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What can I tell those who ask why we allowed the changes in Eastern Europe, why we agreed to pull out our troops? This suggests the unuttered thought; why didn't we use our tanks to restore order? Can anyone seriously think that a problem can be resolved this way today? Have we learned anything from the lessons of Afghanistan? Have we forgotten 1956 (the Human uprising) and 1965 (the invasion of Czechoslovakia to crush the Prague Spring)? Perhaps we have had enough of death notices and disabled veterans. (Eduard A. Shednadze, Pravala, 26 June 1990; 28th Communist Party Congress, 7 July 1990).
The decade long Soviet war in Afghanistan (1989) was the longest counter-insurgency war in Soviet history 1!. It also qualifies as one of the bloodiest and most intractable guerrilla wars of the twentieth century. Not surprisingly, the Afghanistan experience had and will continue to have a major impact on Soviet society, on the generation that fought the war, on the relationship between Soviet society and the Soviet military, and on the degree to which Soviet society holds its leaders to be accountable for momentous policy decisions.
When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in Soviet politics and Soviet society were still firmly entrenched in the era of stagnation. Halfway through the period of the Afghan occupation (in 1985), Mikhail Gorbachev assumed leadership of the CPSU and initiated a reform programme, perestroika, that has led to a radical restructuring and opening of Soviet society and Soviet politics. This reform programme/experience shaped and was simultaneously shaped by the Afghanistan experience.
By 1986-1987, Gorbachev and his foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze referred to Afghanistan as a "bleeding wound" and as a "sin", eventually placing blame for the failed policy decision squarely on the shoulders of the geriatric leadership of the previous regime. Nevertheless, citing continued support and a continue flow of arms and advisors to the resistance by such diverse adversaries as the USA, Pakistan, China, Iran and Saudi Arabia the new leadership maintained that they were forced to continue to follow through with their "internationalist duty"; to assist the Marxist regime until it could consolidate the revolutionary forces that had brought it into power into a sufficient force to resist local, regional and international aggression.
Some evidence...