ASYMMETRIC, UNCONVENTIONAL AND HYBRID ACTIONS IN 21ST CENTURY WARFARE

Abstract

While the nature of warfare is not changing, the physiognomy of conflicts and warfare alters and evolves constantly. It is obvious that interstate wars will not totally disappear but the conflict per se will get new dimensions with the adaptation of potential combatants to progress in science and technology and especially to the new characteristics of the international security environment. There will be frequent asymmetric, unconventional and hybrid actions in the 21st century wars which will affect their privacy rendering them unrepeatable. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

Headnote

While the nature of warfare is not changing, the physiognomy of conflicts and warfare alters and evolves constantly. It is obvious that interstate wars will not totally disappear but the conflict per se will get new dimensions with the adaptation of potential combatants to progress in science and technology and especially to the new characteristics of the international security environment.

There will be frequent asymmetric, unconventional and hybrid actions in the 21st century wars which will affect their privacy rendering them unrepeatable.

Keywords: international security environment; 21st century warfare; asymmetric actions; unconventional actions; hybrid actions.

Introduction

The events of the first decade of the twentyfirst century have demonstrated that, in terms of the international security environment, change is the only constant. There have been identified new risks, dangers and threats of global scale and high intensity, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, and other processes and phenomena which, in addition to the benefits to human society, can have a negative impact such as globalization that intensifies those listed above. All these items cannot be understood through the security paradigm specific to the last century. The nature of the conflict has evolved dramatically in the last decade, beyond conventional battles between armies of nation-states, towards irregular conflicts and instability. This trend occurs worldwide and is an important feature of the security environment of the twenty-first century.

Most armed conflicts in the last decade took place either between sub-state groups or between such groups and conventional military forces, so that the probability that the next threat to national and international security come from national armies is reduced. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), in 2011 there were 27 intrastate armed conflicts and only one interstate conflict1, but globalization makes the differences and conflicts in a state to have an effect on neighboring states and even on other distant countries.

The conflict in a state or region may favor the development of transnational organized crime networks, can develop into civil war that often leads to humanitarian catastrophe and massive refugee flows or can cause the formation of "sanctuaries" of terrorism and dissemination of radical ideologies.

The tasks to be undertaken to counter these risks, dangers and security threats will not entail hiring an army against traditional national army, but an unconventional conflict against non-state enemies using asymmetrical tactics.

1. Considerations on the international security environment

The issues of the twenty-first century warfare cannot be analyzed without reviewing the main elements of the current international security environment, since the study is not limited to armed forces and theaters, but it must take into account the impact of political, economic, social, cultural, technological and ecological factors. These factors do not act independently but are related, and the effects are felt in all areas of life.

The demographic changes represent one of the factors with repercussions in all areas of life, including in the war area. The security environment of this century is and will continue to be affected by four main trends: the relative demographic weight of developed countries will drop by about 25%, the economic power shifting to developing countries; the workforce in developed countries will age and its number will decrease, thus increasing the demand for migrant workers; the population increases and will increase the most in the poorest countries, for the first time in history, the world is increasingly urbanized and the largest urban centers are formed in the poorest countries.2 The growth and concentration of population in urban areas of poor countries, coupled with the decrease of population in the developed countries have obvious implications on conflictuality, in that it can form centers of crime and extremist ideologies and urban insurgency may develop.

In economy, it is considered that the world faces its worst economic and financial crisis since the Great Depression of the '30s to the present. Most developed economies of the world have been or are still in recession, emerging markets recorded a significant decrease in growth and developing countries are fully exposed to external shocks. The poor resistance to impact of the latter makes that the impact of the financial crisis on developing states to be more powerful than the developed economies. It also leads to the concentration of military power - at least in terms of defense budget, and also the development and innovation - in some countries that have the ability to increase spending in this regard.

The energy problem is another factor that has grown in the twenty-first century. Almost half of the world's oil supplies, the main source of energy, is concentrated in 116 large-scale oil fields and for the near future is foreseen a dramatic decrease in production as available reserves, not being as easily accessible as before, will require increased operating expenses that a developing country cannot afford.3 Some countries are already in dispute over oil resources in the Arctic, Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East, creating the possibility of the outbreak of proximity wars.

In addition to these issues of utmost importance, the international security environment is characterized by the risks, dangers and threats derived from: reductions in water, coupled with population growth, climate change and increasing natural disasters, the development of a new dimension of war, the space one, and the desire of certain international actors to achieve space superiority etc. Also, we must report reported to be unable to stop the phenomena that originate in or are stimulated by the problems listed above, such as illegal immigration, terrorism, corruption, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy, failed states, etc.

The processes, phenomena and items listed determine an increase in complexity and unpredictability of crises and conflicts. The asymmetric, unconventional and hybrid actions will dominate the twenty-first century based on discontent, resentment, perceived inequalities and inherited ideologies that constitute the engine of terrorism, insurgency and criminality. State, nonstate actors and individual participants will be involved, which will operate at both local and global level, anywhere in the world where they can get an advantage over their opponents and objectives. Thus, this century is characterized by blurring the distinction between military and civilian regarding the use of violence and the threat of force. The greatest risk of causing a large-scale conflict will be in areas economically vulnerable, poorly governed, subject to demographic and environmental pressures, characterized by deep inequalities, but also with a rich history of conflictuality.

So, we can say that the current international security environment, particularly the 21st century war will be characterized by several strategic trends, such as the growing importance of information, the development of irregular and conventional capabilities, the increased importance of non-military aspects of the war, the expansion of the conflict beyond the traditional battlefield, force protection improvement, the increase of nuclear power and of the degree of difficulty of the interventions environment.4

In what follows, we will analyze the complexity and interdependence of warfare in the twenty-first century war in conjunction with the new features of the international security environment.

2. Complexity and interdependence of combat operations in the twenty-first century warfare

2.1. Warfare in the 21st century

Constant threat to life of human societies, throughout history war has fueled numerous works that denounced the terrible and evil character that accompanied it. Also, it has never ceased to attract interest, provoking judgment to grasp its true nature. Many theorists have been keen to describe this multifaceted reality, to understand how it functions, to determine any limiting and, on civilian level, eradication principles.

From Francisco de Vitoria to Carl von Clausewitz, from Alberico Gentili to Emer de Vattel, from the question of "just war" to that of "absolute war", through "regulated wars" and those of civil wars, it seems that the reflection on this social phenomenon has fluctuated between three main issues: theological-moral, legal and political, anthropological and political.5

Since the end of the Cold War, new reflections on the phenomenon of war have occurred: the idea of a "rosy future" warfare (Philippe Delmas) or on the contrary, that of an obsolete war (John Mueller).6 However, after the events of September 11, 2001, the general trend in academia and journalism was to believe that the world would enter in an era of asymmetric conflicts.7

On the other hand, the current thinking in strategic studies does not suggest any ontological or epistemological rupture from the reflection at the beginning of the end of the bipolar era. Rather, it is about implementing these new conflicts in a general typology which often takes as its starting point a triptych between intrastate, civil and other conflict.

Some believe that, after September 11, 2001, the works on the types of war have changed their approach on this phenomenon.8 This event triggered an unprecedented rebound of war studies. Thus, researchers have started to pay attention and time to explaining the fundamental changes occurring during a war. For example, Pascal Boniface published in November 2001, his "Les Guerres de Demain", which comes with new elements on the typology of wars.9 Referring to future wars, he mentions 24 types of conflicts, from civilizational wars to those who use cyberspace10.

The most popular typology in the mentioned period is the one proposed by Thomas X. Hammes, in his "The Sling and the Stone. On War in the 21st Century"11, which talks about four generations of war. In fact, this classification was originally made by William S. Lind, Keith Nightingale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton and Gary I. Wilson12 in 1989.

The twenty-first century is characterized by two major paradigms. Western countries are constantly at war at distance for their interests. In addition, they put into practice the doctrine of "zero deaths". For this, they either call mercenaries and/or the power of technology13. If to these considerations is added the fact that, currently, non-state groups as religious extremists and narco-traffickers are actors that are involved in armed conflicts, then we have the full picture of what future warfare means and will mean. Basically, the war in the twenty-first century, in addition to conventional warfare between states, asymmetrical, unconventional and hybrid actions, worn usually by non-state actors, manifest more strongly.

2.2. Correlation between asymmetrical, unconventional and hybrid actions in 21st century warfare

2.2.1. Asymmetrical actions in 21st century warfare

Current wars, that is those occurring after 2001, include, among other forms of warfare asymmetrical actions. These are not new14, they have been present throughout human history, in almost all the wars of the past15. What is new about twenty-first century wars, in terms of asymmetric actions, is that they are waged almost exclusively by non-state actors (for instance Islamist neoterorism, degenerated guerrillas, transnational criminal organizations, narcoterrorist, violent irrational entities).

Asymmetry occurs at strategic, operational or tactical levels. Basically, the asymmetry in a war is about adapting to an opponent or a security threat. Partially or totally, this adaptation can be integrated into a more conventional formula of confrontation, moving and expanding the field of conflict from a simple battlefield to political and media space.

In addition, today's opponent is a priori incomprehensible, elusive and irrational, because of the objectives, organization and/or its methods used to achieve the proposed goals. The opponent is incomprehensible because its resources (human, financial, informational) are much lower than those of its enemy. Thus, in Afghanistan, the insurgent forces are much lower in number, equipment and means of warfare and not only, compared to the multinational military coalition forces operating there under a UN mandate. However, the insurgents, using means of warfare often improvised, cause human and material losses to coalition forces. The imperceptible epithet given to the opponent takes into account the fact that it is not organized in military structure similar to that of a national army, but acts individually or in small groups and seek fulfillment of concrete, tangible objectives and have a great psychological impact on the population and enemy forces. In this respect, a great example is the open networks like Al-Qaeda, where the network elements appeared and disappeared in a continuous manner, and could not be vulnerable to indirect actions16. In addition, it seems that a part of the population provides concrete, material and moral support. Frequently, after executing a combat action, this elusive opponent is "hiding" among the population. The opponent is irrational because it opposes a numerically and technologically superior enemy, and not only, but also because they do not care about the civilian victims accidentally in their area of action.

At the same time, asymmetrical actions cover a wide spectrum of modes from non-violence to political violence, from terrorism to certain types of information warfare. The latter is considerably facilitated by the revolution in information and communication technologies both states and nonstate actors have access to. However, asymmetric actions are defined by the fact that one of the players does not respect the common rules set. In case of a war, the rules are often established for the benefit of one of the protagonists, who thus find a way to ensure, once again, their superiority. It is only natural that, after trying to follow the rules of the game, which did not favor them, the enemy seeks to bypass them in order to restore balance, resuming their upward or initiative to compensate for a weakness that otherwise would be fatal17.

Therefore, knowing the mechanisms of asymmetric actions leads to understanding the nature of objectives and identifying the logics which allow belligerents to achieve their intended purpose18. The enemies in any war, asymmetric or not, build their global strategy around three dimensions: the purpose of the action (for instance overthrow a regime and putting a new government in place), available resources (finances, personnel, weapons) and the path chosen to achieve the objective (by force or political means).

Asymmetric actions are based on a strategy also asymmetric. The fight against asymmetric strategies is fought at three levels19: information, strategy and action. They are required to be addressed by a comprehensive, integrated and particularly offensive manner. Each of the three components has a decisive role in waging asymmetric actions. Their achievement, apparently distinct, is in fact interdependent.

Thus, the information is not intended only for the normative knowledge of people and structures responsible, but rather for understanding the motivations, objectives and their lines of force. In other words, it must penetrate their mental universe, which means that belligerent should rely less on the benefits of technological and/or human resources and more on the full integration of information in decision making process.

Regarding the role of the action's strategy, it involves taking a comprehensive and antiterrorist approach of the offensive and defensive means, civilian and military, counter-terrorist and antiterrorist, political, economic and social. The goal is not to be limited to removing the asymmetric force, but to transform the conditions of his action in the sense of legitimacy among the population that supports it politically, morally and even logistically. For example, a good strategy against terrorism must ensure exit doors for the asymmetric opponent. In this way, the latter has the power to place the action in a symmetrical perspective, hence the need to reduce the drama of negotiations on necessary concessions and recycling the former enemy combatants in intelligence or psychological action units.

The action itself is designed to provide information control before and after the decision, but also the communication itself. Beyond the informational dominance the U.S. conceptualized in the first Gulf War (1991), which favors control of data and knowledge, it means controlling the influence, especially on the local population, which is the key of asymmetric warfare.

2.2.2. Unconventional actions in 21st century warfare

Unconventional actions are waged by both nonstate and state actors. The latter calls for such battle tactics and procedures when they counteract the actions of non-state actors. Therefore, we can say that unconventional actions are a response to unconventional threats (terrorism, organized crime and so on). They are generated by three new factors that have emerged in modern commitments20:

* populations - they are more often the stake of military interventions either to protect them from the consequences of a conflict, or to facilitate their return to their country;

* modern employment conditions - they are different from the past ones, as we are witnessing a voluntary or involuntary involvement of populations in a conflict where the belligerents are no longer separated by a linear front and where the distinction between civilian and military targets is least respected;

* multiplication of actors in a theater - it is about the political and local authorities, international organizations, governmental organizations, NGOs, the forces engaged.

On the other hand, the unconventional actions are taken by non-state actors who, in order to achieve their political, ideological or religious goals, use the asymmetric warfare methods and procedures. The main reason for such a practice is the lack of human, material, financial and information resources in relation to those of the government forces. Overthrowing by the non-state actors the unfavorable balance of forces in armed combat is done by generating effects compensating to a large extent, the differences from the institutional and state opponents.

Exercising the unconventional armed violence applies to combat methods of asymmetric systems equipped with physical military capabilities too low to cause damage that threatens the major center of a modern classic army or the gravity center of a state. It describes the manner in which militarized organizations must compensate for this weakness by indirect actions on the opponent's psyche, on that of potential allies and of the population21. The effects pursued all have a common point: to convince the population, state institutions, internal and military security forces about the futility of their struggle and its exorbitant cost.

As an instrument of political violence, guerrilla is designed as a military strategy in the service of a political insurrection action. There are two historical variants:

* a revolutionary version, aiming to end an oppressive and illegitimate regime (for instance Cuba between 1953-1958 or South Vietnam from 1954 to 1975);

* a nationalist variant whose aim is to end the colonial regime or to drive a military occupation force (in the case of Algeria between 1954-1962).

The rebels need time to organize their political machine and engage a process to generate the military force. This period will be used to strengthen their legitimacy among the population. Once the desired power acquired, overthrowing the adverse regime or removing a foreign occupation army will be done through the classic victory. So they have to practically plan and lead a military strategy of attrition against regular and internal security armed forces as well as an indirect strategy that appeals to terrorist methods, propaganda and disinformation designed to demoralize the legal authorities, combining them in an integrated strategy. Therefore, unconventional armed violence is not at the reach of all the organizations.

To avoid the enemy classic military superiority, the militarized actions will be taken with a different approach from conventional combat22. In this regard, the following measures are adopted:

* not accepting a decisive battle in which superiority in mobility and firepower of regular forces may be predominant;

* renunciation of military devices marking a certain front line in the field, the rebels will take a maximum dispersion from adverse device;

* availability of safe regrouping area, where the units will be reconstructed between the two operations, this "sanctuary" must be difficult for regular forces or far enough from the enemy bases to give the guerrilla members time to withdraw. Properly arranged, this "sanctuary" will serve as tactical or operational logistics base.

Professional Western armies equipped the same as the American army, that is relying on the conjunction of the trajectory precision and development of sensor networks can overcome certain technical difficulties they faced in the past.

From this point of view, we can say that:

* geographical distances disappear under the effect of air-mobility and overall control of the third dimension, today, there are no inaccessible places geographically;

* identifying significant military bases and units becomes easier, there are observation systems capable in all weather conditions to identify the positions of military structures and even of isolated fighters;

* targeting/ identification / processing / evaluation loop is reduced to a few tens of minutes and authorizes strikes on opportunity targets of small volume or dimensions;

* collateral damage is less extensive than in the past, by the accuracy of fire, combined with the missile and vectors' depth;

* classic conventional armed forces have the capacity to fight at night and in any weather conditions, while guerrilla has no such capacity. Among the enemy asymmetric influencing forms23, there are:

* decredibilization achieved through intimidation, using military methods (sniping, obstacles, mines traps, ambush) and non-military methods (popular events, press campaign, rumors, kidnappings, assassinations);

* paralysis achieved through operational and tactical movements performed by military methods (sabotage, use of surface to air missiles, mines, bombs, ambushes, suicide attacks) and nonmilitary methods (strikes, popular uprisings);

* dislocation, using both military methods (bombings, assassinations, kidnappings of military leaders and civilians, suicide) and processes nonmilitary (civilian blockade).

At the same time, the unconventional actions are aimed at:

* degradation of military effectiveness of a classic force through: denial of the enemy force capacity to achieve a decisive military victory by decredibilizing the military, clearly showing the public and government the operational failure of the armed forces;

* paralysing the field deployment through delay actions at the operational and tactical level and dislocating the enemy's main effort by isolating and beheading all or part of the enemy army;

* controlling the population in order to turn it against the institutions by conquering it fully or partially. To this end, they seek to24: seduce and alienate the population in order to turn it against the government; terror to remove a portion of the population that they cannot control.

2.2.3. Hybrid actions in 21st century warfare

Wars of the twenty-first century include, as conflicts after 2001 have shown, and will include hybrid actions as a form of armed struggle. Therefore, we can say that in the future there is a tendency of a hybridization of the war, which will take place on two levels: that of the modes of action and that of the actors and their alliances25.

The hybrid actions combine conventional, asymmetric, terrorist, of organized crime capabilities in order to lead to unique and often innovative actions and can simultaneously reveal symmetry and asymmetry. Firstly, it's a hybridization of the modes of action. Guerrilla-type terrorist or organized crime organizations seek to acquire the skills and abilities specific to national armies: electronic and cyber war, drones, surfaceto- air missiles with associated radars. They remain in the line of Mao's theory of revolutionary war, but from now on, state armed forces look, in turn, to expand their asymmetric warfare capabilities as the statements of the 2009 Iranian armed forces' commanders show26.

The convergence of techniques and modes of action renders the dichotomy between symmetry and asymmetry increasingly vague. It is rather a systematic combination of the two, especially since the hybridization of the alliances between state and non-state actors allows these alliances to regroup their symmetric and asymmetric capabilities. The strategic alliance between Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and Syria is the archetype of another type of hybridization. For example, deterring Iran towards Israel is based on the ability of its allies to open three fronts simultaneously against this country, two of which are asymmetrical. The respective alliances are not specific to a new kind of war, but they make the distinction between small or large and asymmetrical and symmetrical distinction between conflicts look obsolete. This reality involves a difficulty in representing the forces.

On the other hand, in the future, most capable opponents may seek to combine the actual destructive capacity with traditional war asymmetric or catastrophic forms27. In this sense, many analysts speak of a mixture of forms of war by combining the increasing frequency and lethality. This construction is described most often as a hybrid war, where the opponents will most likely present unique hybrid threats targeting the vulnerabilities of the state/states attacked.

Therefore, the hybrid actions will be a simultaneous mixture of all forms of war (conventional, asymmetric, terrorist) and corresponding tactics28. The criminal activity also can be considered a part of the problem because it destabilizes the local government the most or encourages the insurgents' fight by providing them with resources. Virtually, non-state actors using hybrid actions perform an innovative mix of strategies, tactics, technologies consistent with their strategic culture, geography and targeted objectives.

The hybrid actions incorporate a full range of modes of warfare, including the conventional ones, tactics and asymmetrical forms, terrorist acts including blind violence and coercion and criminal disorder. These multi-modal activities can be carried out by separate units or by the same unit, but, in general, from operational and tactical point of view, they are led and coordinated in the primary battle space to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict29. The effects can be obtained at all levels of war. Thus, the compression of war levels is complicated by a simultaneous convergence of modes. The novelty of these innovative combinations and adaptations of existing systems by hybrid actions represents another complexity of the current century warfare.

The hybrid forces can effectively incorporate advanced technological systems in their structure and then use them in manners that are beyond the parameters initially set. From a functional perspective, the hybrid military forces are superior to Western forces in the hybrid warfare they are waging against these ones30.

The hybrid actions combine conventional the lethality of conventional conflict with fanatical fervor and longer duration of asymmetrical warfare. In hybrid conflicts, the future adversaries (states, groups of states or non-state actors and individuals) will exploit the access to modern military options, including the coded control systems, portable air-to-ground missiles and other lethal systems that favor prolonged insurrections using ambushes, improvised explosive devices and coercive assassinations.

2.2.4. Relations between asymmetric, unconventional and hybrid actions in this century warfare

The analysis of the ways in which asymmetric, unconventional and hybrid actions occur in this century warfare and also that of the actors that use them, highlights two essential characteristics of the relationships between them: complexity and interdependence.

The complexity of the relations between asymmetric, unconventional and hybrid actions lies in:

* the ways in which these actions are taken within a conflict - usually, the asymmetric modes are preferred;

* the non-state actors who use these types of actions - usually those players are about the same. It is about terrorist groups, guerrillas, insurgents, organized crime. Of course, state actors also use, in response to attacks by non-state actors mentioned above, unconventional and hybrid actions;

* content and nature of the relations with the people in the combat actions' area - in asymmetric, unconventional and even hybrid actions, non-state actors are always looking to attract people to their side, or to demoralize, terrorize and frighten them not to support government forces;

* strategies, tactics and means of warfare used - non-state actors use any strategies, tactics and conventional combat means, modern and improvised to achieve their goals. Sometimes even state actors resort to hybrid modes of action to combat non-state actors, in their capacity as belligerents;

* venue of warfare - very often, asymmetric, unconventional and hybrid actions are conducted in urban territory, densely populated areas, difficult to monitor and control by the state police and military forces;

* diversity of relationships between various non-state actors during the course of asymmetric, unconventional and hybrid actions - there are relations of cooperation and collaboration among the various non-state actors in current armed conflicts, of logistical or financial support, and sometimes when their general interests do not coincide, conflicting relations may occur.

The interdependence of the relationships between asymmetric, unconventional and hybrid actions is given by:

* the relative proximity of the strategies, tactics and means of warfare used by non-state actors in conducting the conflicts they are involved in. In the brief description of each type of action are presented the strategies, tactics and combat range means used;

* the objectives pursued by non-state actors are roughly similar; asymmetric, conventional and hybrid actions are aimed at weakening the power and influence of local and central authorities, discrediting the security and military forces, manipulating the population and sowing distrust within the government;

* all modes of action are directed against governments, local authorities, the military and security forces of the country where the armed conflict occurs, seldom asymmetrical, unconventional or hybrid actions are not aimed at military forces, government and state institutions with security responsibilities;

* the effects of asymmetric, conventional and hybrid actions are cumulative and act in the same direction and meaning. The effects pursued by any way of action, similar or not, contribute to discrediting the local and central authorities, of the military and security forces;

* the modes of action takes place around the same physical and virtual space. The asymmetric, conventional and hybrid actions, occur both in the physical, real, tangible space of densely populated settlements and in cyberspace.

Conclusions

It can be said that the future operational environment will be characterized by a constant and rapid change. The trends manifested in the economic, demographic, and climatic resources will generate at local, regional, and global level a competition of interests which, in turn, will exacerbate the tensions and extremist manifestations. The frequency of intrastate conflicts between ethnic, tribal, religious or political groups will intensify and increase, contributing to and being amplified by the fragmentation of states, transnational organized crime, competition for resources, migration and urbanization. The venues of these conflicts will vary: rural, urban, air, maritime or virtual.

From the above it can be concluded that the war is practiced in different environments and contexts and the contemporary period is marked by the increase of complexity of the method of waging it. The legal, technological, social and environmental context specific to the 21st century will contribute significantly to the increase of its complexity and will create major challenges for those engaged in the planning and conduct of operations. The states, developed and integrated into the international community, will comply with international rules on the use of new technologies, human rights and the environment, while it is possible that the poor and poorly integrated states, and some non-state actors, to violate international law, using forbidden unconventional means.

Although the security environment of the twenty-first century is particularly complex, however, some trends can be drawn regarding the armed conflictuality and warfare. In this context, it is noted the development of three main types of military action - asymmetric, unconventional and hybrid - which have complex interdependence relations. Hence: "... each war, each armed conflict has specific unrepeatable elements, which confer its own physiognomy, totally different from previous and future conflicts"31.

The adoption of such tactics by state and non-state actors as the main way to impose their own combat objectives against advanced armies represents the key characteristic of modern warfare. The access facilitated by the globalization to light weapons, as well as the information and communication technologies will increase the threat of irregular shapes of war toward which the international community will have to adopt a clear common position to provide assistance and security for the affected population.

Footnote

NOTES:

This paper was supported by the National Council for Scientific Research, CNCSUEFISCDI, by grant under project number PNII- ID-PCE-2011-3-0849.

1 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP Actor Dataset v.2.1-2012, Uppsala University, URL: http:// www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/125/125404_ucdp_prio_ armedconflict-dataset_v4_2012.xls.

2 Fred SCHREIER, Trends and Challenges in International Security: An Inventory, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Occasional Paper No. 19, 2010, URL: http://eee.dcaf. ch/publications.

3 Ibidem.

4 Ibidem.

5 Didier MOULINIER, Théorisations de la guerre à l'époque moderne et contemporaine, URL: http://nouvelles-philosophiques.blogspot.ro/2009/05/ theorisations-de-la-guerre-lepoque.html.

6 See Michel FORTMANN, "À l'Ouest rien de nouveau? Les théories sur l'avenir de la guerre au seuil du XXIe siècle", Études internationales, XXXI, no. 1, Mars 2000, pp. 57-90; VENNESSON, Pascal, "Renaissance ou obsolète? La guerre aujourd'hui", Revue française de science politique, 48 (3-4), Juin- Août, 1998, pp. 515-534.

7 Marwan BISHARA, "L'ère des conflits asymétriques", Le Monde diplomatique, Octobre 2001, pp. 20-21.

8 Richard GARON; Dany DESCHENES, Vers une nouvelle typologie des conflits?, URL: http://www.cdacdai. ca/cdai/uploads/cdai/2009/04/garon07.pdf, pp. 9-10.

9 Pascal BONIFACE, Les guerres de demain, Paris, Seuil, 2001, pp. 17-152.

10 Ibidem.

11 Thomas X. HAMMES, The Sling and the Stone. On War in the 21st Century, Zenit Press, SUA, 2006, URL: http://books.google.ro/books?id=d2Ux1lz0PUg C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false.

12 William S. LIND, Keith NIGHTENGALE, John F. SCHMITT, Joseph W. SUTTON et Gary I. WILSON, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation", Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989, pp. 22-26.

13 Eddine CHITOUR, Les guerres du XXIe siècle : Avènement d'un nouveau monde, URL: http://www. agoravox.fr/actualites/international/article/les-guerresdu- xxie-siecle-61505.

14 xxx, L'autre est- il un ennemi?, URL: http:// pedagogie.ac-montpellier.fr/hist_geo/defense/pdf/ cercle/asymetrie_defense.pdf, p. 1.

15 See Steven METZ, "La guerre asymétrique et l'avenir de l'Occident", Politique Étrangère, 1/2003, p. 30.

16 Cf. La guerre asymétrique, URL: http://www. polemia.com/article.php?id=330, p. 3.

17 Emmanuel ANTOINE, Le concept de conflit asymétrique a-t-il un sens? (I), URL: http:// alliancegeostrategique.org/2011/05/06/le-concept-deconflit- asymetrique-a-t-il-un-sens-i/, p. 1.

18 Idem, p. 2.

19 Cf. La guerre asymétrique, URL: http://www. polemia.com/article.php?id=330, p. 4.

20 xxx, L'autre est- il un ennemi?, URL: http:// pedagogie.ac-montpellier.fr/hist_geo/ defense/pdf/ cercle/asymetrie_defense.pdf, p. 1.

21 x x x, Les forces terrestres en opération: quels modes d'actions adopter face à des adversaires asymétriques?, URL: http://www.cdef.terre.defense. gouv.fr/publications/cahiers_drex/cahier_recherche/ asymetrie.pdf, p. 39.

22 Idem, p. 41.

23 Adapted after: Les forces terrestres en opération: quels modes d'actions adopter face à des adversaires asymétriques?, URL: http://www.cdef.terre.defense. gouv.fr/publications/cahiers_drex /cahier_ recherche/ asymetrie.pdf, p. 44.

24 Idem, p. 43.

25 Aymeric BONNEMAISON, Stéphane DOSSÉ, La représentation pour penser la complexité, URL: http://www.defnat.com/site_fr/pdf/TRIBUNE-150910- DOSSE-BONNEMAISON.pdf, p. 2.

26 Idem, p. 3.

27 Frank G. HOFFMAN, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges", Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 52, 1st quarter 2009, URL: http://www.smallwarsjournal. com/.../jfqhoffman.pdf, p. 4.

28 Ibidem.

29 Idem, p. 6.

30 William. J. NEMETH, Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2002) apud Frank G. HOFFMAN, op. cit., 2009, p. 6.

31 Eugen BADALAN, Teodor FRUNZETI, Asymmetry and idiosyncrasy in military actions, Bucharest, Technical and Editorial Army Center, 2004, p 23.

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