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This analysis of Dwight D. Eisenhower's pursuit of a nuclear test-ban agreement assesses the role of science advice in his decision making. It argues that a "scientifictechnological elite" within the administration monopolized the technical conclusions in policy questions, inhibiting the president's inclination to pursue an accord with the Soviet Union for the first half of his presidency. This episode has important implications for understanding Eisenhower's record on nuclear arms control and assessments of his presidential leadership.
Those assessing Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidential legacy often consider his farewell address's warning about the unwarranted influence of the "military-industrial complex." On the recent occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Eisenhower's most famous speech, scholars and commentators continued to debate the origins of the term, Eisenhower's purpose for including the warning in his speech, and the lessons it holds for the twenty-first century. Curiously, few noted that his farewell address included a second warning (Bacevich 2011; Janiewski 2011; Ledbetter 2011). Eisenhower also cautioned Americans that the growing influence of government-sponsored scientific research risked making public policy the "captive of a scientific-technological elite" (D. Eisenhower 1961). The departing president concluded with an eloquent expression of his disappointment over the lack of progress on disarmament. This second warning, largely overshadowed by the first, offers significant lessons for the twenty-first century and points to an overlooked aspect of the thirty-fourth president's legacy.
I argue that the president's own public policy on nuclear testing became captive of a scientific-technological elite within his administration who opposed his inclination to pursue a nuclear test-ban agreement. This internal elite, led by Eisenhower's shrewd Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman Lewis L. Straus and influential physicists, such as Ernest Lawrence and Edward Teller, strived to convince Eisenhower, Congress, and the American public that a test cessation would imperil the nation's security. Although these powerful figures inhibited Eisenhower's efforts at nuclear arms control for his first several years in office, the establishment in 1957 of an advisory committee comprised of leading scientists and administrators from outside the administration later convinced the president to follow his inclinations and pursue a nuclear test-ban agreement. Eisenhower's efforts to conclude a test ban treaty as a first step in easing Cold War tensions and slowing the arms race ultimately failed. Yet two...