Hybrid warfare - identifying the cause of potential conflict is important - not the ways and means?

Abstract

Modern warfare "blurs the lines between war and politics, conflict and peace, soldier and civilian, and battlefield violence and safe zones. The new form of warfare has arisen from the loss of the nation-state's monopoly on violence; from the rise of cultural, ethnic, and religious conflict; a changed narrative for participation in conflict and from the spread of globalization, particularly advanced technology "(Williamson, 2009, p.3). It is more important to understand the potential aggressor and its motivation to conduct aggressive action, than discuss the ways and means he will deploy during confrontation. The adaptability, agility of forces and access to modern, global communication and modern technologies as well as resources, enables actors other than states and increases states ' portfolios during modern war fighting. The discussion of the difference between asymmetric or irregular warfare and hybrid warfare is not academic only. It is even to question if the so-called hybrid warfare is something new at all. Hoffman argues that "hybrid wars are not new". More frequently it is stated by experts that there is nothing new regarding hybrid warfare and it is just a new abbreviation for an old type of warfare. The legal framework for international conflict is not meeting the modern conflict realities and it is required to review and adapt them accordingly. Traditional mechanisms for conflict mitigation and the relevance of time and space during conflicts are changing dramatically and will inflict a far more complex conflict environment. Near real time access to information, powerful pictures, the availability of the internet and access to resources and high sophisticated technology will increase the power of small proxies or networks. The state will lose its monopoly of power and the borders between internal and external security within states and regions will diminish. Modern warfare will be adaptive, agile, well-resourced and very unlikely conducted between states in a conventional manner. The better states are willing to accept these changes and conduct modernization accordingly the better will they be prepared for future conflicts.

Headnote

Abstract

Modern warfare "blurs the lines between war and politics, conflict and peace, soldier and civilian, and battlefield violence and safe zones. The new form of warfare has arisen from the loss of the nation-state's monopoly on violence; from the rise of cultural, ethnic, and religious conflict; a changed narrative for participation in conflict and from the spread of globalization, particularly advanced technology "(Williamson, 2009, p.3). It is more important to understand the potential aggressor and its motivation to conduct aggressive action, than discuss the ways and means he will deploy during confrontation. The adaptability, agility of forces and access to modern, global communication and modern technologies as well as resources, enables actors other than states and increases states ' portfolios during modern war fighting. The discussion of the difference between asymmetric or irregular warfare and hybrid warfare is not academic only. It is even to question if the so-called hybrid warfare is something new at all. Hoffman argues that "hybrid wars are not new".

More frequently it is stated by experts that there is nothing new regarding hybrid warfare and it is just a new abbreviation for an old type of warfare. The legal framework for international conflict is not meeting the modern conflict realities and it is required to review and adapt them accordingly. Traditional mechanisms for conflict mitigation and the relevance of time and space during conflicts are changing dramatically and will inflict a far more complex conflict environment. Near real time access to information, powerful pictures, the availability of the internet and access to resources and high sophisticated technology will increase the power of small proxies or networks.

The state will lose its monopoly of power and the borders between internal and external security within states and regions will diminish. Modern warfare will be adaptive, agile, well-resourced and very unlikely conducted between states in a conventional manner. The better states are willing to accept these changes and conduct modernization accordingly the better will they be prepared for future conflicts.

Keywords: Hybrid warfare; Future conflicts; Permanent war; Dark networks; Cyber space.

Introduction - Development of modern warfare

After the end of the Cold War in 1989 everybody was expecting political stability, cooperation instead of confrontation and continuous freedom for the immediate and mid-term future. The western countries expected to bring home the so called 'Friedensdividende'31 and conflict seemed to be far away. Although some political and intelligence analysts predicted a troublesome future, especially along the former borders of the Soviet Union, they had been accused by the majority of pessimism and negativism in their analysis. For most analysts nothing could endanger the now likely everlasting peace after the two superpowers resolved their controversy over political ideas. It seemed even, that Russia analysts thought about giving up their professions and wondered if they were still relevant and required. Soon did they learn that the future will not be as peaceful as expected and the large block confrontation, starting after the end of the Second World War in 1945, was just overshadowing smaller conflicts which emerged out of the shadows after the Wall came down in 1989.

Over time the narrative causing these conflicts changed: it was not the political ideas, communism versus democracy, which inflicted the Cold War or proxy wars anymore, but regional, ethnological and tribally narrated or religiously motivated groups and networks which caused trouble within mainly autocratic countries and against the globalizing western world. During this time with reduced state and border control, there emerged an increasing number of organized crime groups gaining enormous amounts of money and influence enabling them to either provide financial support or access to other resources like weapons and global terrorist groups, which caused thousands of casualties.

But the core problem for nation states started with the second Gulf War fought after the Iraqi military occupied Kuwait. Since then around 60 more conflicts progressed or continued. Some smaller ones have not even been publicly recognized but others like the conflicts in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, the Intifadas, Somalia, or the Congo had been or are still heavily impacting the political and economic situation within their regions as well as globally.

But the greatest challenge for the global society inherited by these conflicts was and still is that they question the western nation state model. Agreed upon by all member nations of the United Nations, developed after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, it is based on the agreement that internal and external power is the core responsibility of a nation, and it also defined the legal framework for state to state conflicts: the Hague Regulations as well as the Law of Armed Conflict. These developments had ensured for centuries that humanitarian principles and the protection of the civilian population during conflict, as well as brutality against enemy military, was regulated, and if not followed, responsible actors prosecuted. All this was fundamentally questioned during the comparable short period of time since 1989, in overall less than 30 years. These developments had an impact on the mechanisms for crisis prevention and on warfare.

This article will discuss modern types of warfare and immanent transformation of warfare since the end of the Cold War. It will give a perspective for future warfare and what is to be expected during future conflicts.

Different concepts explaining modern warfare

Since the Wall came down recent conflicts and emergencies heavily influenced the development of new concepts concerning future warfare. To emphasize and discuss the most important ones, it is necessary to understand the situation in which these concepts had been developed.

The only remaining superpower, prepared to fight and win conventional battles, dominated the power structures globally. The United States of America in concert with its Allies was able to defeat all potential military threats due to technological supremacy and overwhelming resources. During two Gulf Wars this Coalition did destroy a strong conventional Iraqi military force in weeks, if not days. Potential opponents needed to develop methods to threaten, defeat and weaken these mainly western powers. Knowing that the Coalition was conventionally unbeatable, it was the asymmetric, irregular, unconventional approach of a weaker opponent which was used and continuously developed against the western military might.

On the western side the military did understand that their conventional power, although never beaten in combat, was not well prepared to defeat such an enemy. Identifying these shortfalls strategists, academia and military did respond in developing concepts to better prepare the forces for similar conflicts. The hybrid warfare concept is one in a row of many such concepts or models. The most popular ones had been first the Unrestricted, second the contemporary, third the Fourth Generation and finally the Hybrid Warfare concept. All four did reflect different military and political perspectives, explaining future conflicts based on the experience made in current and recent conflicts. Out of this short and not comprehensive selection the hybrid warfare concept is the most recent. It became especially prominent during the Russian aggression against Georgia and Ukraine. The 4th Generation Warfare concept in contrary was developed because of "...a major geopolitical shift in which the fall of the Soviet Union ended a bipolar world; many ethnic and national groups quickly sensed a new opportunity for freedom or recognition. We should not be surprised by these actors' innovative methods and techniques of warfare as they release pent-up energy and pursue long-held ideological and nationalistic objectives. In the context of the information technology revolution of rapid globalization, of ethnic and nationalist struggles and reactionary religious movements - all layered against the back-drop of the end of the Cold War and the subsequent breakup of a familiar geopolitical and balance-of-power dynamic - a concept like Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) would inevitably emerge" (Williamson, 2009, p.2). Instead of developing this concept further a new catch phrase was inaugurated "Hybrid Warfare". This concept focused a little more on the development of military methods developed by nation states using the successful irregular warfare methods and integrated them into their conventional military, adding modern technology to the very basic kind of asymmetric or irregular warfighting.

If hybrid warfare is the way future conflicts are conducted and what hybrid warfare means is the question since many years. The discussion was started after David Johnson differentiated "three levels of military competence and each level places different demands on the military forces being designed to confront them" (Johnson, 2010) the first time in 2009. His paper had been based on the insights from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Lebanon and Gaza.

Johnson's guiding concept was developed out of past experiences examining several conflicts and was mainly quantified by quality of organization, deployed weapons and command and control mechanisms. The question still remains if the three selected aspects are really predicting the future of warfare or if they are just a reflection of past experiences.

Vladimir Gerasimov, the Russian Chief of General Staff, in contrary wrote in his doctrine: "New generation wars are to be dominated by information and psychological warfare, in order to achieve superiority in troops and weapons control, morally and psychologically depressing the enemy's armed forces personnel and civil population." In his guidelines for Russian military development he stated additionally, that modem militaries have to be prepared for a change in warfare: "From war in a defined period of time to a state of permanent war as the natural condition in natural life." In his doctrine and following papers he was far more trying to predict future warfare and review Russian doctrine accordingly and prepare his military forces to meet future requirements.

But did the Russian leadership develop this concept on its own? No, this knowledge was already available in concepts mentioned earlier. Hoffmann for example wrote in 2009: "Hybrid threats blend the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare. In such conflicts, future adversaries (states, state-sponsored groups, or selffunded actors) exploit access to modern military capabilities including encrypted command systems, man-portable surface-to-air missiles, and other modern lethal systems, as well as promote protracted insurgencies that employ ambushes, improvised explosive devices, and assassinations. This could include states blending high-tech capabilities such as anti-satellite weapons with terrorism and cyber warfare..." (Hoffman, 2009a, p. 5). Gerasimov published his prominent article in the Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, "The Value of Science is in Foresight" in 2013, four years later. NATO's comprehensive approach concept32 developed at the Lisbon Summit, in November 2010, described a very similar approach already three years earlier.

It is more likely that most experts tend to "win the last war" as Sir Basil Liddell Hart once wrote. They are looking backwards instead of forward into the future. In doing so they frequently reflect past conflict forms and methods of warfighting but are not predicting the future. He also stated that: "The downfall of civilized states tends to come not from the direct assaults of foes, but from internal decay combined with the consequences of exhaustion in war." This is exactly what Russia's establishment fears the most. This is the first time in this paper that the cause of conflict becomes more relevant then the methods used to achieve identified objectives.

The competitor's in Future Warfare

It is to believe, that a different way of discussing future warfare is necessary. The named or identified objectives of an actor are the driving factor for political as well as military action and decision. It makes a difference if you want to invade a country or if you just want to destabilize a region in order to stabilize your country internally and in parallel weaken a coalition. These objectives can be described as ends, meaning the goals an actor wants to achieve or the purpose why he deploys power. In order to achieve these ends, it is necessary to choose appropriate tactics, techniques and approaches following different ways. Adversaries, either states or non-state actors, who employ irregular and hybrid warfare approaches that combine the conventional and unconventional methods are far more likely shaping a concept of future warfare. This requires the employment of means which can be explained as resources, weapons, propaganda, etc., in order to achieve the actors' ends. Opponents employ these means not only to destroy, kill, and manipulate, but they do so for a purpose.

Adversaries determine goals and objectives, and they employ irregular and hybrid approaches to attain them asymmetrically when faced with opponent's conventional strength. This approach to explain future warfare makes it easier to understand different methods used by state and non-state actors. Meaning that either can choose to deploy irregular, terrorist or conventional methods to achieve its goals.

The difference is far more framed by available resources or means than by the status of an actor as a state or for example a network. Although states are threats to each other due to their capabilities it is very unlikely that they develop an intent to attack other states by conventional means in the near future. Non-state actors and networks are far more likely to pose threats to our societies. Arquilla and Ronfeldt describe netwar as an "emerging mode of conflict and crime at societal levels, involving levels short of war, in which protagonists use network forms of organization, doctrine, strategy, and communication" (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1996, p.5). These dark networks are becoming increasingly capable due to technological proliferation and access to sophisticated knowledge via the internet. If the new terrain in which conflicts are waged is the mind of the people, the cyber space becomes more important than geographical territory. This virtual space becomes real when people come to believe that it is worth joining a network or just accept a narrative. The cyber space facilitates the spread of ideas and thoughts without any regulatory mechanism. Daesh or the so called Islamic State is a good example how the cyber space can be utilized for spreading information, an idea and concepts for attacks. A different but positive one is TED33 which claims that it spreads ideas. Arquilla stated that "There are five levels of theory and practice that matter: the technological, social, narrative, organizational, and doctrinal levels. A netwar actor must get all five right to be fully effective" (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1996). At the end, it is to understand why and how decision makers and leaders as individuals act under certain conditions, to understand a developing threat. The better we understand either Vladimir Putin or Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, including their social background, their networks and organizational hierarchy, the more likely are we able to predict future developments correctly. It was the narrative which could either be religious, cultural, ethnological or political which influenced threat groups the most, created enemies and helped identifying other actors than the state.

The narrative - a better selector?

Besides the technological dimension which was already discussed, the narrative is the most important driver for individual's activities. It is to be developed in line with social examination and leads to decisions about organizational structures. Daesh did chose the lost caliphate as the narrative to convince people to join and develop a structure in line with former caliphates. To differentiate conflict forms and the ways wars are conducted it seems to be necessary to discuss the narrative or cause of a potential future conflict. Why is this important? The term hybrid warfare describes the way how conflicts are conducted but not the reason of a conflict and it does not differentiate actors. Although both are closely linked together; it is nearly impossible to discuss the potential form of a conflict, without reflecting its potential cause, including the competitors. The conflict form is just a developing and transforming way of warfare based on the cause, the availability of weapons, manpower and resources as well as the geography34 of the battlespace. In this understanding the competitors, including available resources, as well as the circumstances in which a conflict is conducted, do influence heavily which type of warfare is chosen by the parties. At the end, it is a competition between two parties. The attacker or aggressor is potentially choosing the methodology first and will impose power against the rival. It is up to the defender how imaginative, agile, adaptable he and his forces are to meet these challenges successfully.

This might be a different and more pragmatic than theoretical approach to other theorists of warfare. It is reflecting the concept of 4th Generation Warfare or the Contemporary Warfare model as developing models for ways warfare is conducted but far more focused on potential choices of an aggressor reflecting his capabilities, resources and chances. Everything which seems to help him to be successful will be chosen or conducted against a defending or invading enemy. Success in warfare is the capability to impose the aggressors will over the defenders and sustain it.

What is really New?

It remains to discuss whether any element of warfare has changed over time. If the assumption is still valid that an aggressor's will to achieve its objectives or ends is not necessarily a question of attacking or defending space but the will of the population, this would change ways and means dramatically. In consequence does this mean that a core question might be:

* will the classical belief that warfare is about conquering territory remain valid?

or

* will territory just be conquered to gain access to resources if required?

Historically an attacking country does conquer land to impose its will over the opponent. The territory is conquered against the will of the defender mostly against his military force which is to be defeated. After conquering land, it is the task of the attacker to sustain the achievement: he has to implement a system of control and defend the territory. Because the attack is mostly conducted out of a situation in which the attacker has a superiority over the defender, it is the easier phase to conquer and far more difficult to control and defend the conquered territory over a long period of time. This was the case for Nazi Germany during World War II in which the Wehrmacht won every major battle and conquered huge territories but was not capable to completely control either. This opened immense room for partisan movements in nearly all occupied countries and lead to defeat because of the massive number of troops required to basically control conquered space.

Particular difficulties arise in our time of political mechanisms controlling the state of conduct between countries through the United Nations Security Council. In this context one has to mention, that two different entities are to be recognized as potential aggressors. One is still the nation state; the other is a non-national group or network which might be supported or sponsored by a nation or nations. The circumstances which are framing the opportunities for either entity are different. The nation state agreed on the legal framework at least once in the past, the non-nation did never. Nevertheless, is it necessary for the non-nation to become recognized internationally to become recognized as a state at a point to become firstly a legal body and secondly a politically relevant entity. The two current examples are Russia which conquered Crimea and attacked Eastern Ukraine indirectly by proxies and the so called Islamic State which was a non-state network and became a state-like construct. Both used military power to impose their will against a defending nation and conquered territory aiming for the destruction or reduction of global or regional dominance to achieve or promote political objectives.

Military action was always supporting political objectives over centuries. It might be necessary to highlight that it was a way to an end but rarely an end in itself. Clausewitz wrote that: "war is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by different means."35 But is this still valid or did war become an end in itself, similar to the Thirty Years' War in Europe which is associated with the phrase "the war will feed itself'36? It is not as important how someone defines modem warfare, and it really does not matter - what is more important is to understand the reason and narrative of a potential aggressor or opponent.

These are the far more relevant questions: what is the narrative or cause for threatening the West, who has an interest and what are his underlying reasons for attacking? The ends are important, not so much the ways and means which enable an opponent to achieve its intentions. To compare this statement with medicine: it is not about doctors attacking the symptoms but identifying the cause of an illness to find a successful cure. The symptoms might change within each conflict but the reasons for attacking are to be differentiated and identified to avoid confrontations. In order to discern what the motivations of a potential opponent may be and to understand the probable character of a conflict one must "possess a realistic understanding of the "other"" (Mansoor and Williamson, 2012, p. 293). Such a realistic appraisal can only come about through understanding the culture, history, values, approach to warfare, and the putative goals of the adversary (Ibid.).37

States as well as non-state actors are using and will use similar methods or ways and means to achieve their objectives. These are regularly blurring the lines between combatants and civilian population and include all possible or necessary means, cross-departmentally and if possible internationally. As Herfried Münkler wrote in 2004: "The dividing line between combatants and non-combatants had been blurred during World War II at the latest, the consequence had been total war. This dividing lines could not be implemented again after the war was over" (Münkler, 2004, p. 124). For the western nations, including their intelligence and military this does mean, that the challenge to identify either the activities or the individuals conducting violent action remains. It is to believe also, that future conflicts are "protracted slow-burning conflicts of attrition."38 This is creating a problem for western nations because neither their governments nor their populations have the endurance or serenity to await success. Our governments decide only in electoral periods and are just limited willing to threaten their political success by engagements in foreign countries. The western populations are unwilling to risk the lives of their soldiers or overstretching resources in our post-heroic communities. The Afghan saying: "you possess the watches but we have the time" articulates the problem very well. Since these entities do not have to win a conflict, they just need to avoid losing it, or at least neglecting a defeat. Taking the mentioned circumstances into account a potential western success in such conflicts is very unlikely. Since "irregular warfare (in all its forms) in its nature is even more obviously a contest of political wills than is regular combat" (Gray, 2006, p. 229). The pure military might will not be enough to achieve victory. The prime examples are Iraq and Afghanistan: in both conflicts did the coalition, steered by the US, leave or reduce its footprint far too early to stabilize the countries or potentially far too late to just defeat the known enemy.

But how is a conflict evolving and which states are involved on both sides, either as sponsors, using proxies, or directly? The available capabilities and resources are shaping the ways and means of warfare. Two examples should explain how this has an impact. The reason why nuclear weapons are becoming important again is the fact that they, in the same way as sophisticated anti-access and areal denial (A2AD) weapons, are providing the environment in which the effects of a potential military engagement will be so tremendous that no decisions are made to openly defend a threatened partner. The deterring function of such weapons is not so much that of avoiding conflict entirely anymore, but to limit the measures against an opponent's approach. This has changed the way deterrence worked during the Cold War, in which the functionality was to avoid direct conflict entirely. Nowadays the conflict is already eminent due to assumed involvement; a hybrid confrontation below conflict level and a subsequent escalation of force is far more likely. As an example: Russia did assume an offensive campaign by NATO to expand its territory to the East to its disadvantage and in assuming it already became a competitor. It is not important if this is true or not, the assumption is enough to enforce or allow action. In employing A2AD weapons, which could be sophisticated air-to-air weapons or improvised explosive devices the opponents will to continue or begin an engagement or his freedom of maneuver, decision and action, is limited due to the cost of lives and resources. The increasing proliferation of sophisticated weapons systems or technology, either by sponsors or the internet, enhance the capabilities of non-state actors. Additionally, access to resources, by gaining territory, criminal activities, or support from sponsors do enable the development of improvised and adapted weapons, enabling actors to restrict freedom of action and decision even further.

The most critical factors in a hybrid environment are time and information as the graphic shows. The momentum is always with the aggressor and it does not matter which kind of actor he is. The longer a hybrid phase lasts undetected or without appropriate counter measures taken, the less likely is a potential success, even if combat starts. Increasingly important nowadays, when the world is rediscovering "the flare up of interstate conflicts" (WEF, Global Risk Report), besides civil war as a major threat, one of the most critical elements in any strategic situation is the "time". The actors are using this window of opportunity to prepare for offensive action. Western states or coalitions are unable to respond timely because of the intended activities below conflict level. This gray zone during which different activities are conducted is legally problematic and own activities very unlikely supported by the western population. The means taken by an opponent are characterized in US Army Doctrinal Publication 3.0: Unified Land Operations as: "the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects."39 It further describes the hybrid threat as incorporating high-end capabilities traditionally associated with nation-states to exploit vulnerabilities and erode political commitment. In an acknowledgement of the ability to protract war in these circumstances, the threat will seek to wage war in more battle spaces and populations than U.S. forces can directly control.

In order to overcome these large grey spaces, it is important to understand their existence first. Traditional rules and mechanisms like a formal declaration of war, the separation of combatants and non-combatants or civilians or the concept of deterrence do not work under these circumstances.

Hybrid Warfare - a new concept?

The discussion of the difference between asymmetric or irregular warfare and hybrid warfare is not academic only. It may even be questioned if the so-called hybrid warfare is something new at all. More frequently it is stated by experts that there is nothing new regarding hybrid warfare and it is just a new shorthand description for an old type of warfare. Academia and practitioners alike are claiming that hybridity is exactly what happened during previous conflicts. Argumentation used is reaching back to the Spanish guerrilla fighting Napoleon's Army between 1808 and 1814 or the different resistance movements during the Nazi occupation in France, Yugoslavia or Russia during World War II. Although there are some similarities in several aspects of warfighting as a whole of government approach, it is probably better as an example to look at the development of the Russian doctrine concerning deception, misinformation and resistance after a foreign occupation developed since the Russian Revolution40 instead of assuming that Russia developed a new form of warfare.

But what really has changed since the hybrid warfare concept was developed, is the time and the status globalization and communication have reached at this point. It is to a lesser extend a totally new phenomenon but it is enabled by modern technology and conducted within today's societies. Some aspects are to be highlighted below. Besides the dynamics of modem societies including urbanization and litoralisation (Kilkullen, 2013), increasing educational standards, access to information globally in near real time, a global and connected economy is probably the most influential aspect and the backbone enabling everything mentioned above: modem communication, internet, social media, the speed with which information is spread and is impacting decision making processes. Information dominance operating in the cyber space is probably the most crucial capability in the future. The fact that actors are able to spread information with extremely high speed to never before existing recipient numbers within our societies, not being limited by borders or state control, changes a lot.

Conclusion and implications

There are many different competing theories and models which explain hybrid warfare, but as Hoffman states: "[i]f at the end of the day we drop the 'hybrid' term and simply gain a better understanding of the large gray space between our idealized bins and pristine Western categorizations, we will have made progress. If we educate ourselves about how to better prepare for that messy gray phenomenon and avoid the Groznys, Mogadishus and Bint Jbeils of our future, we will have taken great strides forward." (Hoffman, 2009b)

The concepts which explain ways and means of warfare are not as important as the narrative and potential ends, intentions and objectives of an aggressor but the discussion about it is and will remain important. If opponents are understood and their capabilities and available resources are not overseen, conflicts are manageable if the leadership is adaptable, agile and willing to make unpopular decisions. Future conflicts will last long and time is working against western states and coalitions due to their tendency to avoid casualties and political turmoil. The future of warfare encapsulates some continuing challenges: states did already lose their monopoly of power, all actors are using similar methods or ways and means and they will occur in grey spaces below the radar of western analysts and political leaders. They will be conducted very likely in the cyber space and as David Kilcullen wrote: "out of the mountains" in urban densely populated areas.

The territory will not be geographically defined anymore but contains the narrative, fighting for the hearts and minds and potential support, cross borders and outside traditional legal and ethical rules. It is necessary to develop agile processes, forces and modem legal frameworks meeting the challenges of blurring lines between internal and external security, law enforcement and military, civilians and combatants to name just the most important ones. If these types of future wars are to be won it will take time, confidence and endurance.

The threat will not stay in foreign lands but will come to the West, as the attacks in London, Madrid, Paris, Brussels, and Berlin have shown. If the opponents are not able to achieve their goals within their countries or regions they will continue to spread into Western communities and attack at their weak spots. Borders are not providing security anymore and the capabilities of the cyber space are just beginning to emerge. Finally, from the existing concepts of hybrid warfare, we retain the central themes of a deliberate synergistic effect, the concept of forms of warfare in a continuum, and the rapid organizational adaptation of hybrid threats which will continuously frame further discussions.

Footnote

31 English: "peace dividend"

32 'NATO's new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, underlines that lessons learned from NATO operations show that effective crisis management calls for a comprehensive approach involving political, civilian and military instruments. Military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to Euro-Atlantic and international security. Allied leaders agreed at Lisbon to enhance NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach to crisis management as part of the international community's effort and to improve NATO's ability to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction." Available from: http://www.natolibguides.info/comprehensiveapproach [accessed 01.01.2017]

33 Abréviation for Technology, Entertainment, Design - referring to a global conference movement spreading ideas in Education, Business, Science etc., in video form via the internet for free - https://www.ted.com/talks

34 Geography in its human as well as a geographical dimension. Definition: "the study of the physical features of the earth and its atmosphere, and of human activity as it affects and is affected by these, including the distribution of populations and resources and political and economic activities."

35 Carl v. Clausewitz; "On War"

36 Latin: "bellum se ipsum alet". The phrase, coined by Ancient Roman statesman Cato the Elder, is primarily associated with the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648).

37 See also McCulloh and Johnson (2013, p. 17) who demonstrate throughout their study that context is critical. Indeed, their summary statement for "hybrid warfare theory" is "a form of warfare in which one of the combatants bases its optimized force structure on the combination of all available resources-both conventional and unconventional-in a unique cultural context to produce specific, synergistic effects against a conventionally-based opponent.".

38 Canadian Chief of Force Development, Directorate of Capability Integration, 'Hybrid Warfare Concept', p. 1, June 2012.

39 US Army Doctrinal Publication 3.0; Unified Land Operations; p. 4; 2011; accessed 01.01.2017; https://www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/info/references/ADP_3 -0_ULO_Oct_201 l_APD.pdf

40 "Kennan Telegram", US Ambassador in Moscow in 1946, http://nsarcliive.gwu.edu/coldwar/docmnents/episode-l/kennan.htm, accessed 09.12.2016

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