Hijacking Adat Recognition Through the Establishment of New Customary Community Council in Papua, Indonesia

Abstract

Papuan supporters of the Special Autonomy Law hoped that it would become an instrument to ensure their right to equality through the respect and recognition of their unique identity. This recognition facilitated the blossoming of an adat institution called the Papua Customary Council (Dewan Adat Papua). This institution is an important representative of Papuan. However, it was opposed to the Special Autonomy Law, and several of its members have closed relations with the Council of Papua Presidium (Presidium Dewan Papua), which supports the pro‐independence movement. Eight years after the implementation of this law, a new adat institution was formed called the Customary Community Council (Lembaga Masyarakat Adat (LMA)). The LMA is supported by the central government to vis a vis with the Dewan Adat Papua. This article analyses the reasons why the LMA was established as a form of government recognition in Papua. Interestingly, the LMA's strategy is similar to that employed under Suharto by the Customary Deliberative Council (LMA) prior to the Special Autonomy Period when adat institutions were formed and recognized, although with the new goal of achieving governmental policies of interest.

Introduction

“Which company are you from?” A woman sitting beside me posed this unexpected question when I joined a long queue to speak with Lenis Kogoya at his office in the presidential palace. She was a broker for a Chinese company looking for investment opportunities in Papua and thought I was acting in a similar capacity. Many investment seekers are now flooding to see Kogoya. According to a friend working for an NGO, the easiest way to meet with him is to suggest to his staff that a project is going to be implemented in Papua. As the leader of Papua's Customary Community Council (Lembaga Masyarakat Adat, referred to in this article as the new LMA), Kogoya developed patronage networks in Jakarta that led to his appointment as one of President Joko Widodo's advisors.

Adat or customary—which Davidson and Henley () described as a way of life that links history—has been a political and economic source of power since the Special Autonomy Law for Papuan peoples formally recognized the adat rights of indigenous Papuans and obligated the adat community's involvement in decision making. Lenis Kogoya is powerful due to his position as the head of the new LMA. This council is not the sole adat institution in Papua, however. Papua now has a plethora of so‐called adat institutions, each struggling to represent (some) Papuans according to its own agenda. This plurality is confusing to Papuans. The strongest and most authentic adat institution is the Papua Customary Council (Dewan Adat Papua (DAP)), which was based on the Second Papuan People's Congress in 2000 and has branches established from below. These bottom‐up characteristics are the source of the DAP's legitimacy as a representable adat institution. However, because the DAP frequently criticizes the central government, the government does not recognize the DAP, which has resulted in its failure to implement concrete programs for Papuans and has bred dissatisfaction from the Papuan elite. This adat institution only became the principal dialogue partner during Abdurrahman Wahid Presidential term in 2000 (Chauvel ; McGibbon ).

The central government created the new LMA as an ostensibly reliable and representable adat institution 8 years after the enactment of the Special Autonomy Law. Its top‐down characteristics weaken this council's legitimacy as an adat institution, but it has proven to bring more concrete programs to Papua and, therefore, has begun to receive the support from some segments of the Papuan elite.

This article focuses on the institutionalization of adat recognition in Papua, especially regarding two adat institutions, the DAP and new LMA, and argues that the legal or formal recognition of adat produces different interpretations and degrees of institutionalization because there is no consensus on the content of adat at the time of legal recognition. In post‐recognition politics, adat is no longer limited to the matter of Papuan identity. It is now implicated in benefits or profits and is strongly related to concrete development programs. The Papuan case shows that development‐oriented adat institutions could win over the hearts and interests of a materialistic and pragmatic local elite, further diminishing the substance of adat.

The politics of adat are significant because adat authority leads to political‐economic power in Papua's post‐recognition era. This article examines the dynamics of adat politics, even at the village level. It also provides important insights for research on the political implications of adat in other parts of Indonesia or in other developing countries where customary authority has political meaning.

In this article, I examine two cases in two villages—Duku and Muli Due to the sensitivity of this issue, the names of the villages have been changed.—which serve as examples of the involvement of the new LMA in land grabbing in the Merauke district as part of the Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE) project comprises over a million hectares of land which threaten the adat lands (Dewi , pp. 91–95).

Spirit of Adat Recognition and Special Autonomy for Papua

After the fall of the New Order Government, demands for Papuan independence were further strengthened. In July 1998, Papuan intellectuals established the Irian Reconciliation Forum, known as Forum Rekonsiliasi Masyarakat Irian (FORERI). This forum actively organized national dialogue between Papua and Jakarta, the centre of the Indonesian Government, in February 1999. The Papuans were represented by a team of 100, led by Tom Beanal, who met with President Habibie to discuss the concerns of the Papuans. However, because the Papuan representatives directly requested independence for Papua, the Indonesian government closed this dialogue. The new president, Gus Dur, reopened dialogue with Papuan leaders represented by the Presidium of Papua Council (Presidium Dewan Papua (PDP)). Gus Dur also changed the name of Irian to Papua to show the central government's seriousness in removing the stereotypes associated with the name of Irian, that was believed to be an acronym of Ikut Republik Indonesia Anti Netherlands. The meaning is integrated with Indonesia and anti‐Dutch. During the Dutch period, the name Papua was used to distinguish between Papua and Indonesia. Therefore, after the integration, the Indonesian government changed the name to West Irian (1963) and then Irian Jaya (1973). He also supported and helped fund the Second Papua Congress in 2000. This event successfully mobilized Papuans to support the PDP's declaration of independence and intensified demand for Papua's independence (King ; Singh ).

The central government, however, had no intention of supporting Papuan independence from Indonesia and decided instead to give Papua special autonomy status. The Special Autonomy Laws for Papua and Aceh Aceh was also granted with special autonomy through enactment of Law No 18/2001, which was replaced by Law No. 11/2006 on governance of Aceh. Due to the separatism and vertical conflict between Aceh free movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)) and central government, central government gave the special autonomy for Aceh in order to reduce conflict and defend national integrity and Indonesian unity. The fall of Suharto made the voice of Aceh independence louder. In order to reduce the demand of separatism in Aceh, as well as in Papua, central government enacted the Special Autonomy Law for these two prosvinces. were the central government's response to demands for independence in these two provinces after Indonesia lost East Timor in the referendum on 24 August 1999. This special autonomy was mentioned in broad guidelines on state policy (Garis‐garis Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN)) through the upper House of Parliament (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR)) Decree No. IV/1999 on 19 October 1999. This special autonomy materialized on 21 November 2001 when the central government, under Megawati Sukarno Putri, enacted Law No. 21/2001, which granted recognition to the adat communities in Papua. Although the recognition has been granted by law, Papuan special autonomy was not well implemented. The Special Autonomy Law was negotiated between a special committee of parliament (Dewan Permusyawaratan Rakyat (DPR)) and a team appointed by the Governor of Papua. Moreover, the content of this law did not accord with the interests of the central government because it resulted from a Papuan initiative; the Papuan negotiators were also unsatisfied as it did not meet all of their demands. Both Papua and the central government drafted their own Special Autonomy Law. However, an active campaign by local, national and international activists, as well as support from the National Awakening Party and the Golkar Party, resulted in the Papuan draft being accepted in parliament. The central government feared that by granting recognition to Papua through the Special Autonomy Law, Papuan solidarity would strengthen, possibly leading to Papuan independence (McGibbon ; Chauvel ).

Special autonomy marked an important stage in Papuan history. Recognition was legally given by the central government to Papuan communities, which allowed adat values and customs to become central to the Papuan way of life. The Special Autonomy Law mandated the establishment of the Papuan People's Assembly (Majelis Rakyat Papua (MRP)), a formal government body charged with protecting and promoting Papuan values and interests. The implementation of this law facilitated the blossoming of adat institutions such as the DAP. Through this law, traditional institutions could now regulate social, economic and religious aspects of Papuan livelihoods; despite the new existence of governmental institutions, Papuans have always held respect for adat values. Thus, every government official that aimed to co‐opt adat leaders into informal alliances understood the power of traditional leadership.

Enhancement of the Papua Customary Council

The Papua Customary Council or DAP claims to be an adat organization representative of more than 300 tribes in Papua. This organization was established by Theys Eluay during Suharto's regime, although the name was changed from the Papuan Customary Deliberative Assembly (Lembaga Musyawarah Adat, referred to in this article as the LMA or old LMA) to DAP, This LMA is different from the new LMA, Lembaga Masyarakat Adat, which translates to Customary Community Council and is led by Lenis Kogoya. which was reflective of the change in the organization's direction from one of support of the central government to opposition.

The LMA was established as an adat oversight institution to support adat communities. It was initiated by popular Papuan figures, including Theys Hiyo Eluay (Sentani tribe), Oktavianus Rumbekwan (Biak tribe) and Dan Habel Wanda (Waropen tribe), after several meetings conducted on 2 July 1984. This council supported the Papuan struggle for adat rights, while also synchronizing and collaborating with official government programs. Its overall agenda was to assist the government with the implementation of development policies and minimize conflicts of interest amongst Papuans to ensure the smooth operation of government projects (Griapon ). This adat institution was positioned as a government broker in which Eluay played a key role as both a tribal leader and local parliament member. Because it supported government interests, the government correspondingly recognized this council (Wenehen , pp. 134–135).

However, in 1993, the LMA became an instrument of opposition to the Indonesian government. Eluay turned this institution from one of government support to one of government dissent after the Functional Group (Golongan Karya, Golkar) The Joint Secretariat of the Functional Group or Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya was established on 20 October 1964 by the Indonesian army. On 4 November 1970, Golkar joined the election for the first time. It became the political machine of Suharto. Golkar dominated the election during Suharto presidential term. After Suharto's fall, Golkar became the Party of Golkar in 1999. failed to nominate him as a member of the local parliament. Suharto's subsequent fall created the opportunity to strengthen the pro‐independence movement. The pro‐independence movement was getting stronger with the establishment of Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian or Foreri, which was established in 1998 by civil society groups such as churches, traditional councils, women's group and student organisations. Foreri aimed to foster aspirations of Papuans as indigenous people in Papua. This organisation succeeded in organising a team of 100 (tim seratus) led by Tom Beanal to meet President Habibie in national dialogue. In this meeting, this team voiced their desire be independent from Indonesia (Singh , p. 106). This made Eluay the foremost leader of the pro‐independence movement in Papua. Thus, the LMA became the forefront political movement and succeeded in holding the Second Papuan Congress in 2000 to support Papua's independence (Dogomo n.d.). This congress was monumental for the recognition of the rights of the Papuan peoples vis‐á‐vis the Indonesian Government. The LMA became one of the pillars of the Papuan Presidium Council (PDP), The PDP had peacefully supported Papuan independence. It was formed during the Papuan great meeting or Musyawarah Besar (mubes) in February 2000. The members of this council were elected from the Mubes delegations who were considered to be representing the Papuans in their regions. The council consisted of 31 executive members and 501 elected members as regional representatives. Eluay and Beanal were appointed chief and vice chief of the PDP. The Mubes participants believed that these two leaders who came from big tribes in Papua could unite Papuans. This council was prepared to declare Papuan independence. It tried to reconstruct the history of Papua in 1961 and propagate that the New Guinea Raad (NGR), formed by Dutch government in the 1960s, had declared Papuan independence (refer to King , p. 41 for a discussion of the PDP's formation and Chauvel for a discussion of the PDP's reinterpretation of the Manfesto Politik and the flag raising). which continued to mobilize Papuan peoples.

However, after Eluay was murdered in November 2001, the LMA changed its name to the DAP and decided to establish itself as an independent organization with the purpose of protecting and advocating for Papuan rights through the implementation of special autonomy. The Special Autonomy Law created new opportunities for the determination of the Papuan peoples within the context of the Indonesian union (Amiruddin , pp. 166–167).

As established on 8 February 2002, the DAP sought to protect the rights of indigenous people in Papua so Papuans would become ‘the master on their own land’. The DAP's statute emphasized that it is not a political organization in favour of Papuan independence; however, many of the elites and DAP members also became members of the PDP. Even the Chairman of the DAP, Tom Beanal, was the Vice‐Chairman of the PDP. After Eluay's assassination, there was overlapping leadership between the DAP and PDP. Tom Beanal became the chairman of both organizations.

To accommodate the adat structure, the organizational structure of the DAP followed adat regional divisions. The Regional Customary Council (Dewan Adat Wilayah) consisted of the following seven adat regions represented in Table . The subsequent level of the Regional Customary Council was the Local Customary Council (Dewan Adat Daerah). The lowest level in the structure of the DAP is the Village Customary Council (Dewan Adat Kampung). Although the village council is the lowest level of the customary council, it has an important participatory role in articulating the aspirations of the DAP at the local level. In addition, the village council often introduces topics to be discussed at higher levels of the council. As such, the concerns and aspirations of the Papuan peoples are made known to the government.

Members of the Papua Customary Council

No.	Adat regions	Local Customary Council
1.	Tabi	Dewan Adat Wilayah Tabi
Dewan Adat Defonsoro Selatan
Dewan Adat Defonsoro Utara
Dewan Adat Grime Nawa
LMA Port Numbay
Dewan Adat Keerom
Dewan Adat Sarmi
Dewan Adat Mamberamo Raya
2.	Saireri	Dewan Adat Byak
Dewan Adat Yapen
Dewan Adat Waropen
Dewan Adat Nabire
3.	Doberai	Dewan Adat Mnukwar
Dewan Adat Sorong
LMA Malamoy
LMA Raja Ampat
LMA Sorong Selatan
LMA Tambrauw
Dewan Adat Meybrat
LMA Tujuh Suku Teluk Bintuni
Dewan Adat Wondama
4.	Bomberay	Dewan Adat Fakfak
Dewan Adat Kaimana
LEMASKO (Lembaga musyawarah adat suku Kamoro)
5.	Anim Ha	Dewan Adat Merauke
LMA Asmat
Dewan Adat Mappi
Dewan Adat Boven Digoel
DMA Momuna (Yahukimo)
6.	La Pago	Dewan Adat Wilayah BALIM
Dewan Adat Puncak Jaya
Dewan Adat Tolikara
Dewan Adat Yahukimo
Dewan Adat Lani Jaya
Dewan Adat Puncak
Dewan Adat Yalimo
Dewan Adat MamTeng
LEMASA (Lembaga adat suku Amungme)
7.	Me Pago	Dewan Adat Paniai
Dewan Adat Deiyai
Dewan Adat Intan Jaya
Dewan Adat Dogiyai

Source: Retrieved from http://dewanadatpapua.or.id/tentang‐kami/ on 20 December 2015. Due to the change of name from Papuan Customary Deliberative Assembly (LMA) under Eluay to Papua Customary Council (DAP), several adat institutions on the local level (district) are still using ‘LMA’ instead of ‘DAP’.

The DAP aims to incorporate grassroot Papuan aspirations and concerns from and has the goal of revitalizing adat institutions, which were legitimized by the Second Papuan People's Congress. However, the DAP has not been officially recognized by the central government. In order to gain government recognition, the DAP has attempted to register as an adat community organization at the office of the Political and State Union (Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik, Kesbangpol), but the application was not approved. The central government maintained a suspicion of the DAP and feared that it would mobilize Papuans against the Indonesian Government because key DAP members also belonged to the PDP. Moreover, the DAP and PDP did not support the Special Autonomy Law. The DAP had even organized a symbolic return of the Special Autonomy Law to the central government in 2005 to show that the law had failed (FGD in Jakarta on 25 August 2005; Elisabeth et al. ).

New Customary Community Council: a Parasite for the Adat Recognition

The formation of the Customary Community Council, or the new LMA, was supported by the Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs in 2010 as the official government organization of Papuan representation. The ministry tried to ‘revive’ the former LMA established by Eluay by giving this new organization the same abbreviation to deliberately confuse the Papuans (Table ). The central government may have feared that the DAP had the power to mobilize adat communities and contribute towards the strengthening of the separatist movement. Furthermore, the DAP is considered to be legitimated by the majority of Papuans after it successfully mobilized Papuans in the Second Papua Congress.

The strength of the adat communities' movement led to the Draft Law on the Recognition and the Protection of the Indigenous Peoples (RUU PMHA) in 2009, which ensured the central government could not ignore the role of adat institutions as representative of adat communities. The Papua and West Papua development acceleration agency (Unit Percepatan Pembangungan Papua dan Papua Barat), a hand of the central government, could no longer be effectively recognized as a Papuan representative. The MRP also cannot play this role due to Papuan distrust, as well as central government distrust of the MRP. The central government was suspicious that the MRP would become a super body for Papuans against the central government because several elected members of the MRP were perceived to be separatist supporters. On the other side, Papuans distrusted the MRP because its membership selection did not accord with government regulation no. 54/2004. Several MRP members elected by Papuans and considered pro‐Papuan were not even inducted. The central government divided the MRP, which from 2005–2010 covered all of Papua, into two bodies (MRP Papua and MRP Papua Barat) in 2011 with the intention of reducing the MRP's power and authority and making the MRP just an ‘ornament’ of special autonomy (focus group discussion in Jakarta on 19 July 2006). Therefore, the new LMA was formed in Papua as an artificial Papuan representative.

As a government body, the new LMA functions to preserve the adat communities of Papua and to articulate their goals. In addition, it has the purported goal of synergizing development programs with the central government to foment the prosperity of the Papuan peoples within Republic of Indonesia. In contrast to the DAP, the new LMA labels itself as a progressive adat organization. However, based on its actions that are further described in this section, this organization may be more accurately described as a broker than a partner. Lenis Kogoya has said to the media that he will “encourage this council from the province to village level to secure the government's programs in Papua” (Tabloid Jubi ).

Lenis Kogoya was appointed the first leader of the Customary Community Council, or new LMA, on 7 December 2010. The organization's committee also consisted of Hertog Waisimon, Demianus Awiyuta, Paskalis Netep and Ev. Napi Kogoya. These members, especially Lenis Kogoya, have a close relationship with the government (interview with Lenis Kogoya on 12 March 2016; http://lmaprovinsipapua.blogspot.jp).

The new LMA of Papua was formed to garner Papuan support and to counter the influence of the DAP and bring adat institutions further under the influence of the central government. When the DAP was the only adat organization, its support by the Papuan peoples was assumed to be unequivocal. With the emergence of the new LMA, the DAP was no longer the sole body of adat representation. The policy that formed the new LMA and made Kogoya its leader successfully gnawed at the DAP, as noted by a member of the MRP, Joram Wambrauw:

...the DAP, as a part of the PDP, returned as a political organization in December [1961]. Therefore, in order to create an organization parallel to the PDP, the[new]LMA was formed. However, these may represent antagonistic interests and oppose one another (Interview with Joram Wambrauw on 23 Oct 2015).

Lenis Kogoya comes from a tribe in Jayawijaya, in the Papuan Highlands. He has a close relationship with Joko Suyanto, the Coordinating Minister of Political, Legal and Security Affairs of President Yudhoyono. According to information from an MRP member, in the 1990s, Kogoya lived in Suyanto's house when Suyanto became Airbase Commander of Jayapura, Papua (interview with Joram Wambrauw, 23 October 2015).

These close ties between Kogoya and Joko Suyanto are even more clear when considering Kogoya's previous positions within the government. Furthermore, under President Jokowi (2014–2019), Kogoya has been appointed President of the Special Staff. This strategic leadership appointment may be one means by which the new LMA, purported to represent the Papuan people, may in fact be used as an instrument to justify and implement central governmental policies.

Furthermore, the new LMA does not have a wide range of supporters from Papua. The new LMA has sought to garner support from Papuans participating at the lower levels of the DAP (district and sub‐district, or even the village level) as part of a strategy to reduce the role of the DAP and foment further internal fragmentation. Accordingly, the government has also attempted to approach dissenting Papuans.

[The new] LMA and Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia have cooperated to kill us, us Papuans (Tabloid Jubi 15 November 2015).

I said to DAP, the politics of dualism have always become the agenda of the [central] government in order to make DAP powerless. Don`t forget that [new] LMA [Customary Community Council] is well‐facilitated by government. People who previously supported DAP also joined here [new LMA]. There are also several people who do not want to join DAP and would rather become a member of the [new] LMA. Someone created this situation who knew very well the current political scenario in Papua. This man [Kogoya] was placed in power because he had been trained. It isn't just anyone. Where does Lenis come from? From the Highlands. This is an intelligent move (Interview with Septer Manufandu on 22 Oct 2015).

As stated by Septer in the previous quote, the current network of political power in Papua has been filled with the people from the Highlands. This includes the Provincial Governor (2013–2018), Lukas Enembe, who comes from Tolikara; the first and second Head of the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) also comes from the Highlands. The DAP leader, Forkorus Yaboisembut (2007–2015) is from Sentani. He replaced Tom Beanal (2002–2007) who comes from the Amungme tribes in the Timika district. Kogoya's placement as the new LMA leader may form part of a strategy to balance political power in Papua, as Highlands peoples have a record of opposing government policies. From the perspective of the central government, support from the Highlands area is crucial because this area is also believed to be the centre of the Papua Separatist Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka). Therefore, control of the Highlands may imply a potential stabilization of the Papua political situation.

As an adat organization recognized by government, the new LMA holds a significant role in coordinating Papuan policies with the central government. Due to the Special Autonomy Law, every policy to be implemented in Papua must first be consulted with Papuan adat communities. Thus, consulting the new LMA may be enough to legitimate government policies implemented in Papua, even if this organization clearly aligns with the motives of the central government.

Thus, the formation of the new LMA could be argued to form part of the government's strategy to implement its policies in Papua, in both the realms of security and development. However, its legitimacy may be challenged, as the new LMA was established without the free, prior and informed consent of Papuans. In terms of development, the main problem for initiating investments in Papua is the land leasing process, as most land is considered adat, or community land. Thus, adat representation in land leasing processes is very important, and the specifications of the Special Autonomy Law must be considered. Currently, the new LMA has been able to bypass these considerations, essentially becoming a broker of adat lands. It supported the grand design of Indonesian development (Master Plan of Expansion and Acceleration of Indonesian Economic Development, MP3EI). The central government has increasingly welcomed investment in development since 2011. As a result, the number of investments in Papua has continuously grown. Statistical data show that foreign investments more than doubled from 2010 to 2013. In the same period, domestic investment surged to five times its 2010 level (Statistics data of Papua , ). (Figure ) shows the increasing number of domestic and foreign companies that have invested in Papua.

To strengthen its position, the new LMA has also intensified its participation in the lower levels of hierarchy in Papuan communities. Together with the Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs and the Ministry of Home Affairs, Kogoya inaugurated the new LMA in several districts, sub‐districts and villages, thus officially affiliating them with the new LMA (Tabloid Jubi 19 October 2015). The new LMA was inaugurated in several regions of Papua that had become focal points for investment. For example, in 2011, Kogoya created a new LMA region in Timika, where the Freeport Company, the main investor in Papua, is established (Tabloid Jubi 28 Mei 2011).

Moreover, to support the MIFEE, a project whose implementation has been delayed since 2010, Kogoya also inaugurated the new LMA in the Merauke district. This may be considered strategic given that Merauke, along with Mimika, is one of the two biggest contributors to the GDP of the Papua Province, as well as an important investment target by central government (Statistics Indonesia 2013).

In these cases, the adat communities accepted participation in the new LMA because the central government promised to provide salaries for participating council members. Moreover, the central government also promised that the local government would be allocated a budget for the operation of the new LMA. Borrowing from Visser (), the position of the LMA can be described as the “...insider‐out and outsider‐in of government intervention projects, since they are expected to be familiar with adat rules and practice concerning land ownership, marriage, kindship, and jurisdiction”. This case can be seen clearly in the involvement of the new LMA in the land grabbing that occurred through the MIFEE project in Merauke.

The Role of the Customary Community Council in Brokering the Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate

The Customary Community Council in Merauke (LMA‐Merauke) was formed in 2002, long before Lenis Kogoya became the organization's leader. The formation of a Customary Community Council, or LMA, in the Merauke district was initiated by Albert Moyuend Gebze and Ignas Ndiken in 2000 when they began to vocalize their idea in Marind Anim villages in Merauke. In 2001, the first meeting was conducted to elect the board members of the LMA. In 2002, the LMA was formed with Ignas Ndiken as leader of the Merauke district. The inauguration of LMA board members was witnessed by the head of the Merauke district and the bishop of Merauke (interview with AM 23 August 2014). This LMA was ‘used’ to preserve and revitalize the Marind culture and communities, which comprise the major indigenous group in Merauke (interview with PB 20 August 2014; GG 23 August 2014; ER 23 August 2014; and EL 31 October 2015). Marind is the one of the major tribes that lives in the Merauke district. Marind people consist of four groups based on the four wind directions: Imoh, Mayo, Ezam and Sosom. Every group in one village has its own adat leader. The structure of the LMA‐Merauke accommodated the traditional Marind leadership structure. LMA leaders were chosen from the adatelders (tokoh adat) but did not hold the position of adat leader in the village. Usually, the LMA leader is a village elder who cannot achieve the position as adat leader in the village. Adat leadership in Marind Anim was usually inherited, but sometimes, it was obtained by tokoh adat through achievement. Due to his position as tokoh adat, this LMA leader is expected to be able to influence the adat community in the village. LMA leadership thus contested the authority of the adat leader in the village (interview with adat community and adat leader in SN, DM, AL and OG village in Merauke district, 2014–2015). Thus, this council had a claim to be representative of the Marind community.

The DAP also exists in Merauke, but it is not as strong as the LMA in that district. There are several reasons for this. First, the local government supports the LMA instead of the DAP due to the LMA's support of local government policy. The DAP was amongst the first to reject the MIFEE. In July 2010, the DAP sent a letter to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono stating that it rejected the MIFEE project. Johanes Wob, the secretary general of the DAP in the Anim‐Ha region, criticized the fact that in legal procedures, indigenous people were structurally disadvantaged against companies and announced that indigenous peoples' land was ‘not for sale’ (Ginting & Pye , pp. 166–167). Second, due to the DAP structure not following government administration but rather divisions of adat regions, the leader of the DAP in the Anim‐Ha region does not come from the Marind tribe; therefore, the DAP in this region is not as popular as the LMA amongst the Marind people, the major tribe in the Merauke district.

During the first phase of the LMA in Merauke, this body existed only at the district level. An initiative was then taken to establish LMA‐Merauke at the lower levels of the sub‐district and village. The head of the Merauke district, John Gluba Gebze, invited village elders to his office and persuaded them to create the LMA at the village level by demonstrating its importance in the villages. He explained that a LMA leader in each village would become a local government partner for village development and act as a mediator between the government and each adat community (interview with PB 20 August 2014).

However, LMA‐Merauke formation met with resistance from Marind communities, especially at the village level, because this organization would reduce and overlap with the authority of local adat leaders, undermining the pre‐existing adat structure. The existence of the LMA at the village level created a new leadership structure in the village (Figure ). Many villages thus did not form part of the LMA‐Merauke and refused to recognize its existence. Instead, they proclaimed the adat leader as their only true leader.

After the local government, under Gebze (2000–2010), initiated an investment program in Merauke in 2007, the presence of the LMA‐Merauke has become more notable. Over time, the LMA‐Merauke has strengthened its claim as the representative of adat communities, coinciding with the new leadership of Lenis Kogoya. The LMA‐Merauke began to function as a local government partner in the implementation of the development program when Marind communities were involved, particularly regarding the leasing of adat lands (Lembaga Masyarakat Adat Suku Marind Anim, unpublished data). To solidify its position as a government partner, in 2012, Kogoya invited the LMA‐Merauke to participate in the new LMA of Papua Province. During this inauguration, the LMA‐Merauke was promised an annual budget of one billion IDR from local government expenditure. The close relationship between the new LMA and the central government may be seen part of a government strategy to create an ‘understanding’ with adat communities and guarantee the implementation of its policies.

Certain conditions were also arranged to expedite the implementation of the MIFEE project in Merauke district. The central government's promotion of its development agenda may also be witnessed with the MIFEE, a project developed over 1.283 million ha of land. This is the first national project in Papua developed by the Indonesian Government after autonomy was granted to the province. The central government considers Merauke an ideal space for agricultural expansion, as it contains vast, arable areas (Government of Indonesia ).

The MIFEE was launched in Merauke in 2010 as a continuation of a year‐long investment program initiated by Gebze in 2007. The program was first called the Merauke Integrated Rice Estate (MIRE) because rice was the main commodity. To attract wider investment, the MIRE project was repackaged as the MIFEE project, which became the focus of the central government (Government of Indonesia ). In the MIFEE project, Gebze had given the concession to 36 companies above 2.5 million ha areas for total land concession in Merauke district. John Gluba Gebze (2000–2010) and Romanus Mbaraka (2010–2015), head of the district, or bupati, gave location permits to 41 companies for over 2.5 million ha to invest in the MIFEE project, even though the spatial planning had not yet been enacted as local regulation. Gebze released location permits for 36 companies. Mbaraka then released location permits for 16 companies with the caveat that 10 would replace companies whose location permits had expired; 3 companies obtained new location permits; 1 company got an extended location permit; 1 received a new location permit to change its coordinates, and 1 obtained a new location permit for land which it had already received a location permit (interview with the head division of investment, Merauke district investment, 19 August 2014; Board Investment Board of Merauke District data 2014, unpublished).

The MIFEE is the result of a political deal between elites in the Merauke district and representatives of the central government who direct this project. The formation of a new province in the southern part of Papua—South Papua Province—became part of this political deal (Awas Mifee ). Both the MIFEE and the creation of the new province would provide advantages for both parties involved. By creating a new province, the central government would be able to justify the increased presence of military officials. Even though the central government has failed to create additional provinces in Papua thus far, this does not seem to have constrained the deployment of security forces, according to several sources. According to a report by Imparsial, in 2011, it was estimated that there were about 14,842 soldiers to combat about OPM that only 1/10 of army`s number in Papua (refer to Suara Papua 12 April 2012). This would be one means of exerting control and monitoring the separatist movement along the Papua and Papua New Guinea border. Moreover, the contestation of such projects amongst tribal elites would cause further fragmentation within Papuan communities. Lastly, Merauke's elite, especially the head of the Merauke district, could benefit from the creation of a new province. Nonetheless, to date, this campaign for a new province in South Papua has not been successful.

The agenda of this government project falls in line with that of the LMA‐Merauke, as it was declared in a meeting in 2007 that, “the Customary Community Council [LMA‐Merauke] becomes the highest authority for the leasing of Marind Anim lands” (Lembaga Masyarakat Adat Suku Marind Anim n.d.). It can help to reduce the land lease problem from adat community, which is the main obstacle to implementing the MIFEE. This clearly contradicts local Marind adat rules, in which the decision to lease land rests with the head of the clan after consultation with other clan members and leaders. In response, the resistance of adat landowners to the LMA‐Merauke has strengthened.

Statements from several village members indicate their disapproval of the LMA‐Merauke in their sub‐districts, and others refuse to recognize its existence due to the negative reputation of its members. Several individuals told me that LMA‐Merauke members have harmed the community. Interestingly, Gebze, the former head of the Merauke district, also stated that he does not recognize the LMA‐Merauke, saying, “there is no LMA in Marind Anim tradition—I only recognized the adat leader” (interview with John Gluba Gebze on 29 August 2014).

The negative image of the LMA‐Merauke in the Marind Anim community is caused by their perceptions of elites' behaviour at the village, sub‐district and district levels, as well as a distrust of their motives being in the interest of the adat community. The LMA‐Merauke is increasingly seen as a supporter of company and government interests due to its participation in adat land confiscation. This may be further exemplified with the cases of land leasing in two villages, Duku and Muli, which are detailed in the succeeding texts.

Land transfer in Duku offers an example of the involvement of LMA‐Merauke at the village level. The Karya Bumi Papua and Cenderawasih Jaya Mandiri companies (subsidiaries of the Rajawali Group) were granted location permits by the head of the Merauke district in 2010 for over 70,000 ha PT Cenderawasih Jaya Mandiri has a permit for 40,000 ha in the Marind and Kumbe sub‐districts; PT Karya Bumi Papua has a permit for 30,000 ha in the K sub‐district. of sugarcane plantations. The Rajawali Group also co‐opted the leader of the LMA‐Merauke in Duku to help persuade other community members to lease their lands to the company. The LMA‐Merauke leader in Duku actively deals with outside matters, whereas the adat leader only addresses internal matters, particularly relating to rituals in the village. In communications with the company, the LMA‐Merauke, supported by the village secretary (village administration), was more proactive than the adat leader during negotiations, in which the company promised money to the leaders of Duku. The LMA‐Merauke leader in the village was able to persuade community members to lease their land for plantations by promising an income guarantee. As a result, the leaders of the adat, leader of village LMA‐Merauke, and head of village, as well as other village administrators, were receiving between 500,000 and 1,000,000 IDR (around US$38 and US$76) per month from the Rajawali Group (Dewi , p. 96).

Muli provides another example of LMA‐Merauke involvement in the land negotiation process. The LMA‐Merauke recommended that the adat lands of the Muli village be cultivated. The adat community of this village, which has been actively supported by several NGOs (Yayasan Pusaka and SKP‐KAME), rejected the proposal of the Astra Company to create sugarcane plantations on their land. One of the LMA‐Merauke leaders then organized a meeting between company and government representatives with the goal of persuading landowners to give permission for the company to use their lands. The LMA‐Merauke leader later brought these officials to an adat forum, although key non‐adat members were excluded from the discussion, including a pastor who actively participated in the community. Thus, the forum for negotiation was limited only to company and government representatives of the adat communities of the village. Nevertheless, this negotiation strategy failed, and adat landowners did not agree to lease their lands (interview with GG on 23 August 2014; El on 31 October 2015; OT on 8 November 2015).

As a result, adat communities in Muli and other villages have increasingly united against the existence of the LMA‐Merauke. Many negative comments and perceptions of the LMA‐Merauke have spread throughout adat communities, who commonly assert that the LMA‐Merauke only operates in favour of land leasing or as a broker of adat lands.

These cases are examples of how the government used a purported adat institution, LMA‐Merauke, to facilitate the implementation of development projects such as the MIFEE. In the Merauke district, government efforts to revitalize and co‐opt LMA‐Merauke functions were achieved by providing incentives to LMA‐Merauke leaders. Symbolically, the new LMA of the Papua Province induced the LMA‐Merauke for the second time on 11 December 2015. The first inauguration was conducted in Jayapura, yet this second inauguration took place on site in the Merauke district (interview with MG 30 October 2015). I heard speculation amongst the communities of Merauke that a new project by President Jokowi called Proyek Lahan Sejuta Hektar (1 million ha of land) will soon launch; it will be a rice estate that will replace the current MIFEE project (interview with JB 15 August 2014; P2EB‐UGM (unpublished document)).

Marind People's Perception of the Lembaga Masyarakat Adat in the Merauke District

Marind people questioned the function and existence of the LMA in Merauke at both the district and village levels. They said that the LMA was not inaugurated by the adat, and therefore, the LMA could not undermine the authority of the adat leader. The villagers were disappointed with the LMA. They felt that its committees did nothing for the Marind people and only thought of their own interests (interview with adat community in Alu, Sulu and Duku villages on 20–23 August 2014). The resistance of the Marind people culminated in the demand for the LMA's dissolution in a Marind elders' meeting in Wendu on the 2–3 of August 2013 (Wendu Note, unpublished document).

The negative image of the LMA amongst the Marind was caused by distrust of its motives and interests. The LMA was increasingly seen as a supporter of company and government interests during the process of adat land confiscation. One document from the Merauke district LMA clearly stated that the LMA held the highest authority to lease adat lands. This contradicts with local Marind Anim adat rules, in which the decision to lease land rests with the head of the clan after consultation with other clan members and leaders.

As explained in the preceding texts, the LMA attempted to accelerate the transfer of land rights from the adat community to certain companies, as occurred in Muli. The LMA recommended that the company obtain the land from the people in Muli, and the vice leader of the LMA was directly involved in the negotiation process for the land leasing, trying to persuade the adat community to allow the company to build a plantation on their lands. This also took place in other villages such as Muting and Duku where LMA leaders of the district and village aided the land leasing process. The head of Duku village said, “The LMA leader gave permission to the company to use their lands” (interview with leader of Duku village on 22 August 2014). In response, the resistance of adat landowners to the LMA strengthened, especially in villages. Many negative comments about the LMA spread throughout adat communities, who contended the “LMA has acted immorally” (interview with EL on 31 October 2015), “the LMA is an adat land seller” (interview with MY on 20 August 2014; interview with NN on 1 November 2015), “the LMA only comes if there is a land negotiation for land leasing” (interview with SL on 27 August 2014), and “the LMA is a broker of adat lands” (interview with GG on 23 August 2014). One negative statement was directed at the vice leader of the Merauke district: “Albert is really discourteous” (interview with GG on 23 August 2014).

Even though there is resistance from the local community to the LMA, the promised salaries and annual budget for the LMA at the village, sub‐district and district levels promoted the formation of the LMA. The local government of the Merauke district also enacted local regulation no. 4/2013 to support the LMA as an adat institution that partners with the government and to give the LMA the authority to manage adat rights including lands and customary rights (hak ulayat).

Conclusion: Old Dynamics, New Packaging

After legal recognition of adat communities was achieved with the passage of the Special Autonomy Law, the central government tried to exert its control through the establishment of the new LMA from 2010. First, this council countered the power of the Papua Customary Council (DAP), stemming from the failure of the government to maintain the control of the Papuan Customary Deliberative Assembly (Lembaga Musyawarah Adat, the former LMA) under Theys Eluay. Second, this council has been successfully used as a tool to achieve the exploitation of land and natural resources in Papua, thus positioning the new LMA as a development broker in Papua.

The LMA in Merauke was initiated by several Marind elders to preserve and protect the culture and land of the Marind people in the district. Later, this LMA formed branches in the lower levels—at the sub‐district and village levels—in the Merauke district. Even though Marind Anim communities at the village level resisted its presence because the authority of the LMA overlapped with that of local adat leaders and would undermine pre‐existing adat structure, the Merauke district government supported this formation and tried to involve the LMA at different levels as government partners to represent the Marind people.

This local government support was used to accelerate further investments in the Merauke district. This can be seen clearly in the implementation of the MIFEE project. Several cases show that this council helped to smooth the MIFEE project by accelerating the process of land leasing, which is actually a form of land grabbing. The involvement of the LMA, which acted as an adat institution and the Marind people's government representative in the Merauke district, meant the local government or company could not be accused of grabbing adat lands because the land leasing process was considered to include free, prior, informed and consent from the Marind people.

This is an example of corrupted recognition applied in the implementation of the MIFEE project. The government created a proxy agency that could serve the structural and cultural function of adat and using it in accordance with government policy orientation. The new LMA is a relatively peaceful mechanism by which the central government has secured control of Papua. The new LMA of Papua, as a purported adat organization, represents the invisible hand of the government through which specific policies may be achieved without the violation of human rights. Furthermore, the new LMA justifies the implementation of investment policies, which have supposedly been subjected to a process of community consent through the representatives of the new LMA. It helps the government avoid any severe accusations that is neglecting or repressing Papuan rights.

Although it may be argued that the establishment of new LMA is a form of government recognition of Papuan communities, this recognition is not based on the Papuans' idea of adat. In the end, this institutional recognition of adat is only artificial and has allowed the implementation of the central government's policies in Papua in collaboration with a small segment of opportunistic Papuan elites.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Prof. Okamoto Masaaki for his comments on earlier versions of this article. The research was supported by the Graduate School of Asian and African Areas Studies, Kyoto University, Japan and MEXT Japan.