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Nearly everyone knows the children's story of the ugly duckling. Once upon a time three ducklings were born, two yellow and one black. The black chick, whose large egg had mysteriously appeared in the mother's nest, was different than the others: he was black and larger in size. The black duckling was branded as ugly by his siblings because he was larger and different in color. But as he grew older, his grace and worth became apparent. One day the realization struck home to the entire duck family that this was no ordinary brother. He was special; he was not an ordinary duck, but rather had grown into a beautiful swan.
This paper examines the ugly duckling thesis as applied to the 1988 Wellington Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA). In mid- 1990 the Wellington Convention has become the object of considerable international scorn and criticism both for what it does and does not purport to do. CRAMRA has in effect been branded the ugly duckling of the Antarctic Treaty System, criticized by many, loved by some and ignored by few. The main aim of this study is to weigh the political, legal and environmental benefits versus costs of putting the Wellington Treaty into force, with a view toward determining how this sullied instrument might be permitted someday to evolve into a beautiful regulatory swan.
There is no doubt that the Wellington Treaty provides positive contributions for the Antarctic Treaty System. This agreement marks completion of the resource protection regime under ATS (the other aspects being for fauna and flora, seals and living marine resources) by providing regulation and environmental standards affecting minerals activities. It provides a negotiated agreed upon consensus approach to deal with the regulation of mineral activities that impinge upon complex questions of national sovereignty and the environmental protection of Antarctica. CRAMRA sets up a formal mechanism to address those issues. It establishes certain ground-breaking environmental provisions, one of which is the principle of "Thou shall not proceed in mineral activities unless sufficient information on exploration is available." Importantly, the requirement that sufficient information must be available entails a process that is checked by a consensus provision for all parties.
The environmental provisions in the Wellington Convention...