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Abstract
In the recent literature on personal autonomy, especially the literature informed by feminist concerns, the intricacies of the relationship between oppression and personal autonomy remain a topic of debate. While it may be obvious that oppression diminishes autonomy in some cases, close examination calls into question exactly how this is accomplished. One common proposal suggests that, while we must be aware of external factors, in most contemporary cases, it is the internalization of oppression that threatens personal autonomy. While I agree that this is a concern, I suggest that a preoccupation with internalized oppression, and with the internal aspects of personal autonomy in general, obscures the fact that oppression may impair autonomy regardless of its degree of internalization. We must also look outside of the agent—outside of her desires, beliefs, or values; beyond her process of critical reflection, sense of self-worth, or level of normative competence—to properly evaluate the autonomy of her decisions. I propose an externalist account of oppression's diminishment of personal autonomy. I argue that personal autonomy is so closely linked to the social and political circumstances in which it is exercised that those circumstances may diminish autonomy regardless of the psychology, competencies, or skills of the agent—and conclude that full personal autonomy requires a just society.
