Content area
Full Text
Little attention has been paid to how and when economic sanctions end, especially compared with the amount of research on their effectiveness. A game in which the ending of sanctions is part of interstate bargaining about a contested policy is analyzed. In case of audience costs, sanctions may occur because governments use strategies that commit them to their ideal policy position. Governments use as constraints domestic political groups that have an interest in the disputed policy. Alternatively, rent-seeking enables governments to obtain political gain from the opportunities for side payments provided by sanctions. Results show that commitment strategies help states improve their bargaining position and make the resolution of the conflict more difficult. Data on the duration and ending of sanctions initiated in the period between 1914 and 1990 are used to test these hypotheses. The analyses provide clear evidence that commitment strategies affect the duration of sanctions.
In December 1998, the United States and Great Britain began operation Desert Fox, culminating a year with increasing tensions over the ending of economic sanctions against Iraq. Both Saddam Hussein and the sanctions survived the military operation. However, by forcefully pressing the issue that sanctions should be lifted, the Iraqi leadership succeeded at least in revealing serious disagreement in an alliance that had operated as a united front during the Gulf War. Compared with the often heated debates about the motives behind sanctions and their effectiveness, the lifting of sanctions receives only scant attention. Interest in sanctions often dissipates as soon as they are implemented.
The effectiveness of sanctions is generally studied in relationship to their costs. Critics of sanctions underscore the costs for the sender state. Furthermore, they emphasize that the ruling elite in the targeted state finds ways to mitigate the costs of the sanctions or it is willing to have ordinary citizens suffer most of them. In summary, critics claim that sanctions are, most of the time, ineffective because the costs fall on the wrong people. Supporters of economic sanctions emphasize the importance of the contested issue and the dearth of alternative instruments, thus placing the costs to the sender in perspective. Moreover, they point out the occasional success of sanctions, especially when the sanctions receive multilateral backing.' Sanctions are more likely to...