BALOCHISTAN AND ITS GEOSTRATEGIC POTENTIAL IN SOUTHERN ASIA

Abstract

The importance of Balochistan derives mainly from its geographical position and mineral resources. In addition to providing access to Central Asia and the Caspian resources for the US, China, Europe and the Indo-Pacific countries, its rich reserves of iron, copper, gold, uranium and other energy reserves have always kept up the interest of the world's key players, from the 19th century "Great Game" -- the strategic rivalry and conflict between the British Empire and the Russian Empire for supremacy in Central Asia up to the current conflict between the US and China over the same region of Central Asia. In addition to these stimulating factors, Balochistan has also a fairly long coastline which includes Gwadar -- a small port on the coast, strategically located between the three major regions of the world: the oil-rich Middle East, the densely populated South Asia and the mineral resources rich Central Asia.

Headnote

The importance of this province derives mainly from its geographical position and mineral resources. In addition to providing access to Central Asia and the Caspian resources for the United States, China, Europe and the Indo-Pacific countries, its rich reserves of iron, copper, gold, uranium and other energy reserves have always kept up the interest of the world 's key players, from the 19th century "Great Game"-the strategic rivalry and conflict between the British Empire and the Russian Empire for supremacy in Central Asia up to the current conflict between the United States and China over the same region of Central Asia. In addition to these stimulating factors, Balochistan has also a fairly long coastline which includes Gwadar - a small port on the coast, strategically located between the three major regions of the world: the oil-rich Middle East, the densely populated South Asia and the mineral resources rich Central Asia.

Keywords: Balochistan, South Asia, Gwadar, Pakistan, mineral resources, China-Pakistan.

1. Context and history of the conflict

The controversies involving Balochistan1 started after 1893, when the establishment of the Durand Line separated the Pashtun and Baloch tribes living in Afghanistan from the tribes currently living in Afghanistan, India, Iran and Pakistan (see Fig. I2). In the early 30s, some Balochi leaders have anticipated a possible withdrawal of the British from the region. Consequently, demands for independence3 began to rise and be promoted by the Balochi ethnic groups and supported by the Khan of Kalat4 himself, with reference to Nepal and Kalat which, in his opinion, ought to have the same status5.

After the British departure, the territories under their control were joined to Pakistan and Queta municipality, "a legislative body dominated by the non-Balochi, ratified this annexation. Later, the Khan was forced to sign the document of annexation, which led to the outbreak of the armed insurgency of 1948, led by the Khan's brother6 7.

Pakistan gained its state independence in 1947, when India and Pakistan were granted the privilege of becoming two sovereign countries. Currently, Pakistan consists of four provinces: Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Sindh, a state capital - Islamabad, and a Federally Administered Tribal Area {FATA)1, which includes seven distinct tribal agencies, administered directly by the Federal Government of Pakistan through a special set of laws. Each of the four provinces of Pakistan is associated to an ethno-linguistic group: Punjab with Punjabis, Balochistan with Balochi, Khyber Pakhstunkhwa with Urdu (as national language) or Pashto (as majority language) and Sindh with Sindhi. Supported by cultural roots, these ethnic and linguistic groups often promote themselves as "peoples" or even "nations"8. This is the case of Balochistan. With an area of over 347,192 km2, approximately 43.6% of the total area of Pakistan, Balochistan is the largest but also the "poorest" and least populated province of the four provinces and territories of Pakistan.

The province of Balochistan is strategically located in the south-west of Afghanistan and is bordered by Iran to the west, the Punjab and Sindh provinces to the east, the Pakthunkhwa Province to the north-east and the Arabian Sea to the south. It comprises 30 districts, and the most important city of the province, Quetta, which is located near the border with Afghanistan and is also the Capital Province, an important commercial and communication center, a strategic military location for the Pakistan Armed Forces and the main hub of the ISAF land supply line for the coalition forces in Afghanistan.

The population of Balochistan province of is estimated at about eight million people (about 5% of the Pakistan's population), with a very low density of approximately 22.5 inhabitants per km2. This is largely due to the predominantly mountainous relief, the water scarcity and the deserted land. Baloch and Pashtun are the two major ethnic groups in the province, with common aspirations and ideals: free and independent Balochistan and Pashtunistan states.

The province is very rich in natural gas reserves, about 40% of Pakistan's total production of gas originates from this region; Balochistan has also one of the largest reserves of copper and gold in the world. Although earnings from the export of natural gas annually reach 1.4 billion euro per year, only 8% of this revenue goes back into the province. For this reason, the Balochi nationalists and supporters of secession feel neglected, abused and robbed by the central government. The lack of infrastructure has a big impact on the population's education, as the literacy rate is below 31% of the total population. The province is also the main center and supplier of weapons on the black market in the south and southwest of the neighboring country, Afghanistan.

The main effect of the province loss would be that Pakistan would lose much of its natural resources, which would make it more dependent on the energy supplies from the Middle East. The fact that these natural resources are not exploited to their full capacity, and that almost only nonBaloch provinces, especially the Punjab province, benefit from them, fuels the separatist beliefs of the Baloch nationalists, who think that these natural resources could contribute significantly to the economic development of an autonomous Balochistan; on the other hand, an independent Balochistan would restrict Islamabad's access to the Gwadar Port and the resulting benefits. And the losses that Pakistan might suffer in case of a possible secession are not limited to the economic field. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is another key aspect which attracts international attention. Without an arid and depopulated area, as most of the Balochistan is, the government in Islamabad would have to identify new areas for testing missile and nuclear arsenal, but they would be too close to populated areas. This is an additional argument allowing the Baloch nationalists a game of international sensibilities, supported by declarations of acceptance of any nuclear demilitarization programs of the Balochistan Province in exchange for state independence9.

2. Nationalism, insurgence and selfdetermination

Balochistan, the largest province of Pakistan, is also an area troubled by an increased armed insurgency, fighting for both the right to manage their own natural resources and for cultural and territorial autonomy, which has always been impaired by the games of the big powers in the region.

A statistics for the year 2013 compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism of the United States of America10 reveals that Pakistan ranks second in the top ten of countries where terrorist attacks are common in the everyday life, with an average of 1.21 deaths and 2.6 injuries/attack. According to the same report, more than half of the total number of attacks (57%) and deaths (66%) and almost three quarters of all injuries recorded following the attacks (73%) occurred in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Given that two of these three countries are currently undergoing civil unrest or armed conflict with international involvement, this statistic becomes alarming for Pakistan.

Baloch nationalist and self-determination feelings date back to the 12th century. Recently, if we consider the 60 years that passed since the creation of Pakistan, the Balochistan Province is undergoing a continuous period of secession; the "deaf' fight for independence of this province, during the last decades of the British Empire presence in the region resulted in it's annexation to Pakistan in 1947, which was the beginning of a period of subjugation and attempt to transform the Baloch identity into a Pakistani identity based on Islam. Much of this strategy involved the destruction of the tribal power of the local leaders and the concentration of authority in the hands of the central government - a strategy that largely continues to this day. The armed riots launched by the Baloch ethnics and repressed by the government from Islamabad took place, chronologically, in 1948, 1958 and 197311. The reaction of the Pakistani central authorities to the Baloch secessionist movements has always been one as decisive and important as it should be a state's territorial unity. For example, in 1948, 24 hours after the creation of the Republic of Pakistan, the Balochistan region declares its independence, which makes the new state of Pakistan's reaction extremely fast and forceful - the Army of the Islamic Republic (Pakistani army) invades Balochistan on April 1st and crushes the first attempt of secession of the province.

According to the Pakistani government sources, there are currently five militant groups operating in Balochistan. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) is the most prominent, requiring the separation of Balochistan from Pakistan. Besides this, the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), the Balochistan Republican Army (BRA), Lashkar-e-Balochistan and Baloch Jhalawan Tigers emerged to challenge the government in Islamabad. Over the time, these groups were responsible for many attacks on gas pipelines, electric transmission lines, security checkpoints, railroad tracks, oil tankers, government offices, attacks against everything that is administered by the federal government of Pakistan, and even against pro-Pakistani government tribal members or civilians.

The Balochistan Liberation Army, the most prominent of the five clandestine militant groups, although formed in the early 1980s, gained international recognition in 2000, after a series of attacks in densely populated areas. This group planned attacks aimed mainly at reducing the benefits that the government in Islamabad has due to its presence in the province. As a result, natural gas pipelines, oil fields, Pakistani security forces, civilians employed in the government sectors in Quetta and journalists have constantly been the targets of attacks. The Balochistan Liberation Army has always taken responsibility for the systematic "ethnic genocide" against Punjabi civilians, residents and employees living in the province of Balochistan, in response, they say, to the punishments that the Pakistani Army, led by the government in Islamabad, has applied on the Balochistan nationalist population.

The same government classified the Balochistan Liberation Army as a terrorist organization in 2006; later the same year, the British government declared that the Balochistan Liberation Army was an illegal group and banned the access of its members in the UK. Soon after, the actions of this group were classified as terrorist by the State Department of the United States, the group being included also by this State on the blacklist of worldwide terrorist organizations.

The Balochistan National Party, a political party that promotes the provincial rights and supports the provincial autonomy through peaceful means, as well as the politicians who are members of the party are also victims of the conflict between the Balochistan Liberation Army and the Government of Pakistan. Many leaders of the party, especially its senior members have fallen victims to this political conflict. Thus: Habib Jalib Baloch12, general secretary of the party, was killed in Quetta on July 14, 2010, Jumma Khan Raisani and Abdul Salem, were killed on September 28 and July 22, 2011, both in the city of Khuzdar; the press at the time blamed the Pakistani security forces for these "government executions" and the way it combats the Balochistan provincial opposition.

Lashkar-e-Balochistan, a separatist militant group, better known as the Balochistan Army, is located in Balochistan and was founded in 2009, but became known in 2012, after they claimed responsibility for several attacks in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, resulting in several deaths and injuries. The group is believed to hold more training camps, in Balochistan and Afghanistan.

An independent Balochistan seems not to be in the interest of any regional or international power. However, the presence of Balochi militants in Afghanistan has brought an important and valued contribution to the relationship between Pakistan and its neighbors. Balochi leaders have actively sought the support of the USA and India for free movement of their co-ethnics and even had a positive feedback when, in 2012, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher introduced a resolution in the United States' House of Representatives, requiring Pakistan to recognize Balochistan's right to self-determination. According to his plea to the members of Congress, the "riots" of 1958, 1973 and 2005 of the Balochi ethnics "indicate the long-lasting popular discontent with the regime of Islamabad and with the plundering of its vast natural resources, while the province remains the poorest in country"13. However, both the United States and India on the one hand, and the international community on the other, are reluctant to openly support the separatist movement in Balochistan, given the danger of the international precedent.

3. The strategic interest and natural resources

Ever since the British domination in India, the territories of Balochistan have generated a real interest, due to their geostrategic position. Having in mind the geoeconomical and geopolitical importance of this region, the British administration in India has been waiting long time for a favorable moment to intervene in the northwest end of the continent It was thought that the existence of some buffer states between the colonial territories and the Soviet Empire would protect the British interests in the region. Soviet invasion in India through Afghanistan, the Khyber Pass14 and Bolán Pass15, has always been perceived as a potential threat to British India; for this reason, the Indian Government launches a series of research-exploring expeditions in the territories led by Captain Grant (1809), Colonel Henry Pöttinger16 (1810) and finally by Mounstuart Elphinstone17 (1812), who collected information on the geographical and political situation prevailing in the vast regions of the northwest. The geopolitical importance of Balochistan was the main factor in the foreign policy pursued by the British government in India, who focused on protecting the line of communication with Afghanistan, which transits the province.

The policy pursued by the United States in South Asia has always aimed at maintaining the military balance between India and Pakistan, two countries with nuclear potential, unstable political regimes, and last but not least, two countries that are important partners. A certain difference tends to be made by the United States, and it is in favor of India, which is in full economic and military growth and seems more capable of providing regional stability on the one hand, and of combating China's influence in the region on the other hand. Based on these considerations, the United States concluded a series of treaties with India, such as the Strategic Partnership Initiative in 2004 on the development of cooperation in the civil nuclear fields, the civil space programs and high-tech fields, which resulted in signing the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement in 2008.

Supporting the policy of balance necessary between India and Pakistan, the United States sought the cooperation with Pakistan in order to combat the threats of Islamic extremism, especially after September 2001, offering Pakistan security assistance in amount of 16 billion dolars18 during the past thirteen years and the status of a very important non-NATO partner in the war against terrorism, which started in the United States in 2001.

It is known that the Allied military presence in Afghanistan will be significantly reduced after 2014. Military analysts expect that the "support" offered by Pakistan to the United States, in the form of a logistic transit point or a so-called "effort to mitigate" the extremist attacks against the American troops will decrease considerably. At the same time, in order to ensure long-term strategic benefits in the region, the United States will seek a stronger partnership with India19, as mentioned above.

This form of mutual cooperation between the United States and Pakistan could be endangered by the Baloch nationalism and its supporters in the province, as this fight for independence could complicate the US-led war against Islamic terrorism in the region. Moreover, a "quiet" Balochistan pleases both the partners in the coalition operating in Afghanistan, and especially the United States who benefit from the facilities derived from the operation and control of the Shamsi Airport, rented since 2001 for logistics activities and surveillance missions by the Air Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States.20

China's interests in Balochistan derive both from the fifty years of political and military relations, period during which China considered Pakistan its main partner in South Asia, and in the context of the good economic relations that Beijing has steadily developed with Islamabad. Economically, Balochistan became China's physical link to its investments in the exploitation of Iranian gas and oil in the Middle East. At the same time, Chinese investments in Pakistan have become significant: China operates gold and copper mines in Saindak, near the borders with Afghanistan and Iran, and after the construction of the Gwadar port, it has become one of the most important investors in the province.

Built in the south-west of Pakistan, Gwadar has come to be considered the main Chinese naval outpost in the Indian Ocean, designed to protect Beijing's supply lines in the Middle East, while counteracting the growing presence of the United States in the region21. The Chinese investment in the Gwadar Port proves to be very important for the Chinese economy, contributing to the development of the South-western region of the Xinjiang province, providing a real economic opportunity for the Uighur population22 and hence the development of relations between the Muslims in the two neighbor regions, as well as a military development. Located at about 460 km west of Karachi, the Gwadar port strategically and militarily offers the possibility to observe the American naval activity in the Persian Gulf and the Indian naval activity from the naval bases in Gujarat and Mumbai23. To this end, on January 30, 2013, the Government of Pakistan signed a concession agreement in order to lease the Gwadar port to the Chinese authorities, withdrawing the operation right from the Port Authority of Singapore, which had held this right during the past five years. Although it was assumed that Singapore would continue to have this right for another forty-five years. Pakistan has given to China24 the operational control of the port, creating thus serious economic problems with an immediate impact on the region, especially on India. The greatest effect, however, is the fact that China gets an oil supply port on land, a trade that can not be controlled by the superior American naval power. Moreover, Gwadar is a major cog in the planned Pakistani-Chinese energy corridor, an old plan of China abandoned in 2009 because of the volatile situation in Balochistan - the construction of a refinery in Gwadar, with a capacity of approximately 20 million tons per year. This new refinery would be connected to Kashgar of eastern China, avoiding thus the Malacca Strait and the dangerous sea routes through the South China Sea, East China Sea and Yellow Sea. Also, both China and India are major importers of fossil fuel and use the Strait of Hormuz as main route, which is just 250 miles from Gwadar; the Chinese presence in Gwadar, in addition to restricting the influence of India in the region, becomes a serious threat to the Indian marine transport in the event of armed hostilities25.

The extremely big distance between the eastern ports of China and Kashgar, of about 3500 kilometers, compared to only the approximately 1500 km between Kashgar and Gwadar, turns the latter into the point of transit and access to northwest China of the imports of crude oil from Iran, the Persian Gulf and Africa. Through the "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor", the Gwadar port will be connected to the city of Kashgar, the Xinjiang region of northwestern China through a network of highways, railways and pipelines for the transportation of oil and natural gas; the secretariat of this project has already been launched in Islamabad on August 27, 2013 (see Fig. 2)26.

The corridor also provides for the construction of200 km of tunnel at Gilgit Baltistan, which will give China access to the Strait of Hormuz, the strait via which is transported a third of the global oil production. Moreover, from a military point of view, Gwadar will give China the ability to maneuver and have a naval presence in the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean, although China is not a naval power in this region27. Derived from the same need for energy security and due to a higher Western influence in Burma/Myanmar28, China's interest to open a path for the electricity supply is crucial and closely related to Gilgit-Baltistan - in the north, and Balochistan - in the south, two regions rich in mineral resources, valuable for Chinese companies29.

For Afghanistan, the third country with a strong Baloch ethnic minority, the idea of an independent Balochistan will only fuel the feelings of Pashtun ethnic groups, present on both sides of the Durand Line, which strongly desire selfdetermination both in Afghanistan and in the Federal Administered Tribal Territories of Pakistan. Afghanistan's interest in Balochistan is mainly economical, stemming from the development of deep-sea port facilities in the Gwadar Port. For 23 Hasan Zaser MALYK, "Strategic Carnage of Balochistan", IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS), Volume 8, Issue 4 (Mar. - Apr. 2013), pp. 4-77, p. 4.

24 Syed Irfan RAZA - China given contract to operate Gwadar port, http://www.dawn.com/news/786992, accessed on 5/20/2014.

25 Jason R. MURTHA - The Strategic Importance of Balochistan, Master Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2011, p. 41.

26 Adapted from an image presented by Mr. Aasim Siddiqui, Ex-Chairman, All Pakistan Shipping Association (APSA) & Managing Director - Marine Group of Companies, available at: http://www.intermodal-asia.com/files/ aasim_siddiqui_apsa.pdf, accessed 5/20/2014.

27 port be a game changer?, FIRSTPOST.INDLA (India), 04.02.2013, http://www.firstpost.com/india/willchinas-takeover-of-paks-gwadar-port-be-a-game-changer612682.html, accessed 5/20/2014.

28 Burma, officially the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, usually abbreviated Myanmar is a sovereign state in South Asia that is bordered by Laos, Thailand, China, Bangladesh, and India.

29 Vikas KUMAR - Pakistan 's Fragile Periphery, Future Directions Associate Paper, 27 March 2014, p. 6.

a country with the largest lithium deposit in the world and real prospects of economic growth, but lacking maritime facilities, Gwadar offers Afghanistan a quick and cost-effective possible access to the Indian Ocean and opportunities arising from this exit to commercial sea roads. Moreover, given the current situation and the effort that the United States put in Afghanistan, this Afghan interest for Gwadar pleases Washington who would prefer Pakistan instead of Iran, as a transit territory for the Afghan trade. Of course, it should be noted that the strong cultural and religious ties offered by the Pashtun ethnic group from the two neighboring countries have also a contribution to this30.

Wishing to meet its energy needs and its obvious interest in Central Asia and Iran, India has to analyze which situation best represent its interests: a stable Balochistan within a strong Pakistan or an independent Balochistan and moderate Pakistan31. In one possible scenario,

India may be tempted by an anti-Pakistani alliance through an insurrection in Balochistan, generating pressures in Islamabad that could end the conflict over Kashmir32.

In the effort to get access to the Indian Ocean, Russia has been courting Balochistan since the time of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 - February 1989. A certain tacit agreement seems to have been developed between the two parties at that time: the Soviets provided economic and military support, and in return, the Baloch party offered assistance for the insurgency in southern Afghanistan and access to the facilities of the the Gwadar Port. Although the years of the Cold War are long ended, military analysts consider that there are still residual feelings of distrust between Moscow and Washington in terms of the presence in the region. If China's interests are added to the mix, a smoldering tension haunts the international stage33.

Russia's interests in Balochistan can be interpreted in the following ways:

- the old issue of natural resources is equally applicable to Russia;

a great world power and at the same time a great consumer, Russia can not give up the temptation to control also the oil in the Gulf, estimated at about 60% of the known global reserves; thus both natural resources from the Indian Ocean and Antarctica may come under Soviet control and management;

- fish catches transport - about one third of the total global fish - from the Indian Ocean, especially the Arabian Sea to the countries of Central Asia could become much faster and more efficient34;

Russia may be the beneficiary of the shortest way to transport natural resources from and to Antarctica, known as the largest pool of untapped mineral resources in the world35.

The Gulf strategic military aspect and access to the Indian Ocean should not be neglected either, as they offer Russia further proximity to a more or less declared partner, China.

For Iran, Balochistan is the only land route to the future gas pipeline that will link one of the largest natural gas operation fields, located in Pars in Iran, the main point of distribution of natural gas from Shaheed Benazirabad (ex Nawabshah), Pakistan; nearly 1200 km of the total gas pipeline of approximately 1881 km will transit the territory in Balochistan.

As regards the deep water port of Gwadar, its advantages are clear, and in the absence of a matching competitor, Balochistan can only benefit from such advantages. Iran, however, is developing what is called today the "Chabahar Free Trading Zone", a free trade area of the port of Chabahar, located just 110 miles away and a worthy competitor to be reckoned by the Chinese investors in Gwadar. Funded mainly by Indian companies, the Chabadar port is in direct competition with Gwadar for access to the same markets; this competition has become a major concern for Pakistani officials who declared that the success of the Chabahar port would cause a huge financial setback to Pakistan36. For Iran instead, this initiative is part of a larger plan of rehabilitation of the Sistan-Baluchistan region in southeastern Iran, one of the poorest and least developed regions of Iran, a Baloch-majority region.

As an important partner at the global discussions, Europe, through its economically stronger member states, participates actively to the game that seems to take place in the region. Thus, after the mutual agreement of cooperation between the EU and Pakistan37 signed in 2004, the two parties increasingly used this forum in order to facilitate as many aids as possible for Pakistan on the one hand, and to open the European market for products from Pakistan, on the other hand. Thus, between 2009 and 2013 the European Union donated humanitarian aids, grants, including grants provided by the European Investment Bank amounting to approximately euro 485 million support for Pakistan, including contributions from the Member States amounting to about 423 million euro38.

The Member States did not hesitate too much, trade flourished between Pakistan and Sweden, who has become a leading investor in the labor market in Pakistan; economic relations further tightened, as Sweden became the early warning air system supplier for the Pakistani army39 and the Netherlands became the fifth largest destination for exports from Pakistan.

Given the international interest in this region, Pakistan's stability is vital for the great global powers such as the United States of America or China, but also for Europe. All other individual national interests merge into the international common interest, further contributing to the internal development of Pakistan40.

Given the current energy crisis, it should be no surprise that the energy security in Pakistan is a top national priority. Pakistan's economy is one of the world's most dependent on natural gas, which represents about 50 percent of the total energy consumption in Pakistan, the main source of energy in the country. Two thirds of the existing reserves of natural gas are in Baluchistan; while the province provides about 40% of the total natural gas production in Pakistan, it consumes only a modest 17% of it.

Besides these considerable reserves of coal and natural gas, there are indications that it would also have large reserves of oil; the geological reports show a quantity of 19 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 6 trillion barrels of oil, as untapped natural resources in the province Balochistan41.

Conclusions

The attempt of the international community to convince the government of Pakistan to involve politically the nationalist opposition of Baluchistan is not a solution easy to implement, but, at least in theory, it might be successful in tempering the hostilities in the province. The development of a stable security environment in the fixture of Pakistan and Balochistan, allegedly two sovereign states, is inevitably closely linked to the progress of radical Islamic terrorism in the region. To minimize the concerns about India's influence in Afghanistan, and particularly in Balochistan, after the military forces of the United States and NATO Alliance will leave the country, the Islamabad regime will try to strengthen the relations and support for the Taliban, fact that was officially denied and which is reflected in the intensity of the current insurgent activities in Afghanistan. Consequently, Balochistan is and will remain an important segment of the Pakistani strategic thinking42.

The internal security of Pakistan is, as I mentioned above, a source of concern for the European countries. From their point of view, the collapse of Pakistan would induce long-term negative consequences for the political development of Afghanistan. Pakistan's ability to control its nuclear capabilities and to minimize the risk of proliferation of the arsenal, where it fails as a state, is also analyzed. At the same time, an independent but unstable Balochistan would attract militant organizations that will probably use the advantage provided by the lack of power in the province in order to achieve political ideals and a safe heaven for terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, a base for regrouping, recruiting and planning future terrorist attacks which could be targeted, why not, even against the European territory.

A nuclear-armed state, such as Pakistan, is a target that must be monitored, especially since the internal challenges pull the country in different directions and the domestic developments have significant implications for the region and Western countries, part of the coalition in Afghanistan43.

There is also a consensus that a division of Pakistan could induce serious security challenges in the region, raising the concerns of both politicians and scientists, who fear that the Baloch insurgency could have a drastic impact on the neighboring countries that are also home to large communities of Baloch ethnics. None of these countries would agree with the movement for territorial autonomy of these minorities44.

It is known that the natural and energy resources represent one of the main reasons for potential conflicts worldwide, and this only makes Balochistan a piece worthy of notice on the chessboard of the great world powers. Until the alternative energy resources will be widely produced and distributed, the gas fields and the oil and mineral riches that are still available globally will be sought for exploitation purposes by all the major global players and the Balochistan province, one of the numerous regions renown only due to its potential energy is unlikely to decline in importance in the near future.

Footnote

1 The tribe and the province are usually written either Baludí and Baluchistan or Baloch and Balochistan, but the latter spelling appears to be currently winning writings on the subject and, therefore, I will use it in this material.

2 "The spread of ethnic Baloch in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and India", available at: http://balochistanhcr.blogspot.com2011_07_01_archive.html, accessed 5/20/2014.

3 Alok, BANSAL, The Revival of Insurgency in Balochistan, Strategic Analysis Paper, April-June 2005, http:// idsa.in/system/files/strategicanalysis_abansal_0306.pdf, accessed at 5/20/2014, p.3, apud Owen Bennett JONES, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, Penguin Books, New Delhi, 2002, p. 132.

4 Khan al Kalat or Khan-e-Qalat - is the title held by the former heads of State of the State of Kalat. Balochistan Kalat State and is now part of Pakistan. Leaders of Kalat were legally subordinate to political authority of a larger state each for different time periods: the Mughal Emperor Akbar beginning in Delhi, then after 1839 the British, and finally the government of Pakistan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ KhanofKalat).

5 Alok, BANSAL, The Revival of Insurgency in Balochistan, Strategic Analysis Paper, April-June 2005, http:// idsa.in/system/files/strategicanalysis_abansal_0306.pdf, accessed 5/20/2014, p. 3, apud Veena KUKREJA, Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2003, p. 131.

Footnote

6 Ibidem.

7 Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA): semi-autonomous tribal region in northwest Pakistan, bordering the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan and Balochistan to the east and south, and the provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika and Khost in Afghanistan, west and north.

8 Alexander, ATARODI, Insurgency in Balochistan and why it is of strategic importance, Report no. FOI-R-3110 -SE, FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, January 2011, p. 16.

Footnote

9 Frederic, GRARE, Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism, Carnegie Papers, No. 65, January 2006, P-11.

10 Annex of Statistical Information, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence, Based at the University of Maryland, April 2014, http://www.state.gOv/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224831 .htm, accessed on 5/20/2014.

Footnote

11 Frederic, GRARE, 2006, op. cit.

12 Habib Jalib Baloch: Baloch nationalist politician who served as a member of the Senate of Pakistan and as Secretary General of Balochistan National Party; was shot dead by unknown assailants in Quetta on July 14, 2010. (http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habib_Jalib_Baloch).

Footnote

13 Huma IMTIAY, "US congressman tables bill for Baloch right to independence", in The Express Tribune, February 18th, 2012, http://tribune.com.pk/story/338079/us-congressman-tables-resolution-calling-for-independence-ofbaloch/, accessed 5/26/2014.

14 Khybers Pass: located at an altitude of 1070 m, is a mountain pass that the north-east of Spin Ghar mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan such links; part of the ancient Silk Road, is one of the oldest known mountain passes in the world, throughout history has been a major trade route between Central Asia and South Asia and a strategic military location (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khyber_Pass).

15 Bolán Pass, important crossing at Balochistan's border, connecting Jacobabad and Sibi with Quetta city, which has always occupied an important place in the history of British military campaigns in Afghanistan, (http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolan_Pass).

16 Lieutenant General Sir Henry Pöttinger, (October 3/1789 - 18 March 1856), Anglo-Irish military and colonial administrator who became the first Governor of Hong Kong. In 1806, he joined the British campaign in eastern India and in 1809 as a lieutenant fighting Mahratta war; is promoted to the rank of colonel after expedition Nushki, Balochistan in 1810, an expedition financed by the East Indian Company for research and the realization of maps unstudied regions of Balochistan and Persia, of the concerns about the possible invasion of India by the forces French, (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Pottinger).

17 Mountstuart Elphinstone (October 6, 1779 - November 20, 1859), historian and politician Scottish nearest British government in India.

Footnote

18 Larry HANAUER, Peter CHALK, India's and Pakistan 's Strategies in Afghanistan. Inplications for the United States and the Region, RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, Occasional paper, 2012, p.10.

19 Ibidem, p. 11.

20 Jason HEEG, Insurgency in Balochistan, Kansas State University, available at: http://finso.leavenworth.army.mil/ Collaboration/universities/Balochistan_final.pdfi, p. 7, accessed on 27.05.2014, p. 7.

21 Alexander, ATARODI, Insurgency in Balochistan and why it is of strategic importance, Raport No. FOI-R-3110 -SE, FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, January 2011, p.28.

22 Uighur. ethnic Turkish population living in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, mainly in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China, where they are officially recognized as one of the 56 ethnic minorities.

Footnote

30 Hasan Yaser MALYK, 2003, op. cit., p. 5.

31 Suba D. CHANDRAN, Akbar Bugti and after: Implications for Balochistan & Pakistan, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies issue brief, no 38, New Delphi, India, p. 4.

32 Frederic GRARE , Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism, Carnegie Papers, No. 65, January 2006, p. 12.

33 Jason R. MURTFLA, 2011, op. cit., p. 67.

Footnote

34 Ahmad, Lt. Col. Syed Iqbal, Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance, Karachi, Royal Book Company, 1992, p. 256.

35 Cheema G. SHABBIR, Intra-State Conflicts and Development Strategies: The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan, available at http://pbrc.soka.edu/files/documents/workingpapers/cheema.pdf, p. 7.

36 Haider ZIAD "Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan's Gwadar Port", Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 2005, p. 101.

37 Bilateral cooperation agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Islamabad signed on 24.11.2004, http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyld=368, accessed on 12.06.2014.

38 Shada ISLAM, Moving EU-Pakistan Relations Beyond Words, http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/Islam_Moving_Augll_final.pdf, accessed on 5/15/2014.

39 In early 2006, the Pakistan Air Force ordered six Saab 2000 aircraft equipped with the Erieye AEW equipped Saab 2000 from Sweden worth about $ 1 billion; In December 2006, the Pakistani Navy commissioned a number three aircraft equipped with Hawkeye 2000 AEW, the total cost of the program is the $ 855 million, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/sweden-fmalizes-saab-2000-aewc- contract-with-pakistan-02377/, http://www.defensenews. com/article/20061211/C4ISR01/612110301/Pakistan-seeks-P-3s-with-Hawkeye-radar, accessed on 6/13/2014.

Footnote

40 Alexander ATARODI, Insurgency in Balochistan and why it is of strategic importance, Raport No. FOI-R-3110 -SE, FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, January 2011, p. 25.

41 Adley PRIYASHREE, Balochistan A Backgrounder, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Special Report, Issue 32, October 2006, New Delhi, India, p. 7.

42 A. SIDDIQUE, "Unrest in Balochistan Contributes to Regional Tensions", Radio Free Europe, 20 July 2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/Unrest_In_Baluchistan_Contributes_To_Regional_Tensions/2104498.html, accessed on 5/15/2014, p. 34.

43 Alexander ATARODI, 2011, op.cit., p. 39.

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