criteria for Afghan refugees were therefore toughened, too. For example, their right of residence in several Iranian provinces and towns has been taken away34.

Negotiations and diplomatic manoeuvres may bring some results in the following years. Tehran alleviated the speed and course of the forced deportations. In spite of that, there was some information about deportations at the beginning of 2009 again. According to this information, there were 9000 deported Afghans in January and about 13 000 in April. In 2010, about 7500 Afghans returned from Iran. The next year, it was more than 15 000 people, while the main provinces where people returned to were Kabul (26%), Nangahar (14%), Herat (8%), Kandahar, Laghman, Balkh, Baghlan and Paktya (each 4%)35.

6. "Security Concerns"

The tension in the relations between Iran and the West has grown during the last 33 years. The overthrown Shah Pahlavi (ally of the USA) was replaced by the theocratic regime of Ayatollah Khomeini, who was called by the United States "The Great Satan". The Americans reacted later on by including Iran among the states called "The Axis of Evil". The situation has got complicated after Iran agreed to follow their nuclear programme. But from the current Iranian government point of view, the roots of distrust towards the Western countries are still in the year 1953, when the Prime Minister of Iran Mohammad Mosadegh was overthrown in a coup d'etát orchestrated by the Great Britain and with the help of the USA. The pro-American Muhammad Reza Pahlavi was appointed head of government, against Iranian nationalists.

Thus, it is quite a logic explanation that the Iranian support for Afghan rebels is supposed to thwart the American plans of stabilizing the region. The presence of American and coalition forces near Iranian borders is in Tehran considered as an immediate threat of their national security. Providing training and equipment for rebels thwarts military forces and means of coalition. When we consider the fact that a similar tactics of support was chosen by Tehran also against Iranian rebels, the only conclusion is the Iranian strategy is to divert the military endeavour of coalition into a larger area. Instability in Iraq was beneficial also for Iran's economic goals. It caused the decline of Iraqi oil production, which consequently decreased its price on the world markets and Iran achieved superior profit.

Such explanation of Iranian strategy and attitude towards Afghanistan is not complete. Firstly, it does not consider the diversity of Iranian engagement in Afghan affairs that we tackled in the previous parts of this article. If Iran was interested just in distracting and weakening American and coalition forces, why would they search for such financial means to restore Afghanistan? Secondly, disregardless which government is in power in Tehran, it will have to deal with the same economic, ethnic, religious and social problems and challenges. Thus, to understand the Iranian interests in Afghanistan as a collapsing neighbouring country is more important36.

7. Afghan Factor as a Tool to Solve Iranian Problems

Generally speaking, any unstable state with a weak leadership and administration and permeable borders in the imminence is a problem. Such state can cause complications on the regional, and in some situations, also global scale. It can be the reason for conflicts, civil wars, refugee waves and consequent humanitarian crises needing to be solved by the forces of international society.

Experts argue about how to characterize the situation of Afghan state at present. The annual review by the organization Fund for Peace - by means of The Failed States Index - places Afghanistan in 2013 on the 7th place in the ranking (out of 178 evaluated states) regarding the riskness and the possible unstable course of progress37. From this point of view, the Iranian concerns about their unstable neighbour are justified.

Iran uses their Afghan activities handily for their own inner political intentions. In the years 2001- 2005, when the rise of oil prices allowed Iran to offer significant sources for the restoration of the country, there were better circumstances for economic consolidation and, therefore, also good conditions for refugees to return to Afghanistan. However, the rise of national income from the oil sale covered also deeper economic problems of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Oil and gas form approximately 80% of Iranian export and more than two thirds of national income. Energy sector did not stimulate the rise and creation of jobs of the whole society.

There are other export commodities, such as carpets and pistachios, nevertheless, those are not of big importance.

In relation to the situation in Afghanistan in the years 2003 - 2006, when Taliban began to obtain their lost positions again, the position of Iran, the neighbour of the biggest opium producer in the world, has also worsened. Iran is one of the countries most struck by the dramatic rise of opium production in Afghanistan after the year 2001. In the world ranking of drug addiction Iran takes the highest places.

In October 2009 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) research showed that there were at least 2 million people drug addicted in Iran. Iran receives 15% of world opium production and published data show that this number is still growing. Iranian borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan are very busy routes regarding drug smuggling. 60% of opium transported from Afghanistan crosses Iran 38.

Teheran fights the violent groups of smugglers who move along the borders. They are often interconnected with armed groups from Afghanistan and Pakistan. The line between organized crime and extremist religious militants is getting thinner and thinner39. Hundreds of Iranian security agents were killed by smugglers.

In 2008, Iranians confiscated 1000 tons of drugs and spend 500 million USD every year on fighting the smuggling. Most of it is spent on building infrastructure around the borders and the training of customs officers. Lack of organs in Kabul to supervise the production and trade with opium and unwillingness to cooperate and fight these phenomena complicate the normal neighbourhood relations between Iran and Afghanistan.

When Ahmadinejad took the Office and the situation in Afghanistan got less and less stable there was a significant turn in Iranian policy. The president used higher income from the energy sector to enhance the welfare of the poorest people. However, he did not do the most important thing; he did not take measures to eliminate unemployment40.

In 2007, Iranian administration realized that their economy needs radical reforms. There was an uncontrolled rise of contraband rise. Due to public expenditure rise, Tehran had a difficult task of reducing grants.

Also, because of an extreme rise of prices of common rice, the grant system for bakery products was supposed to be reformed so that it would work just for the poor and not for all citizens. Finally, this intention was not implemented. But there was a back-up plan in form of rationing of subsidized petrol.

While Ahmadinejad was the president, Iranian policy towards Afghanistan was influenced by several inner political factors. Afghanistan became a political scapegoat, which has been considered the cause of economic problems in Iran. At the same time, Iran's approach focused less on development and reconstruction of Afghanistan, but more on securing the border with the aim to stop drug trade.

Considering the Iranian worries about Afghan drugs, we may ask why does Iran supply guns to the same group that does not allow consumption of drugs in their own territory, but unscrupulously uses the incomes from growing and exporting drugs for their own goals.

Let us not forget that guns do not travel to border provinces Herat, Farah and Nimroz, but to the South to Kandahar and Helmand. By investing in the three provinces, Iran creates a buffer zone towards other Afghan provinces. This can definitely have effect on destabilization of the whole Afghanistan41.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is seriously interested in becoming the regional leader. Iranians are proud of their historical fame of Persian empires. Afghanistan as an unstable state can stir its ambitions.

Thus, Iran stands in front of a difficult task - find a compromise between a strong Afghanistan not threatening them with drugs and refugee waves and a reasonably weak Afghanistan to remain in a subordinate position towards Tehran.

8. Developmental Tendencies of the Situation

Recent events in the political, economic and military field have doubted the ability and ideas of Iran regarding their policy towards Afghanistan. It was caused especially by the reduction in oil prices. In the recent years, this has caused more than 50% reduction of national income and has had a negative effect on unemployment (cca 17%) and inflation (cca 25%). Another factor Iran had to deal with was the pressure of international community in form of sanctions due to their nuclear programme. Last, but not least, it was the distrust in presidential election results, which finally drove the country in a dangerous turbulent position. Although things calmed down after the mass demonstrations, we cannot say that the situation was solved. It is just a question of time until the young frustrated society turns against their government again because of the worsening economic situation.

Another aspect of the support for Afghanistan remains questionable. Political promises will hardly be fulfilled if Iran does not have adequate economic potential. Economic crisis used up foreign currency reserves and the country will have to try harder to focus on their inner problems. President Ahmadinejad has fought for voters' trust by means of a stronger policy of subventions and grants. Afghan issue served him as one of the factors for justifying the homeland problems.

Hassan Rouhani won the presidential elections in June 2013. He is being presented as a moderate cleric who is tightly connected to the present day regime and also to the "father founder" of Islamic Republic of Iran - Ayatollah Khomeini, whose assistant he was. Hassan Rouhani represents rather hope than certainty of real significant change of Iranian policy. In spite of strong public mandate, he is not in the position of directly elected presidents of western political systems. Regarding the foreign affairs, including Iranian policy towards Afghanistan, this change could bring less populism and more pragmatism that is so necessary for solving bilateral relations, as well as regional problems, which are the subject of interest of both countries. During the inauguration of the new minister of foreign affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif, Rouhani announced he was in favour of rhetoric change, which should be less confrontational. "Foreign policy is not pursued by repeating slogans," he stated about the harsh rhetoric of his predecessor Mahmud Ahmadinejad that led Iran into isolation. Rouhani emphasized that foreign policy shall be used to gain recognition, which is necessary for Iran at present. He pointed out that "It does not mean that we give up our principles, we just change the method"; Iran will still advocate their interests, but "in an adequate and rational way"42.

Theoretically, it is possible that Iran agrees on negotiations with the USA and European countries. In this case, Iran could become the mediator in solving the Afghan issue and the main activator of Afghanistan's reconstruction. The USA and its allies could be able to perform the so-called trade strategy. Iranian offer would, therefore, occur along with the claim for consent for their nuclear programme.

Conclusions

Iran's approach to their eastern neighbour has several aspects, which have one thing in common: following Iran's own national interests. The security aspect tries to undermine the American (and coalition) force in the country, since Iran considers them a significant security threat. Thus, on one hand, they agreed on a limited support for Sunii radicals from within Taliban, i.e. their religions and ideological enemies. On the other hand, they markedly support ethnically and religiously similar communities in Afghanistan, with whom they plan to cooperate after the retreat of American armed forces.

From the geographical point of view, Iranian influence focuses on the area of provinces close to Afghan border, while the biggest support is devoted to Herat province. However, Iranian influence is notable also on central level in Kabul. Investment and trade play an important role in enforcing Iranian influence in Afghanistan43.

It is not just the geographically and ethnically close border provinces where Iran dominates and stimulates economic, intellectual and spiritual growth of the citizens. This way, Iran obliges the citizens and strengthens their loyalty towards it at the expense of the more distant and ineffective centre in Kabul.

Afghanistan is important to Iran from economic and political perspectives because of the access to the states of Central Asia. In this context, an old situation is mentioned from the times of "The Great Game" - who controls Afghanistan, controls Central Asia. In the long term, Afghan territory may serve for Iran for the transport of energy to China, which is an important purchaser of Iranian natural gas and oil.

Success of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the economic and political influence expansion to the East is yet more and more affected by the course of situation inside the country. Present-day political leaders of Iran apply the "whip and sugar" policy towards their neighbour for several reasons. Firstly, they care about stabilization and securing their own border. Afghan refugees distract the society form the inner economic problems. Secondly, with the policy of including border provinces under their influence, they try to weaken the power of central Kabul government. Although this attitude is far from friendly, it tries to distract people from their own problems.

In general, Iran contributes to the economic development and political stability in the region, however, Iranian activities play a rather minor role in the economic development of Afghanistan and its northern neighbours. This is caused, partially, by their own insufficient economy and partially by lack of experience of Iranian companies with investments in foreign projects.

For the citizens of Western provinces of Afghanistan, Iranian engagement definitely brings along a number of benefits which the central government in Kabul is not able to provide. On the other side, this also presents a negative factor for the stability of Afghanistan as a whole, because their central government is evidently weakened by foreign engagement, which on one hand provides financial aid, and, on the other hand, focuses on specific regions and pursues their own pragmatic strategic goals.

When we consider the Iranian engagement in support for anti-American and anti-Kabul militants, Iran undoubtedly represents at least a controversial element in building the Afghan state.

Footnote

NOTES:

1 The name of the Islamic Republic of Iran is connected to the revolution in 1979 (author's note).

2 K. Jha LALIT, "Concern in US over increasing Iranian activity in Afghanistan", in Pajhwok Afghan News, March 16, 2011, available at http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2011/ 03/16/concern-us-over-increasing-iranian-activity-afghanistan; A. AIRAN, "Iran accused of supporting Afghan insurgents. Cultural and economic influence weighs heavily in country's control over militants", Central Asia online, June 7, 2010, available at http://centralasiaonline. com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2010/06/07/feature-03

3 A. DZISIÓW-SZUSZCZYKIEWICZ, "Analiza nt. polityki Iranu wobec Afganistanu", in Biuro bezpieczenstwa narodowego. Departament Analiz Strategicznych, p. 6, Warszawa, December 23, 2010, available at www.bbn.gov.pl/.../AnalizaBBNntpolitykiI ranuwob...

4 K. MÓZOVÁ, "Teherán spája ideológiu a pragmatizmus", in Despite Borders - Central Eastern European Watch, January 1, 2008, available at http://www.despiteborders.com/clanky/data/upimages/mo zova_iran_extremizmus-SK.pdf.

5 M. AXWORTHY, D?jiny Íránu. ?íe ducha - od Zarathutry po sou?asnost, Praha, Nakladatelství lidové noviny, 2009.

6 Ibidem, pp. 17-22.

7 "Iran army forces parade near Afghan border", in CNN World, November 1, 1998, available at http:// articles.cnn.com/1998-1101/world/9811_01_iran.Wargames _1_afghan-border-official-iranian-news-agency- afghan- taliban?_s=PM:WORLD

8 Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, United States Department of State Publication, April 2012, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/195768.pdf , accessed on 2013-05-05.

9 A. TELLIS, MUKHARJI, J. (eds.), "Is a Regional Strategy Viable in Afghanistan?", in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 2010, pp. 45-50, available at www.CarnegieEndowment. org/pubs; S. SHAHID, "Engaging Regional Players in Afghanistan. Threats and Opportunities", in A Report of the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Project on October 15, 2009, available at http://csis.org/files/ publication/ 091124_afghan_players_0.pdf

10 A. RASHID, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Paksitan, Afghanistan and Central Asia, London, Viking, 2008; A. RASHID, Taliban: Islam, oil and the new great game in central Asia, London, I.B.Tauris, 2002; K. MATINUDDIN, The Taliban Phenomenon. Afghanistan 1994 - 1997. With an Afterword Covering Major Events since 1997, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1999.

11 B. MISZTAL, "Upadajace panstwo jako sasiad: Strategia Iranu wobec Afganistanu", in Sprawy polityczne No. 1 (39), 2009, pp. 43-44; R. NORTON-TAYLOR, J.BORGER, "British special forces seize Iranian rockets in Afghanistan", The Guardian online, 9. 3. 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar /09/iranian-rockets-afghanistan-taliban-nimruz, accessed on 2012-11-10; ***, "Iran supplies weapons to Taliban", Channel 4 News, 18. 3 2010, available at http://www.channel4.com/news/iran-supplies-weapons- to-taliban, accessed on 2012-10-10; M. GORDON, "U.S. Says Iranian Arms Seized in Afghanistan", The New York Times, 18. 4. 2007, available at http://www.nytimes. com/2007/04/18/world/middleeast/18military. html?_r=0, accessed on 2012-10-10; A. HAIRAN, Iran accused of supporting Afghan insurgents. Cultural and economic influence weighs heavily in country's control over militants, available at http://centralasiaonline.com/en _GB/articles/caii/features/main/2010/06/07/feature-03; ***, Les Organisations terroristes financées par les Mollahs, Iran - Resist (Iran hotline info), available at http://www.iran-resist.org/ir139

12 L. ?ECH, Regionálne aspekty a súvislosti medzinárodnopolitického vývoja Afganistanu, Ekonom, Bratislava, 2011, pp. 80-88; 131.

13 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is ethnic Pasthun, who founded and lead the military organization and political party Hezb-e Islámí, he was engaged in the war against the Soviet Union. In the course of the civil war, he strengthened his positions by violence and terror and when Taliban came to power, he emigrated to come back to the country again after the allied invasion and to lead war against the United States and the regime in Kabul, M. TAHIR, "Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Return to the Afghan Insurgency", in Terrorism Monitor Volume, 29.5.2008, ro?. 6, ?. 11, available at http://www.jamestown.org/b programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4951&tx_ttnew s[backPid]= 167& no_ache=1, accessed at 2013-04-06.

14 J. KRAUS, "Íránské aktivity v Afghánistánu: Konstruktivní nebo destruktivní p?ístup?", in Defence & Strategy online, 15.12.2012, vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 45-52, available at http://www.defenceandstrategy.eu/cs/aktualni-cislo-2-2012/ volna-tribuna/iranske-aktivity-v-afghanistanu. html

15 Ibidem, pp. 46-50.

16 T. JOHNSON, "Ismail Khan, Herat, and Iranian Influence" in Strategic Insights, July 2004, III, No. 7. available at http://hawk.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ ISN/34033/ichaptersection_singledocument/40df6437- bda 6-40bb-9d07-0fc5cb4a2161/en/johnsonJul04.pdf

17 Who is Who in Afghanistan, Afghan Biographies, Hussein Sayed Anwari, 23.7.2012, available at http://www.afghanbios.info/index.php?option=com_afgha nbios&id=186&task..., accessed at 2013-04-05

18 Day of Assura is the most important celebration for Shi'as, commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Husayn at the Battle of Karbala.

19 A. MAJIDYAR, A. ALFONEH, "Iranian Influence in Afghanistan: Imam Khomeini Relief Committee" in Middle Eastern Outlook, 2010, No. 4, available at http://www.aei.org/files/2010/07/27/No-4-Middle-Eastern -Outlook-g.pdf

20 ***, "Iran Pledges Cooperation in Education Sector", Pajhwok Afghan News, 01-03-2007, available at www.pajhwok.com

21 Council on Foreign Relation, March 30, 2009, available at www.cfr.org

22 M. MILANI, "Iran and Afghanistan", The Iran Primer, 2010, available at www.iranprimer.usip.org

23 B. MISZTAL, "Upadaj?ce pa?stwo jako s?siad", in Sprawy polityczne, no. 1 (I) jesie? 2009, pp. 38-59.

24 This route will make the distance from the area of Persian Gulf to Afghanistan 700km shorter and it will significantly reduce the importance of Karachi - Kandahar route, which is the traditional route from Afghanistan to the international waters. For more information, see M. Milani.

25 A. J. TELLIS, A. MUKHARJI (ed.), "Is a Regional Strategy Viable for Afghanistan?", 11-05-2010, available at www.carnegieendowment.org

26 B. MISZTAL, "Upadaj?ce pa?stwo jako s?siad", in Sprawy polityczne, no. 1 (I) jesie? 2009, pp. 43-44.

27 A. MALEKI, "Iran", in Frederick STARR (ed.), The New Silk Roads: Transport and Trade in Greater Central Asia,Washington D.C., Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2007, pp. 185-189.

28 Full name Bonyad-e Shahid (Foundation of the Martyrs) and Bonyad-e Janbazan va Mostaz'afan (Foundation of the Oppressed and Disabled).

29 R. MAKARIUSOVÁ, Po?átek p?sobení islamských nevládních organizací s radikálním podtextem, Mezinárodní politika ?.11, 2008, ro?. XXXII. S. 19; J. BENTHALL, J. BELLION-JOURDAN, The Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World. London, I. B. Tauris, 2003.

30 Amar-e Eszteghal-e Atba'e Afghan Dar Iran (Statystyki dotycz?ce zatrudnienia Afga?czyków w Iranie), in Alef News Agency, December 19, 2009, available at www.alef.ir

31 A. MAJIDYAR, A. ALFONEH, Iranian Influence in Afghanistan: Refugees as Political Instruments, Listopad, 2010, available at www.aei.org

32 The situation in 2007 led to political crisis in Kabul. Afghan parliament asked for resignation of minister for refugees and minister for foreign affairs. After Karzai's interpellation the deportations were stopped, see A. MAJIDYAR, A. ALFONEH, 2010.

33 There are about 1.5 mil seasonal afghan workers in Iran, most of them illegal. They can be found mostly in Iranian provinces near the borders with Afghanistan - Sistan, Baluchestan, South Khorasan and Razavi Khorasan.

34 A. DZISIÓW-SZUSZCZYKIEWICZ, Analiza nt. polityki Iranu wobec Afganistanu, Biuro bezpieczenstwa narodowego. Departament Analiz Strategicznych, p. 11, Warszawa, December 23, 2010, available at www.bbn.gov.pl/.../AnalizaBBNntpolitykiIranuwob...

35 Stosunki dwustronne Iran-Afganistan, 2012-08-09, available at http://www.stosunkimiedzynarodowe.info/ kraj,Iran,stosunki_dwustronne,Afganistan

36 F. BEZHAN, Tensions Simmer Between Tehran, Kabul in RFE/RL, May 15, 2012, available at http://www. rferl.org/content/iran_afghanistan_tensions_rise/24581508 .html

37 The Failed States Index 2013, available at http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable

38 World Drug Report 2006, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; L. BEEHNER, Afghanistan's Role in Iran's Drug Problem, September 14, 2006, www.cfr.org

39 C. ZAMBELIS, Is Iran Supporting the Insurgency in Afghanistan?, November 6, 2009, www.jamestown.org

40 B. MISZTAL, Upadajace panstwo jako sasiad: Strategia Iranu wobec Afganistanu, in Sprawy polityczne, No. 1 (39), 2009, pp. 43-44.

41 R. DREYFUSS, "Iran Hedges its Bets in Afghanistan" in The Diplomat, August 07, 2012, available at http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/07/iran- hedges-its-bets-in-afghanistan/2/, accessed on May 6, 2013.

42 "Nový prezident Rauhání chce zmeni? zahrani?nú politiku Iránu" in správy.pravda.sk, August 17, 2013, available at http://spravy.pravda.sk/svet/clanok/290223- iran-novy-prezident-chce-zmenu-zahranicnej-politiky-aby -nebola-velmi-konfrontacna/, accessed on September 9, 2013; "Jaký bude nový íránský prezident?" in IHNED.cz., June 17, 2013, available at http://dialog.ihned.cz/c1- 60082430-jaky-bude-novy-iransky-prezident, accessed on September 9, 2013.

43 F.W. KAGAN, K. KAGAN, D. PLETKA, "Iranian Influence in the Levant, Iraq and Afghanistan" in A Report of the American Enterprise Institute, 2008, pp. 37- 57, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080215_ Iranian Influence.pdf; B. MISZTAL, "Upadajace panstwo jako sasiad: Strategia Iranu wobec Afganistanu", in Sprawy polityczne No. 1 (39), 2009. pp. 43-44; A. LEITHEAD, Iranian Influence in Afghanistan, in BBC News, June 11, 2007, available at http://www. Afgha nistannewscenter.com/news/2007/june/jun112007.html#3

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