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Soc Choice Welf (2016) 47:939957
DOI 10.1007/s00355-016-0998-4
ORIGINAL PAPER
Received: 28 November 2015 / Accepted: 20 September 2016 / Published online: 27 September 2016 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016
Abstract The reverse nested lottery contest proposed by Fu et al. (2014) is the mirror image of the classical nested lottery contest of Clark and Riis (1996a), which has been axiomatized by Lu and Wang (2015). In this paper, we close the gap and provide an axiomatic underpinning for the reverse nested lottery contest by identifying a set of six necessary and sufcient axioms. These axioms proposed specify the properties of contestants probabilities of being ranked the lowest among all players or within subgroups, while the axiomatization of the classical nested lottery contest by Lu and Wang (2015) relies on axioms on contestants probabilities of being ranked the highest among all players or within subgroups.
We are grateful to the editors in charge and two anonymous referees for their insightful comments and suggestions. We thank Dan Kovenock, Chengzhong Qin, Birendra Rai, Christian Riis, Santiago Sanchez-Pages, and Alberto Vesperoni for their kind comments and discussions. Jingfeng Lu gratefully acknowledges the nancial support from Ministry of Education, Academic Research Fund, Singapore (R-122-000-217-112). Wang gratefully acknowledges nancial support from Project 71501112 supported by NSFC, and from Qilu Young Scholars and Zhongying Young Scholars of Shandong University. All remaining errors are our own.
B Jingfeng Lu
Zhewei Wang [email protected]
1 Department of Economics, National University of Singapore, 10 Kent Ridge Crescent,
Singapore 119260, Singapore2 School of Economics, Williamson Centre for Law, Economics, and Organization, Shandong
University, 27 Shanda Nanlu, Jinan 250100, China
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Web End = Axiomatization of reverse nested lottery contests
Jingfeng Lu1 Zhewei Wang2
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940 J. Lu, Z. Wang
1 Introduction
A Contest Success Function (CSF) species a contestants probability of winning a contest given the contestants effort outlays. The lottery-form CSFs, which are rst axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998a), have been widely adopted in the contest literature starting from Tullock (1980). Skaperdas (1996) shows that the lottery-form CSF is the only family of continuous CSFs that satises ve easily interpretable axioms.1 Clark and Riis (1998a) replace the Anonymity axiom in Skaperdas (1996) with a new Homogeneity axiom to...