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This article examines the question of how serious President Eisenhower was in contemplating the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and Chinese mainland. To do this, it surveys Elsenhower's thinking and policies about the issue from 1953 to 1968 in regard to maintaining the security of South Korea. In contrast to many in the literature who argue that Eisenhower would have been very reluctant to authorize their use or who downplay the significance of his many statements about the use of nuclear weapons, it maintains that the president was much more willing to use nuclear compellent force than many have supposed. In regard to Elsenhower's reputation, this article adopts a post-revisionist stance that questions the consensus in the literature that he viewed them as instruments of deterrence, not war fighting. It also suggests that more research should he initiated to investigate the relationship between presidents' national security policies, commitments, and the option of nuclear compellence.
The role of nuclear weapons during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953 to 1961, and questions about their potential use during his administration, have generated a veritable cottage industry of scholarship.1 Whole shelves of books have been written about his national security policies during the Cold War, and the paramount role he placed on the military and political utility of nuclear weapons. The "New Look" of the Elsenhower administration, committed to "security and solvency," stressed making deep cuts in conventional armed forces, increasing strategic air power, and brandishing the threat of nuclear retaliation. If general war broke out between the United States and the Soviet Union, according to Eisenhower, it would have inevitably become a nuclear conflict, with catastrophic consequences for the world. It would, indeed, have been "suicidal" for both the superpowers to engage in such a conflict (Immerman and Bowie 1998, 247).
Yet, paradoxically, in spite of the emphasis Eisenhower placed on these awesomely destructive weapons, his administration is not usually identified by most as one committed to robust nuclear war fighting. Instead of examining Eisenhower's views about the possible use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, many scholars have preferred to analyze their role in strengthening deterrence and war prevention, in serving as instruments of coercive diplomacy, or in serving as a tool...