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CHRISTOPHER S. HILLIMAGINABILITY, CONCEIVABILITY, POSSIBILITY ANDTHE MIND-BODY PROBLEM[n03](Received 26 July 1995)In the early seventies Kripke unveiled a line of thought that was
designed to resuscitate dualistic philosophies of mind.1 This line of
thought was greeted with a chorus of objections, some of which have
helped considerably to bring the relevant issues into sharper focus.
Still, despite the number and philosophical value of these replies, the
line of thought has continued to attract sympathetic attention. Indeed,
it figures prominently in three of the most original and provocative contributions to the contemporary literature on the mind-body
problem W.D. Harts Engines of the Soul, Stephen Yablos The
Real Distinction Between Mind and Body (as amplified in its companion piece Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?), and David
Chalmerss The Conscious Mind.2In addition to being provocative, Kripkes line of thought was
characterized by broad relevance. In one version it challenged
token-materialism, and in another, type-materialism. Both versions
continue to attract admirers. (Token-materialism asserts that each
concrete psychological particular, such as the pain I experienced at
10:00 last night, is identical with a concrete physical particular, such
as the firing of my C-fibers at 10:00 last night. Type-materialism
comes in more than one variety. The strongest version claims that
every type of psychological state is identical with some type of
physical state. A much weaker version, which is substantially more
plausible, claims that every type of sensory state is identical with
some type of physical state.)In this paper I will try to show that those who continue to be
favorably impressed by Kripkes line of thought have underestimated
the resources that are available to materialists. Specifically, I will
maintain that the most widely accepted part of that line of thought,
the argument against type materialism, admits of an answer that is
fully satisfactory.Philosophical Studies 87: 6185, 1997.
c[n0d] 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.62 CHRISTOPHER S. HILLTwo last preliminary comments. First, I will be concerned only
to defend type-materialism about qualitative states, that is, typematerialism about states that are like being a pain in that they are
forms of sentience. Second, although it is of course my intention to
carry the discussion forward, I will not be aiming at radical originality. Thus, I will be relying heavily...