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Abstract
Russia is modernizing its nuclear arsenal. In this dissertation, I seek to answer two questions. Why is Russia modernizing its nuclear arsenal? And what factors determine which specific weapons are prioritized over others? I argue that Russian nuclear modernization is driven by security concerns. Specifically, nuclear modernization hedges against the future development of American ballistic missile defense and conventional counterforce capabilities that could erode Russia’s nuclear deterrent, which Russian leaders perceive to be the ultimate guarantor of Russian sovereignty and territorial integrity. While Russia’s perception of an American threat can explain why Russia is modernizing its nuclear arsenal, it cannot explain why it prioritizes particular systems over others, as multiple weapons systems may increase the survivability of the Russian nuclear arsenal. I argue that powerful domestic actors—including Vladimir Putin and his inner circle, the Russian military, and the defense industry—support weapons systems that are useful for advancing their political or financial interests. The weapons supported by the most powerful of these actors are the weapons Russia prioritizes. Weapons that Russian leaders believe will enhance Russia’s international status and systems that align with Russian strategic culture or otherwise meet the needs of the Russian military—including the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, Russian Navy, and Russian Air Forces—are the weapons most likely to be developed. This resulted in the prioritization of novel nuclear weapons—the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, Kinzhal hypersonic aeroballistic missile, Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle, and Tsirkon hypersonic sea-launched cruise missile—as well as weapons that Russia claims are the best at something—including the Sarmat ICBM or Tu-160M strategic bomber, which Russia claims are the longest-range ICBM and fastest bomber, respectively—as Russian leaders perceive them as useful tools for status competition.
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