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This study tested hypotheses developed from the distinct literatures on negotiations and coalitions and hypotheses integrating the two. In a complex, three-person negotiation simulation, subjects had to decide jointly how to allocate two resource pools. They were given multiple pieces of information regarding their negotiation preferences, coalition alternatives, and entitlements. Coalition alternatives and entitlement cues affected only the resource pool to which they were directly linked, but compatible interests, through the coalitions they generated, affected both resource pools, including the one to which these interests were not directly linked. We discuss the importance of integrating negotiation and coalition research in a way that incorporates the social dynamics of the negotiation interaction.
Resource allocation decisions in small groups can be usefully analyzed from a negotiations perspective (Brett, 1991). Conflicting interests are resolved through multiparty negotiation in both formal and everyday social interaction, within groups ranging from governments and organizational task forces to research teams (Ancona, Friedman, & Kolb,1991; Bazerman, Mannix, & Thompson,1988; Brett & Rognes, 1986). In multiparty negotiations, bargainers are faced with cooperating enough to reach mutually acceptable agreements while simultaneously competing enough to satisfy individual interests-interests that may align with others' interests in ways that are distributive, integrative, or compatible (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Froman & Cohen, 1970; Kelley, 1966; Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Pruitt, 1981; Thompson, 1990). Multiparty negotiations are complex social interactions because of both the multiple sets of preferences that must be considered in fashioning agreements and the interpersonal dynamics that grow increasingly complicated as more people interact (Bazerman et al., 1988). An especially important source of complexity in multiparty negotiations, and one that is the focus of this article, is the inherent potential for coalition membership to influence the negotiated outcomes (Caplow, 1956; Chertkoff, 1967; Gamson, 1961; Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Miller & Komorita, 1986; Murnighan, 1986).
A coalition is defined as two or more parties who cooperate to obtain a mutually desired outcome that satisfies the interests of the coalition rather than those of the entire group within which it is embedded (Komorita & Kravitz, 1983; Murnighan, 1986).1 Coalition researchers have explored how features of a bargaining context affect coalition activity and subsequent resource allocation decisions (Miller & Komorita, 1986; Murnighan, 1978). Compared to negotiation research, however, coalition...