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The Burdens of Judgment and Fallibilism
Rawls's burdens of judgment are a list of factors that explain why reasonable persons in a diverse society are likely to hold different, often incompatible, conceptions of the good. The burdens allow us to see persons who disagree with our comprehensive moral commitments as reasonable agents who make diligent use of their moral powers. Moreover, according to Charles Larmore, the burdens of judgment satisfy political liberalism's ambition of supporting liberal political principles through a minimalist moral conception. The burdens ground liberal politics in the modest notion of reasonable disagreement, avoiding reliance on controversial comprehensive notions such as autonomy, individuality, skepticism, or value pluralism. This distinguishes political liberalism from the comprehensive liberalisms of Kant and Mill, as well as the doctrines of contemporary liberals such as Joseph Raz and Will Kymlicka.
I argue that the burdens of judgment cannot provide adequate support for liberal political principles unless they are read in a way that comports with Kymlicka's autonomy liberalism. Specifically, the burdens must include Kymlicka's commitment to fallibilism and critical reflection about the good if they are to provide adequate support for liberal political principles. I also argue that political liberals such as Larmore and Rawls fail to appreciate the modest character of Kymlicka's conception of autonomy liberalism. Kymlicka's fallibilism provides the best possible accommodation for political liberals' concerns about controversial doctrines such as individuality, skepticism and value pluralism. These arguments support the general conclusion that political liberalism collapses into autonomy liberalism or comprehensive liberalism. (I shall use the terms autonomy liberalism and comprehensive liberalism interchangeably.)
Political liberals aim at a minimalist moral conception because they desire an account of liberal political principles that can be endorsed from a wide range of moral, religious and cultural perspectives. Autonomy liberals recognize the desirability of such an account, but they deny that liberalism can be entirely divested of controversial content and still maintain a cogent justification of its political principles. Political liberalism encourages the naïve expectation that liberal principles can meet with an easy acceptance, even from very conservative religious perspectives. As I shall argue, political liberalism's moral minimalism can be manipulated in a way that reconciles it with decidedly illiberal results. The only way to avoid this problem is to recognize...