CONFLICTS IN GEORGIA 1991-2008. "THE 2008 FIVE-DAY WAR" - A DIFFERENT CONFLICT FROM THE 1990S

Abstract

The ethnic conflicts in Georgia erupted at the beginning of the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union and they are still not solved, creating problems not only for Georgia and its development, but also for the Black Sea region. The solution for such conflicts is in the best interests of Georgia and the Black Sea region, as well as of the European Union, because after the recent enlargement, the EU has two member countries from that region. Another issue is the security role Georgia can play by providing the corridor for energy resources from the basin of the Caspian Sea to Europe. The stereotype of these conflicts is that they exist in Georgia between different ethnic groups and become active from time to time. This article argues that the 2008 war was not an intrastate war which happened inside the country between different groups, but it had also two participants from the international system. This kind of war also happens because there is no other leverage which can be used by country "A" to maintain its influence on country "B" as it did in the past, thus provoking the military conflict between different identity (here: ethnic) groups and supporting the minorities who are controlled by country "A".

Headnote

Abstract

The ethnic conflicts in Georgia erupted at the beginning of the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union and they are still not solved, creating problems not only for Georgia and its development, but also for the Black Sea region. The solution for such conflicts is in the best interests of Georgia and the Black Sea region, as well as of the European Union, because after the recent enlargement, the EU has two member countries from that region. Another issue is the security role Georgia can play by providing the corridor for energy resources from the basin of the Caspian Sea to Europe.

The stereotype of these conflicts is that they exist in Georgia between different ethnic groups and become active from time to time. This article argues that the 2008 war was not an intrastate war which happened inside the country between different groups, but it had also two participants from the international system. This kind of war also happens because there is no other leverage which can be used by country "A" to maintain its influence on country "B" as it did in the past, thus provoking the military conflict between different identity (here: ethnic) groups and supporting the minorities who are controlled by country "A".

Keywords: Ethnic identities; National interests; Georgia; War, Constructivism; Realism

Introduction

The reason why I have decided to write an analytical comparison of the conflicts in Georgia in the 1990s and in 2008 is that there is little written on this subject and this article will fill the gap to some degree. Another reason is the applicability of it to the current conflict in Ukraine, for example. There are various studies written about the war in 2008 and the conflicts in the 1990s in Georgia, but they mostly offer a mere history of the conflicts and not the comparative analysis of the conflict that will try to exhibit the differences and similarities and provide a more thorough search for the real reasons behind these conflicts. I will draw parallels with the Ukrainian conflict and show the similarities and differences there are with the conflicts in Georgia and how these experiences from Georgia can be applied to better analyse the current conflict in Ukraine.

To explain more why I have opted for this question for my research, which I will mention later, I shall state that nowadays many local conflicts have gained international importance and become matters of international disagreement. As I will show in this article, this is the exact situation in Georgia's case and I will prove it. The local ethnic conflict not only gained major importance for the international society, but it also de facto and de jure evolved from a local to an interstate conflict. This is the reason why the main research question of this article is very important and provides new insight into to the so-called frozen conflicts in Georgia.

In the 1990s, the conflicts in Georgia were considered to be ethnic conflicts and the actors of these conflicts were the ethnic groups that were demanding independence and separation from Georgia (see the history part below) and they were regarded as an intrastate war, i.e. one that happened inside Georgia. But in 2008 there was a military conflict between two independent states - the Russian Federation and Georgia and it became an international military conflict. The main question of this article reads as follows: What was the reason for changing the type of conflict and its actors/characters (officially recognized parties of the conflict) of the 2008 Five-Day war in Georgia?

At the beginning I shall provide a historical background: how these conflicts appeared after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and what kind of roots they had in the Soviet Union.

I have reviewed the methodology through which the research question is answered and for a better explanation of the issue, I have resorted to different schools of international relations and decided which ones are better suited to the current cases.

To render clear the scale of the research, it is to be mentioned that it spreads across both intrastate and interstate levels because, as I have already mentioned, it changes from a local to an interstate conflict.

Theory and Methodology

For any article, the theoretical consideration is important and adds scientific value. Thus, I have decided to base my work on the constructivism theory and explain the case with the help of the latter. Nevertheless, I do not intend to give myself the benefit of choosing one of the International Relations schools I feel comfortable with. I will challenge accordingly the explanatory power of constructivism with realism, which is one of the leading and most interesting schools in the field of international relations. Why have I chosen these two theories and not the others? Why have I used the method of challenging one theory with another? To answer the first question, I plan to argue in the main part of my article that these two theories best explain the cases mentioned here.

The second question already deals with methodological aspects, which I prefer to also include in the introductory part of my work. This article is grounded on qualitative research, where analysis relies on argumentation and the findings stemming from it. As far as the field of qualitative research methodology is concerned, I mainly use the comparative approach, which best suits the tasks and goals I aim to reach. My purpose is to show that the 2008 war exhibits some similarities but was different in essence from the conflicts of the 1990s, and to discover the reasons why this change occurred in 2008. The comparative method enables me to compare not only the cases, but also two international relations theories/schools which best explain the situation and offer a forecast and possible solutions.

Analysis of the conflicts

The hypothesis mentioned here is that the regional player (Russia) has its own interests in maintaining its influence on Post-Soviet countries and it uses different kinds of tools to reach these goals, including the conflict between various identity groups (here, ethnic groups).

As it results from the hypotheses, the main reason for the intrastate conflict is the outside force and the behaviour of it can be explained by Realism. I will provide a theoretical explanation from Realism in the conclusive part of the article. However, is this the best theory for explaining the cases? If so, do small (weak) countries have any chance of altering anything? Is there any other theory which better explains these cases? Or even, do we have to use only one theory in our scientific work or can we use more than one pertaining to international relations within the same scientific work?

History:

South Ossetia (called 'Tskhinvali region' or 'Samachablo' by Georgia) is a territory of 3900 square kilometres located within the Caucasus. Its status in international law is controversial. Whereas South Ossetia considers itself as being an independent State since its declaration of independence of 29 May 1992 and it has also been recognized by five Member States of the United Nations (UN) in the aftermath of the military conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008 (the Russian Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, and Tuvalu), the Georgian government, as well as the majority of Member States of the UN, consider it to be part of the Georgian territory.

The present-day conflict between South Ossetia and Georgia is rooted in a different understanding of historical facts and developments. Whereas Ossetians consider South Ossetia as being part of the Ossetian territory from ancient times and argue that Ossetians were always closer to Russia than to Georgia, Georgians hold that the ancestors of the Ossetians migrated from their homeland north of the Caucasian mountains into the territory they call Samachablo (Nussberger, 2015, p. 1). For a better understanding of the analyses of this work what will be made below, it is necessary to thoroughly explore history. For this purpose, another more comprehensive background review is offered by the U.S. Congressional research service: "Tensions in Georgia date back at least to the 1920s, when South Ossetia made abortive attempts to declare its independence but ended up as an autonomous region within Soviet Georgia after the Red Army conquered Georgia. In 1989, South Ossetia lobbied for joining its territory with North Ossetia in Russia or for independence. Georgia's own declaration of independence from the former Soviet Union and subsequent repressive efforts by former Georgian President Gamsakhurdia triggered conflict in 1990. In January 1991, hostilities broke out between Georgia and South Ossetia, reportedly contributing to an estimated 2,000-4,000 deaths and the displacement of tens of thousands of people. In June 1992, Russia brokered a cease-fire, and Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian "peacekeeping" units set up base camps in a security zone around Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. The units usually totalled around 1,100 troops, including about 530 Russians, a 300-member North Ossetian brigade (which was actually composed of South Ossetians and headed by a North Ossetian), and about 300 Georgians. Monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) did most of the patrolling. A Joint Control Commission (JCC) composed of Russian, Georgian, and North and South Ossetian emissaries ostensibly promoted a settlement of the conflict, with the OSCE as facilitator. Some observers warned that Russia's increasing influence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia over the years transformed the separatist conflicts into essentially Russia-Georgia disputes. Most residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia reportedly were granted Russian citizenship and passports and most appeared to want their regions to be part of Russia." (Nichol, 2009, pp. 2-3).

One must highlight the last fact about passportization from this historical review. As it becomes apparent, south Ossetia and Abkhazia were parts of Georgia in the Soviet period and accordingly people residing in these territories were citizens of Soviet Georgia, but after the independence of Georgia from the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation gave its citizenship to the majority of the people who lived in other independent countries and were not citizens of the Russian Federation. What are the goals of these actions taken by Russia? The hypothesis of this article claims that Russia is using different methods for reaching its interests so as to keep its influence on Post-Soviet Georgia and one of the methods used is granting Russian citizenship as leverage for manipulation.

Eruption of military clashes

Once again, it should be emphasised that the goal of this article is not to discover who is guilty and who is innocent, but to thoroughly analyse the reasons for the conflict. But to reach such a goal, it is important to know the background. Here I will provide some details on actual fighting and the assessment made by the International Crisis Group: "Close to midnight on 7 August 2008, a senior Georgian military official announced that Tbilisi had decided to restore "constitutional order" in South Ossetia. The Georgians had declared a unilateral ceasefire several hours earlier, after another day of fighting between Georgian and Ossetian forces in and around the region's capital, Tskhinvali. But Georgia's defence ministry said South Ossetian militias had nevertheless continued into the evening to heavily shell Georgian villages and positions. By 1:00am on 8 August, Georgian troops had launched a large-scale military offensive on Tskhinvali, supported by artillery, and advanced quickly. At approximately 1:30am, tank columns of the Russian 58th Army started crossing into Georgia from the Roki tunnel separating North and South Ossetia. Apparently, the Russians had anticipated, if they did not actually entice, the Georgian move. Prior to these opening events of 7-8 August, the security situation in South Ossetia had deteriorated sharply. In July, four Georgian soldiers serving in the Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) 3 were detained by the South Ossetian de facto authorities. They were released after an ultimatum by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, but shortly thereafter, Russian warplanes flew over Georgian territory in an open warning to Tbilisi. The South Ossetians and Georgians reinforced their forces and weaponry in the zone of conflict, in violation of ceasefire agreements. In the past months, Russia also had been bolstering its position in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Starting in March, talk of war - an attack on the southern part of Abkhazia - had been rife in Tbilisi. A senior European diplomat said that U.S., German and European Union (EU) leaders had on repeated occasions talked Saakashvili out of launching an attack. Each conversation worked for "about two weeks", the official said. A South Ossetian told Crisis Group in late July that Russian advisers and military officers had recently arrived in the town of Java. They hired local Ossetians at salaries of euro1,000 a month - huge by local standards - to help construct military buildings. Russia also sent extra "peacekeepers" into Abkhazia in April and army railway workers on 30 May. Georgia denounced these moves as illegal occupation. But in two months the railway crew repaired the rail link from Sukhumi to the city of Ochamchire which had been broken for years. Moscow insisted that was for "humanitarian" purposes, but only a few weeks later, at least a portion of the 9,000 Russian troops who went into Georgia via Abkhazia travelled with their hardware via the railway." (Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008, pp. 1-3.)

According to the assessments made by the same group, all parties breached the rules and all are guilty of various things: "The Russia-Georgia conflict has transformed the contemporary geopolitical world, with large consequences for peace and security in Europe and beyond. Moscow's initial moves into South Ossetia as large-scale violence broke out there on 7-8 August were in part a response to a disastrous miscalculation by a Georgian leadership that was impatient with gradual confidence building and a Russian-dominated negotiations process. But Russia's disproportionate counter-attack, with movement of large forces into Abkhazia and deep into Georgia, accompanied by the widespread destruction of economic infrastructure, damage to the economy and disruption of communications and movement between different regions of the country, constitutes a dramatic shift in RussianWestern relations. It has undermined regional stability and security; threatened energy corridors that are vital for Europe; made claims with respect to ethnic Russians and other minorities that could be used to destabilise other parts of the former Soviet Union, with Ukraine a potential target; and shown disregard for international law. Russian actions reflected deeper factors, including pushback against the decade-long eastward expansion of the NATO alliance, anger over issues ranging from the independence of Kosovo to the placement of missile defence systems in Europe, an assertion of a concept of limited sovereignty for former Soviet states and a newfound confidence and aggressiveness in foreign affairs that is intimately linked with the personality and world view of Russia's predominant leader, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Georgia, too, has mishandled its relationships with Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 2004, abandoning real confidence building and often following confrontational policies towards the conflict regions. With patience it might have demonstrated that the regions would be better served by enjoying extensive autonomy within an increasingly prosperous and democratising Georgia. Instead, President Mikheil Saakashvili and a small inner circle of bellicose officials used menacing and arrogant rhetoric that made the dispute with Moscow and the conflict regions bitter and personal. All sides bear responsibility for the humanitarian consequences of the violence, as tens of thousands of civilians in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia have been displaced amid disturbing reports of atrocities." (Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008, p. i).

Identity Groups:

The conflict between the two ethnic groups has roots that date back to the Russian Empire, so it did not start in the 1990s, as the Russian Empire was trying to create different identity groups on the territory of Georgia on the grounds of various ethnicity and ideational structures, e.g. Ossetians have the belief that they are closer to Russians and have accordingly the right to join North Ossetia and Russia.

According to the Constructivist school of international relations: "normative or ideational structures are just as important as material structures Constructivists argue that material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded. For example, Canada and Cuba both exist alongside the United States, but the simple balance of the military power cannot explain the fact that the former is a closer American ally, and the latter a sworn enemy. The ideas about identity, the logic of ideology and established structures of friendship and enmity lead to the fact that the material balance of power between Canada and the United States, and Cuba and the United States has radically different meanings. Constructivists also stress the importance of normative and ideational structures, because they are thought to shape the social identities of political actors." (Burchill at al., 2005, Constructivism-Christian Reus Smit, p. 196).

The South Ossetia case in Georgia is an example of how Russia tries to create leverage so as to control Post-Soviet countries. Nicu Popescu describes and compares other cases where Russia uses the same methods to keep its influence on Post-Soviet countries: "Russia has been a player during and after the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. During the 1990s, Russia's policies towards the conflicts were largely supported by the secessionist forces, even if not always so unambiguously. The main type of Russian support was directed through the conflict settlement mechanisms. Russian-led peacekeeping operations have de facto guarded the borders of the secessionist entities, helping to maintain a status quo that was favourable to the secessionist sides. The open phase of the conflict in South Ossetia (Georgia) lasted between 1990 and 1992 and claimed approximately a thousand lives. The conflict ended with a ceasefire agreement signed on 14 July 1992. As a result of the ceasefire agreement, there is a trilateral peacekeeping operation consisting of Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian troops. A Joint Control Commission (JCC) consisting of Russia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia (a Russian region) and Georgia oversee the security situation and pursue negotiations on conflict settlement. The OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) supervises the situation. The EU is an observer in JCC meetings on economic issues.

The conflict in Transnistria (Moldova) lasted for a few months in the spring and summer of 1992. It resulted in some 1,000 casualties. A ceasefire agreement was signed on 21 July 1992. The war ended after the Russian 14th Army intervened on behalf of Transnistria and defeated the Moldavian troops. A trilateral peacekeeping operation has been in place since the ceasefire was declared. As in South Ossetia, the peacekeeping troops consisted of military forces from the two parties in conflict (Moldova and Transnistria), and Russia as the leading peacekeeper. The OSCE oversees the situation. The negotiations on conflict settlement were carried out in the so-called 'five-sided format', which consisted of Moldova and Transnistria as conflict parties, and Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as mediators. In October 2005, the format became '5+2' after the EU and the US joined in as observers" (Popescu, 2006, pp. 1-2). From these two cases, we can conclude that the main outside force is Russia and that it uses similar tools to reach its goals of influence to the ones mentioned above. According to realism and its balance of powers principle, small/weak Ossetia and Transnistria should be in alliance with Georgia and Moldova to balance Russia's military power, but according to their beliefs and shared values/knowledge, Ossetia (now already officially) and Transnistria have created an alliance with Russia in order to balance not the power but the danger, which is the social perception of societies. As Barry Buzan states in his book "Security-a New Framework for Analysis", danger/threat is a social perception rather than existing materially, and the securitization of the issue happens according to this perception and not according to the real, materially existing threat. (Buzan, Waewer and De Wilde, 1998 p. 50). This perception of threat is the result of the shared ideas, beliefs and values, which according to constructivists, have structural characteristics and exert a strong influence on social and political action.

Another tool for creating different identity groups so as to possess ground for influence in a country is to strengthen the affiliation of the ethnic minority groups to Russia. Is it enough for Russia to trust what ethnic minorities think in a certain moment of history? Maybe they will change their mind in the future and claim they can live in a country next to the majority ethnic group, and so the social perception of the threat dilutes. Then, this means that Russia had quite a fragile influence in that country, be it Georgia, Moldova (Corpädean, 2015, pp. 249-268) or other Post-Soviet target countries. Thus, this was the reason why Russia implemented an illegal passport policy in Georgia, so as to claim that it had citizens living there and thus it benefitted from the right to protect them.

Kristopher Natoli offers an interesting legal analysis in his article "Weaponizing Nationality: an Analysis of Russia's Passport Policy in Georgia": "Prior to Russia's military campaign into Georgia, the Russian government implemented a policy of distributing Russian passports to and thereby conferring Russian citizenship on South Ossetia's population. Attempting to legitimize its invasion, Russia asserted its sovereign right to protect its citizens against the aggression of another state. As the international community responded to Russia's actions, the focus was on the proportionality of Russia's response and not whether the invasion was actually justified or legitimate. A state's sovereign right to confer citizenship is a powerful right. Not only does it establish a reciprocal relationship of rights and obligations between the state and the individual, but it affects a state's rights vis-à-vis the other states. By marrying the state's sovereign right to confer the citizenship with the state's sovereign right to protect its citizens, the former right can be effectively transformed into a tool of state aggression. Russia's policy of conferring its citizenship en-masse to the citizens of another country seems like just such an arbitrary and abusive use of an acknowledged right. Whether Russia's passport policy is viewed as a creeping annexation or naked aggression, international law should not, and, this author believes, does not, legitimate such a scheme. Although identifying Russia's passport policy as unlawful and illegitimate may not prevent it from continuing to carry out such a policy, the international community should not allow Russia to aggressively re-establish its sphere of influence under the pretence of legal legitimacy Identifying Russia's policy as an abuse of rights, it would expose any future action based on that policy as an aggressive action and give the international community grounds for refuting Russian's claim of having the right under international law to protect its "citizens." (Natoli, 2010 pp. 416-417).

A similar concern is expressed in report #195 on the Five-day War between the Russian Federation and Georgia by the International Crisis Group, published on 22 August 2008: "Russia's actions in Georgia have been a warning to all other former Soviet republics, amounting to pursuit of a doctrine of limited sovereignty with respect to countries it views, because of history and geography, as within its natural sphere of influence. Ukraine, with its Western predilections and NATO ambitions, is potentially vulnerable to this doctrine. Russia has considerable leverage, of which it has already made some use: the Crimea was for a time Russian; the eastern part of the country has a large ethnic Russian population and close cultural ties to Russia; the economy has more than once been targeted by energy blackmail. Putin reportedly told President Bush at NATO's Bucharest Summit in April 2008: "You understand, George, that Ukraine is not even a state! What is Ukraine? Part of its territory is Eastern Europe, and another part, a significant one, was donated by us!" The Baltic States have the protection of membership in the EU and NATO but also the vulnerability of large ethnic Russian populations. Moscow's claim that the rights of those populations are abused has taken on a more ominous tenor in the wake of its post-7 August assertions with regard to its constitutional obligations and interpretation of responsibility to protect (R2P) claims in the Georgia case" (Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008, p. 17).

Hence, as we have seen since the beginning of the 1990s, Russia has been supporting ethnic minorities and trying to keep its influence in Georgia. The next step to a passport policy was to strengthen its influence and prepare the ground for a possible necessary invasion of the country, which eventually happened in 2008. But why did it become necessary for Russia to invade another sovereign country since it was known that the international society would recognize that action as an aggression against one of its member states, Georgia? The answer is, as I have suggested in my hypothesis, that the regional player (Russia) has its own interests of maintaining its influence in Post-Soviet countries and uses various kinds of tools to reach these goals, including the conflict between different identity groups (here, ethnic groups). From the beginning, the ethnic conflict and the act of supporting ethnic minorities was enough for Russia to keep its influence on its Post-Soviet republic, but since the official declaration of the wish to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and especially after the Rose Revolution, as well as following the reforms which made Georgia's integration a real issue, Russia's politics became more aggressive and merely supporting separatists to maintain the status quo was impossible.

NATO Stance:

In 2002, at the NATO Summit of Prague, Georgia officially declared its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, thereby starting its NATO integration process. Since 2003, following the "Rose Revolution" in Georgia, NATO-Georgia relations became more intense and dynamic. On October 29, 2004, the Alliance launched an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with Georgia in order to assist the country in attaining NATO standards and successfully implementing democratic reforms. Georgia was the first country ever to start the implementation of the IPAP. On September 21, 2006, at the Informal Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in New York, the Alliance made a decision to start its Intensified Dialogue on Membership Issues with Georgia. This decision vividly marked a qualitatively higher level in NATO-Georgia relations and was a logical step forward from a partnership format towards the membership candidate status of Georgia. As a result of the successful implementation of IPAP requirements and the progress achieved within the Intensified Dialogue, on April 3, 2008, at the Bucharest Summit, the Allies made the decision that Georgia would become a member of NATO. The decision is a momentous political message on the way to Georgia's NATO membership. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, n.d.) To conclude, the reason why Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 was the fact that the old tool of controlling and manipulating Georgia with frozen conflicts was not effective anymore for reaching Russia's goal of keeping its influence on this Post-Soviet neighbour, since Georgia made a different choice, to integrate into western economic and security alliances, and the new reforms and development in Georgia made this a real perspective. Ronald D. Asmus claims as one of the main thesis of his book "A Little War that Shook the World" that: "The war did not happen because of the protection of rights of minorities or the status of separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The main reason for the war is a geopolitical one - Georgia was looking to the west and this was unacceptable for Russia. Moscow used these conflicts as the means and ground for the much bigger Russian strategy to disorient Georgia, keep it in its sphere of influence and break all pro-western aspirations of Tbilisi". (Asmus, 2010, pp. 9-10).

I shall now present another two arguments to prove that Russia genuinely had as its strategic goal to stop Georgia from developing pro-western aspirations and preserve its influence on it. Firstly, from the analysis of the "Six Point Agreement" which was negotiated between Georgia and Russia and which aimed to end the war between the Russian Federation and Georgia in August 2008, it results that Russia was conducting military operations outside the conflict zone, which is a clear indicator that its official reason, that of protecting its citizens in Georgia, was simply untrue, because in territories outside the South Ossetian region there were no Russian citizens. Georgia had never recognized the passportization policy of Russia in South Ossetia and, accordingly, any person with this kind of passport would not be able to live outside South Ossetia, in the territory of Georgia that was controlled by the Georgian government. Then, what was Russia's aim? The answer lies in what we have already mentioned, to control the whole of Georgia, change its foreign policy priorities and pro-western integration. Here is what we have read in the Six Point Agreement: "1) Russian troops will leave areas outside Abkhazia and South Ossetia within a month; 2) At least 200 EU monitors will be deployed to those areas; 3) OSCE monitors will be able to return to Tskhinvali; 4) UN observers will remain in Abkhazia; 5) Int. discussions to start on October 15; 6) Saakashvili pledged not to use force." (Civil Georgia, 2008). The Second argument to prove that Russia really had as its strategic goal to stop Georgia from developing pro-western aspirations and keep its influence on it is found in Dmitry Medvedev's speech of November 21, 2011, delivered to soldiers at a base in Vladikavkaz, north of the Georgian border, where he admits that Russia managed to stop the spread of NATO to its borders with the invasion of Georgia: "NATO would have expanded by now to admit ex-Soviet republics if Russia had not invaded Georgia in 2008 to defend a rebel region, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said on Monday. Moscow has strongly opposed the expansion of the Western military alliance to include former Soviet republics such as Georgia and Ukraine. NATO promised Georgia eventual membership at a summit in 2008, but enthusiasm for Tbilisi's entry cooled after the brief war later that year, which saw Russian troops invade Georgia to protect Georgia's tiny rebel region of South Ossetia. "If you... had faltered back in 2008, the geopolitical situation would be different now," Medvedev said in a speech to soldiers at a base in Vladikavkaz, just north of the Georgian border. "And a number of countries which (NATO) tried to deliberately drag into the alliance, would have most likely already been part of it now. We abandoned direct competition (with NATO), but... we now have different visions of the solutions of a number of security issues," Medvedev said." (Dyomkin, 2011). From this it is also clear that Russia has the same interests in Ukraine, i.e. to deter/stop it from joining NATO. The new Government which is in power after the famous Maidan protests has pro-western integration aspirations and, together with Georgia, Ukraine was also promised at the NATO Bucharest summit in 2008 that it would become a member of NATO. "NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO" (NATO, 2008). These similar circumstances make it possible to generalize some of the analyses and conclusions of this article in the light of the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine, where ethnic minorities demand the separation from Ukraine, as it was the case of Georgia.

But how was the Five-Day War of 2008 in Georgia different from the ethnic conflicts that started in the 1990s in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Samachablo, as Georgians call it)? The first argument for this difference is the level of the conflict. In the 1990s, the conflict was located inside the state of Georgia, but the 2008 war happened between two sovereign countries, Russia and Georgia, both members of the United Nations. This means that the conflict changed from a local to an international one. The second characteristic is the different status of Russia from what we have seen at the beginning of this article. Russia had been the mediator in this conflict since 1990s, but after 2008 it became part of it. To prove all this, what I have mentioned here is useful as it provides information about the Geneva talks, which mark the official international platform of negotiations after the Five-Day War in 2008.

"In the aftermath of the Georgian-Russian war in August 2008, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) called for the establishment of a mediation forum which was aimed at security and stability in the South Caucasus. The initiative goes back to the "Six-Point Ceasefire Plan" reached by the French (and then EU) President Nikolas Sarkozy and his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, which brought to an end the military confrontation between Moscow and Tbilisi. The agreement, together with its followup document from 8 September 2008, envisaged the creation of a new platform involving the EU, the OSCE, the UN and the US, as well as the conflict parties: Georgia and Russia. On Russian request, officials from Abkhazia and South Ossetia were also included in the talks. Moscow's demand coincided with that of the EU and OSCE, the latter also considering that the talks should be all-inclusive. Tbilisi acquiesced. Thus, in October 2008, an international mediation process - the Geneva talks - started over the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts. The negotiations began with high expectations. Predictably, many of these have not been met yet. The main failure of the talks has been the inability to prevent Russia from vetoing the extension of the UN and OSCE missions to Georgia's breakaway regions. To date, the Geneva talks have achieved limited concrete results: Russia's decision to withdraw its military troops from Perevi, a small Georgian village beyond the South Ossetian administrative border. More broadly, the forum remains a unique international mediation platform, which keeps the conflict parties at the negotiating table and in contact with one another." (Mikhelidze, 2010, p. 2)

Hence, as we can see, unlike in the 1990s, Russia lost the status of mediator and became part of the conflict which in itself changed from a local to an international one, and this happened as a result of Georgia's choice and successful reforms after the Rose Revolution, meant to implement this new approach. The fact that Russia became part of the conflict or, in other words, participated in this conflict as one of the parties involved, can be seen from the abovementioned chapter called "Eruption of Clashes", where it is shown that the Russian army invaded Georgia and was involved in a fight against the Georgian army. The second argument is the Six Point Ceasefire agreement which was negotiated between Georgia and the Russian Federation on August 12, 2008 by Nicholas Sarkozy, President of France at that time, as the mediator between the participants in the military conflict65.

More proof that the Russian Federation is no longer a mediator is that in the Geneva Talks it does not have the status of mediator, but the same status as Georgia, which unarguably is one of the sides in the Five-Day War. Both Georgia and Russia are official parties in the negotiations. This is a clear fact that one can find, for example, in news articles: "On March 22-23, the 35th round of the Geneva International Discussions took place. As per tradition, the main format for discussing Georgia's occupied territories involved official parties from Georgia, the Russian Federation, as well as OSCE, UN, and EU representatives and the US as co-chairs of the format. Representatives of the de facto governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were also invited." (Adzinbaia, 2016). Here, no one mentions Russia as a mediator.

To put it simply, Russia had to implement more aggressive policies towards Georgia to deter its shift towards the west and because Russia understood that the old tool of supporting separatists was not effective any more so as to reach its goals.

Conclusion

As a conclusion, I shall admit that this topic prompts a different attitude from the perspective of various countries. I have striven to give this article a nonbiased and high scientific value, which has been my main goal. The article's main research question and thesis are proved through the analyses of the main and secondary resources and now I will try to analyze this case in the conclusion part through the comparative method of two different international theories: constructivism and realism. I will start with constructivism. In the section called "Identity Groups", I have written about constructivism and its theoretical suggestions; so how can this theory of constructivism be adjusted to the case of Georgia? We have already seen two notions of constructivism: the idea of identity, as well as friendship and enmity. For more thorough analyses we also need to discover how interests work according to constructivism. Alexander Wendt claims in his article "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," that: "Identities are basis of interests. Actors do not have a "Portfolio" of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations" (Wendt, 1992, p. 398).

From this, we can conclude that interests of identities are formed in the process of social interaction. The same social interactions and perceptions of danger define enmity and friendship. If we take the case of Georgia, there are three parties involved in the interactions: Georgia, the Russian Federation and two ethnic minority groups. These minority groups which believe they possess different ethnic identities have the perception of danger from Georgia because of the abovementioned ethnic conflicts with Georgia at the beginning of the 20th century and in the 1990s. They try to balance this perceived danger through the alliance with Russia and this makes them very dependent on Russia, as well because only Russia and another four countries recognize them as independent states. Now, if Russia wants to implement its strategic goals - which is, as we have already shown above, wishing to stop NATO enlargement close to its borders - will it be interested in solving the ethnic conflicts in Georgia? The answer is no. Because it is in Russia's best interests to keep these conflicts frozen, when it has leverage on both, namely on Georgia because it will be impossible to solve these problems without Russia, and on ethnic minorities who will not be able to get recognition from other countries. Otherwise, if these conflicts are solved and Georgia is able to restore its territorial integrity, it will continue to move towards NATO until it becomes a member state. It is in Georgia's best interest to be a member state of NATO because it provides collective security to all its member states. This is not only the priority of a certain Georgian Government, but it is the choice of the citizens of Georgia which was approved by the plebiscite conducted on January 5, 2008. The citizens of Georgia were asked the following question: Should Georgia pursue integration into NATO? - 77.0% of Georgian citizens answered Yes. With this, they approved that they wanted to see Georgia as a member state of NATO (Election Administration of Georgia, 2008). More recent public opinion polls in Georgia were conducted in 2015 by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and support for the accession of Georgia to NATO is still high at 69% (Kokoshvili, 2015).

At the beginning of the article I set out to provide an analysis from the standpoint of realism and constructivism. Why was it necessary to use two theories and, as I have mentioned above, to build bridges between them? The reasons are two: first, they are different theories, but they both belong to the discipline of international relations. When a researcher chooses only one theory it can provide good explanations for several things but there are also issues where the explanatory power of one of the theories is weak and another theory offers a better explanation. So, the principle I have used has enabled me to exploit the potential of both theories. It has become possible in the following way: I have divided the issues that would be better explained by constructivism and the other issues that would be better explained by realism. This kind of method is correctly used if they do not produce controversial results. But if they produce the results which answer to the researcher's main research question and prove the hypotheses that the researcher suggests at the beginning of his/her work, the scientific value of a study will be stronger than in the case of using one theoretical school for explaining all the issues that a researcher wants to discuss. To follow this method, I would like to explain why I have decided to use constructivism for the analysis of the local intrastate issue; unlike realism, which is a state-centric theory, constructivism offers a good social explanation of the behaviour of the local ethnic identity groups and shows how they define their interests through the interactions with other ethnic identities or states. But these local interests are partly, if not significantly influenced by the interactions at the international system level and on that level interacting actors are already independent sovereign states, and realism is the theoretical school that provides a strong explanation on the behaviour of states.

When I mention realism, I mean its various dimensions. They are quite different in details but they share a clear family resemblance (Burchill at al., 2005, Donnelly, p. 30). As the reader may notice, I do not support too much division between theories or explain all issues only from one theoretical perspective. What I will do again is take the issues and explain them through the premises from realism, as a family of different dimensions. The premises/suggestions which will be used for the explanation can derive from neo-realism, from classical realism or from other dimensions. This makes the ongoing work issue-driven, which means that I write the work not to adjust to any of the theoretical schools or even to any dimension inside a theoretical school, but first I discuss the issue or suggest the hypothesis and then employ the theories which I believe best fit the explanation. I will use several assumptions that Realism makes to explain the reasons why the Five-Day War erupted in Georgia in 2008 and why this case is useful for analysing the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The assumptions are as follows:

"1) The keystone of Morgenthau's realist theory is the concept of power or "of interest defined in terms of power," which informs his second principle: the assumption that political leaders "think and act in terms of interest defined as power". This concept defines the autonomy of politics, and allows for the analysis of foreign policy regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of individual politicians. Furthermore, it is the foundation of a rational picture of politics 2) International politics, like all politics, is for Morgenthau a struggle for power because of the basic human lust for power. But regarding every individual as being engaged in a perpetual quest for power-the view that he shares with Hobbes-is a questionable premise. Human nature is unobservable. It cannot be proved by any empirical research, but only imposed on us as a matter of belief and inculcated by education. 3) In the fourth principle, Morgenthau considers the relationship between realism and ethics. He says that while realists are aware of the moral significance of political action, they are also aware of the tension between morality and the requirements of successful political action. "Universal moral principles," he asserts, "cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but ...they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place". These principles must be accompanied by prudence for as he cautions "there can be no political morality without prudence." (Carpowicz, K., Julian, W., 2013, Column 2.2).

Briefly, we can extract the following conclusions from this citation: 1) States are motivated by a drive for power, security and pursuit of 'national interest', much like people, because people often behave in a self-interested manner. 2) Human nature could be inherently selfish and there is no chance for it to be changed. As a result, humans will act to further their own interests even if the implementation of these interests is against and harms the interests of others. This can often cause conflict. Since human nature is unchanging, there are few prospects that this kind of behaviour will change. 3) International institutions and law play a role in international relations, but are only effective if backed by force or effective sanctions. It is time now to use all the above mentioned historical facts, analyses and assessments to explain and generalize the case of Georgia through realism: let me start with interests; because realism is a state-centric theory, I will analyse the interests of Georgia and Russia. Another reason for this is that I have already discussed the interests of the ethnic minority groups when I explained them by means of constructivism. As we have seen, Russia's interests were to stop NATO enlargement in Georgia and to keep its influence on Post-Soviet Georgia. Georgia's interests were to restore de-facto territorial integrity, as it was put by one of the Georgian military officials, they were going to restore the constitutional order in South Ossetia (Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008, pp. 1-3.). These interests are conflicting. Thus, as realism says, for the states the most important driving force are interests and Russia successfully implemented/pursued its interests even though this was detrimental to the interests of Georgia and stopped NATO enlargement in Georgia. For reaching these strategic goals, Russia used all the methods I have discussed above against Georgia, such as the support for minorities, or the Passportization policy so as to create juridical grounds for invading Georgia when it was necessary. The next assumption of realism claims that international institutions and law play some role, but are effective if they are supported by the power. Effective sanctions also suit this case of Georgia; despite the fact that the international society and institutions recognize the territorial integrity of Georgia, Russia recognized the two breakaway regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as independent states.

The next issue for this conclusive part of the article is: How is the case of Georgia similar to the conflicts in Ukraine and how can it be used for future policy analysis? In Ukraine, there are two types of conflict: one is similar to Georgia's conflicts in the 1990s and the second is different. The one that is similar to Georgia's case is the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, where Russia supports pro-Russian-separatists (Reuters, 2015). The second is the Crimean Peninsula, which is now occupied by the Russian military. As the international crisis group reports: "Despite repeated expressions of support for the Minsk process and recognition of Ukraine's sovereignty over the separatist Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DNR, LNR), Moscow's policy in Ukraine's east looks more likely to strengthen those entities than prepare for the dismantlement the Minsk agreement envisages. The Kremlin views Ukraine's European choice as a major security threat and the 2014 overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych as Western-backed and aimed at isolating Russia. It wants to keep Ukraine under its pro-Western leadership unstable, embroiled in open-ended military confrontation it cannot afford, so as to return it eventually to its sphere of influence. Moscow often seems to play with several options, but its tactical fluidity is dangerous. Almost 10,000 have died in the conflict, and tens of thousands of troops face each other along a 500-km line of separation." (Crisis Group Europe and Central Asia Briefing N°79, 2016, p. 1).

If we add the fact that has already been mentioned above, that Ukraine was promised together with Georgia to become a member of NATO, it becomes clear that the Russian Federation has the same goal in Ukraine that it had in Georgia. These interests are to stop Ukraine's western integration and keep it under its influence. Another similarity to Georgia is that Russia supports ethnic minorities in the fight against the pro-western government of Ukraine. How are these similarities important for future policy analysis? Because Russia has similar interests in Ukraine to the ones it had in Georgia and because they show the will to use military power and even get involved in war and invade the neighbouring country to reach its interest. Hence, there is a possibility that if Russia is not able to reach its strategic interests with the support of ethnic minorities, it will use its large army and start a full-scale war against Ukraine. Russia will only avoid this kind of large military conflict if it sees a power and serious international support behind Ukraine; otherwise, realism says that for states, interests are the most powerful driving force and they will implement them even if they are against the interests of others. Another assumption which I will repeat is that international institutions and law work or are effective if they are supported by power. This is also quite suitable in the Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula. Russia occupied it and despite the fact that it breaks the principle of inviolability of frontiers which is a cornerstone of European security (See the Helsinki Final Act, p. 5), Russia still thinks that historically it was Russia's territory and Russia has right to regain it. (Alpert, 2014). According to Article I of the Helsinki Final Act (See the Helsinki Final Act, available from: http://www.osce.org/helsinkifinal-act?) which established the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1975, every country has the right "to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance." All OSCE member states, including Russia, have sworn to uphold these principles. In line with such principles, Ukraine has the right to choose for itself whether it joins any treaty of alliance, including NATO's founding treaty. Moreover, when Russia signed the Founding Act, it pledged to uphold "respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security" (NATO, 2016). This is why realism is right about institutions and law in international relations. The reason why I believe that unlike the conflicts in eastern Ukraine, the case of Crimea is different is that Russia used another type of reasoning to invade another country, and this reason was a resurrection of historical justice. If other countries uphold the same reasoning to resurrect historical justice, there is a high possibility that wars will erupt in various places in the world. If Russia has political will, it has all the necessary resources to help end the conflicts mentioned above. As a final word, I would like to mention that the goal of this article has been to analyse and discover the deeper reasons for the Five-Day War in Georgia in 2008, as well as to show the differences and similarities between the conflicts in Georgia in the 1990s and in 2008.

Footnote

65 see the Six Point Peace Plan, available from: http://smr. gov.ge/Uploads/9bbbc7 .pdf

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