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Theory Dec. (2012) 73:315355
DOI 10.1007/s11238-012-9310-y
Published online: 26 May 2012 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012
Abstract Judgment aggregation theory, or rather, as we conceive of it here, logical aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of merely preference judgments. It derives from Kornhauser and Sagers doctrinal paradox and List and Pettits discursive dilemma, two problems that we distinguish emphatically here. The current theory has developed from the discursive dilemma, rather than the doctrinal paradox, and the nal objective of the paper is to give the latter its own theoretical development along the line of recent work by Dietrich and Mongin. However, the paper also aims at reviewing logical aggregation theory as such, and it covers impossibility theorems by Dietrich, Dietrich and List, Dokow and Holzman, List and Pettit, Mongin, Nehring and Puppe, Pauly and van Hees, providing a uniform logical framework in which they can be compared with each other. The review goes through three historical stages: the initial paradox and dilemma, the scattered early results on the independence axiom, and the so-called canonical theorem, a collective achievement that provided the theory with its specic method of analysis. The paper goes some way towards philosophical logic, rst by briey connecting the aggregative framework of judgment with the modern philosophy of judgment, and second by thoroughly discussing and axiomatizing the general logic built in this framework.
The present English paper has evolved from an earlier French paper co-authored with Franz Dietrich (Un bilan interprtatif de la thorie de lagrgation logique, Revue dconomie politique, vol. 120, 2010, pp. 929972). Many thanks to him for allowing this author to present this new version. Thanks also for their comments to Brian Hill, Mikal Cozic, Daniel Eckert, Itay Fainmesser, Jim Joyce, Lewis Kornhauser, Gabriella Pigozzi, Rohit Parikh, Roberto Serrano, Jan Sprenger, Jonathan Zvesper, and the participants to the many conferences or seminars where versions or variants of this paper were given.
P. Mongin (B)
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique-GREGHEC, HEC Paris, 1 rue de la Libration, 78350 Jouy-en-Josas, Francee-mail: [email protected]
The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory
Philippe Mongin
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316 P. Mongin
Keywords Judgment aggregation Logical aggregation Doctrinal paradox
Discursive dilemma General...