Content area
Full text
Metascience (2012) 21:9194 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9549-x
BOOK REVIEW
Understanding the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction
Vera Hoffmann-Kolss: The metaphysics of extrinsic properties. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2010, 222pp, 89.00 HB
Robert Francescotti
Published online: 5 April 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties is one of the most fundamental in the eld of metaphysics, and there is no better place to learn about the difference between these two types of property than in Hoffmann-Kolss new book. Intuitively, a property P is an intrinsic property of an object x just in case xs having P does not depend on the features of xs environment, but only on what x is like in itself. Each of the various denitions of intrinsic and extrinsic offered in the contemporary literature aim to make this intuitive notion more precise. Hoffmann-Kolss divides these accounts into three main categoriesmodal, combinatorial, and relational. The rst and largest part of her book is a detailed presentation and critique of various accounts that t these three categories, culminating in her own version of the relational account that avoids problems she presents for the other analyses.
The modal accounts addressed include Lewis (1983) account of intrinsicality in terms of duplication, where an intrinsic property is characterized as one that could not possibly differ between duplicates, and the subsequent account that Lewis develops with Langton (1998), where intrinsic properties are dened as those that can be exemplied by an individual alone in the world, independent of accompaniment. Vallentynes (1997) and Yablos (1999) modal accounts are also reviewed.
Hoffman-Kolss argues that each of these modal accounts either misclassies various disjunctive properties or rests on ill-dened notions. For instance, while Lewis denes intrinsicality with the notion of a duplicate, he also recognizes that the latter notion relies on the former: x and y are duplicates if and only if they share all the same intrinsic properties. Lewis appeals to the notion of a natural property to clarify what it is to duplicate in a way that does not rely on the concept of intrinsicality. Yet, Hoffmann-Kolss notes, the account is unsatisfactory since the controversial distinction between natural and non-natural properties is not
R. Francescotti (&)
Department of Philosophy, San Diego State University, 5500 Campanile Drive, San Diego,...