The Disenchantment of Hell and the Emergence of Self-Conscious Individuality: Examining Su Shi’s Philosophy of Disposition

Abstract

In pre-Song Chinese thought, the afterlife, or the subterranean realm was a sacred space distinctly separate from the world of the living, an extension of the political–religious–cultural order of the Chinese empire. Even after the introduction of Buddhism to China, although the Buddhist concept of hell applied karmic retribution to the present life in an attempt to provide ethical norms for real life, the sacredness of the afterlife remained intact. Song Dynasty Chinese thought underwent a profound “modernization” transformation. Su Shi, with the concept of qing 情 [disposition] at its core, disenchanted the sacred afterlife, shaping a new, self-conscious individuality in the interplay between the living and the dead, the finite and the infinite, the mortal and the immortal. This new individuality, with its spiritual spontaneity and freedom, integrated the afterlife with the present world, internalizing infinity and immortality into a utopian spiritual homeland. This free individuality, entirely different from Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, marking a hidden potential in the development of Chinese intellectual history that has yet to be fully revealed.

1. Introduction

This study undertakes a comprehensive inquiry into the philosophical contemplations of Su Shi 蘇軾 (1037–1101) concerning 地府 [the subterranean realm] as well as 地獄 [hell], elucidating its unique significance in Chinese intellectual history. In the context of pre-Song China, the notion of the subterranean world assumes a dualistic role in the cognitive purview of Chinese literati. It serves as both a realm of intense fear, demarcating the absolute boundaries of earthly life, and as a physical domain rich with tangible life experiences.

The notion of hell holds a profound significance within the framework of the Chinese intellectual tradition, primarily manifesting as the principle of 因果報應 [karma-phala, cause and effect], intertwined with the notion of 六道輪回 [saṃsāra, cyclic existence laden with suffering]. In the pre-Buddhist Chinese context, the operation of cause and effect within the subterranean realm was directed towards the individual self and their descendants. In cases where an individual believed in the possibility of escaping this retribution, the burden of retribution would then fall upon their descendants. With the advent of “the Buddhist conquest of China”, the Buddhist notion of hell merged with the traditional Chinese understanding of the subterranean realm. Here, cause and effect directly affected the individual self, binding them to eternal suffering for their evil. This imagery of terror came to establish ethical norms for the present life, thereby incorporating the notion of hell into the foundational fabric of traditional Chinese ethical conventions.

In an astute manner, Su Shi systematically dismantled the metaphysical substratum attributed to the subterranean domain, effecting an assimilative synthesis of insights drawn from the historical interplay between Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism. In the realm influenced by Chan Buddhism and Daoism, Su Shi embraced death as a mere illusory mirage. He perceived death as a fleeting instant within the broader horizon of human existence, as indicated by his oft-quoted phrase, 人間如夢 [life is but a dream]. Consequently, both the idea of hell and the experience of suffering are relegated to the realm of 虛妄 [illusory appearance]. Rather than succumbing to fear for potential posthumous retribution within hell’s confines, Su Shi advocated for the immediate pursuit of 覺悟 [bodhi, self-enlightenment] during one’s current lifetime. This pursuit aims to transcend the confines of finite corporeal existence, thereby facilitating the realization of the ultimate unity that binds the self and the world, leading to a metaphysical consolidation of individuality with self-consciousness.

The inherent terror, suffering, melancholy, and angst associated with the subterranean realm undergo a process of systematic disenchantment. In its place emerges a new perspective that emphasizes the validation of individual life experiences. This critical juncture, in essence, inaugurates a profound reorientation of the prevailing metaphysical Weltanschauung during the epoch of the Song Dynasty, as the recognition of individual self-consciousness becomes the central driving force of existence. As the foundation of a nova sense of individuality takes root, a fresh cosmic framework emerges—one that consciously distances itself from conventional notions of hell, ghosts and spirits.

This study further examines Su Shi’s philosophy of individuality within the intellectual–historical context of the rise of Neo-Confucianism. The latter half of the 11th century, during which Su Shi flourished, marked a pivotal era when Neo-Confucianism emerged as the dominant ideological framework of imperial China. Consequently, any analysis of Su Shi’s “philosophy” must situate his thought against this transformative intellectual backdrop. It is critical to note that Song thinkers, including even iconoclastic figures like Su Shi—who championed individual freedom—were deeply embedded in political roles. Thus, isolating a “pure philosophy” from its sociopolitical milieu proves methodologically untenable. The ascendancy of Neo-Confucianism further solidified the indivisibility of scholarly inquiry and political praxis for most literati. As Peter K. Bol has demonstrated in his analysis of late 11th-century intellectual history, Neo-Confucianism’s emergence was not an isolated doctrinal shift but rather an expression of broader socio–political–cultural–religious transformations in Song China (cf. Bol 2008, pp. 7–30). James T. C. Liu similarly underscores the intrinsic linkage between the Song intellectual focus on inwardness and moral cultivation, and the concurrent restructuring of political culture (cf. Liu 1988, pp. 37–52).

This study does not purport to examine Su Shi’s philosophy through the holistic lens of Song Chinese culture—an endeavor far exceeding the scope of a single paper. Its central objective resides in illuminating the unique character of Su Shi’s philosophical vision: his unprecedented emphasis on individuality, freedom, and spontaneity within the intellectual landscape of Song China. The qing 情 [disposition]¹-oriented philosophy of individuality he pioneered faced relentless censure from Neo-Confucian scholars and never attained mainstream status in subsequent Chinese thought. Yet we must inquire: How did such a philosophy emerge at all? This inquiry reveals that, while Su Shi indeed assimilated substantial Buddhist and Daoist conceptual resources, he did not, as Neo-Confucian critics alleged, corrupt Confucianism with heterodox doctrines. The integration of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism in Song China was not an isolated intellectual event, but rather a philosophical revolution that mirrored the broader Tang–Song transition—a systemic rebirth of Chinese cultural paradigms. Though historically marginalized, examining Su Shi’s latent potential provides new hermeneutic frameworks for re-evaluating Chinese intellectual history from the Song onward. Rather than viewing it as a monolithic Neo-Confucian narrative, this approach invites us to recognize it as a polyphonic field, where suppressed alternatives call for rediscovery.

Methodologically, this study diverges from conventional approaches. Rather than analyzing Su Shi’s early political discourses (e.g., his celun 策論 [policy memorials]) to decipher his complex relations with the New Policies debates or incipient Neo-Confucianism—a terrain extensively mapped by Peter K. Bol—we pioneer an alternative hermeneutic path (cf. Bol 1992, pp. 254–99). Historically, our textual focus centers on Su Shi’s later exile period (1079–1101), when his withdrawal from Northern Song court politics catalyzed profound meditations on fundamental philosophical questions: the individual’s ontological status, the nature of being, life–death dialectics, and subject–object relations. Systematically, we prioritize two textual corpuses: first, his purely philosophical works like ontological discussions on xing 性 [nature], ming 命 [cosmic destiny], and qing 情 [dispositions] in Dongpo Yizhuan 東坡易傳 [Collected Commentaries on the Zhouyi]; second, his literary creations during the exile that crystallize individualized dispositional consciousness, particularly poetry where philosophical insights permeate through aesthetic forms. Political “death” paradoxically engendered new existential horizons for Su Shi, enabling trans-temporal contemplations of being—an observation prefigured not by modern scholarship but by Qin Guan 秦觀, one of the “Four Academicians of the Su School”, who astutely noted:

The Way of Su lies foremost in the profound realization of one’s innate nature and cosmic destiny, attaining self-enlightenment. Next manifests in the magnanimity to shoulder weighty duties and the foresight to navigate distant horizons. As for his policy discourses and essays, these are but the most elementary instruments through which he engaged with worldly affairs.

蘇氏之道，最深於性命自得之際，其次則器足以任重，識足以致遠，至於議論文章，乃其與世周旋至粗者也。

(Qin 2000, p. 981)

As Qin Guan insightfully observed, the most authentic passage into Su Shi’s intellectual universe lies not through the labyrinth of political texts, but through direct immersion in his extra-political writings where his liberated consciousness surges in torrents of self-realization through apprehending innate nature and existential destiny. This constitutes the epistemological bedrock of our methodological framework.

2. The Notion of Afterlife in the Pre-Song Chinese Intellectual Context

Although the term diyu 地獄, commonly translated as hell in English, is a specialized term that emerged in the Chinese lexicon following the introduction of Buddhism to China, the concept of an underworld, or difu 地府, had already been present in traditional Chinese thought prior to the arrival of Buddhism during the Han dynasty. The Chinese imagination of the “posthumous world” had undergone a complex and protracted evolution well before this period.

Prior to the Han dynasty, it was believed that the living and the deceased inhabited entirely separate realms. Upon death, it was thought that the soul of a mortal would descend to the Yellow Springs beneath the earth. The synonym for “death” in Chinese, qushi 去世, literally signifies a permanent departure from the world of the living. During this era, the Chinese conception of the afterlife was imbued with a sense of sacredness. The posthumous world was seen as a mirror image of the world of the living, with a sacred order spanning both realms. Ge Zhaoguang has pointed out that the deceased were believed to continue their existence in the subterranean realm, governed by the Tufu 土府 [Earth Prefecture] and its overseer, the Tubo 土伯 [Earth Elder]. The dead still yearned for the guidance of a sacred force to ascend from the Yellow Springs and Earth Prefecture to the celestial sphere (Ge 1994, p. 38). Yu Ying-shih has provided a more nuanced analysis of the Chinese concepts of hun 魂 [soul] and po 魄 [soul-vigor] during the early Qin and Han periods. The hun was thought to connect with heaven, while the po was associated with the earth. After death, the deceased would descend to the Earth Prefecture, and only by becoming an immortal could the hun ascend to heaven, transforming into an eternal and ageless deity (Yu 2004, pp. 18–21). Walter Liebenthal, drawing on resources from the 禮記·郊特牲 [Book of Rites-Jiao Te Sheng], which was compiled during the Western Han period, has noted that the traditional Chinese conception of the posthumous world is grounded in the theoretical foundations of Chinese natural philosophy. This is characterized by a view of spiritual beings based on the concepts of hun and po.

All creatures must die; dying they return to earth. (The part returning to earth) is called their kuei 鬼 (or po 魄). Bones and fleshes are buried below; they disappear and become jungle and fields. The Breath (chi 氣) of the creatures rises and shows; it shines above, (therefore it is called) ming 明. A smelling vapor (appears) sickening (the mourners) at heart. This is the essence of the (dead) creature. In it shen 神 (or hun 魂) manifests itself.

(Liebenthal 1952, p. 333)

It is evident that, from this period onwards, Chinese thought had already developed an imaginative conception of the order of the afterlife. During the Han Dynasty, a system of the afterlife centered on Taishan 泰山 [Mount Tai] gradually emerged in China. Upon death, people’s souls no longer descended to the earth prefecture but instead returned to Mount Tai, which had its own “political-theological” order. The hierarchical order of seniority and social status that existed during one’s lifetime continued in the afterlife on Mount Tai. After the rise of Daoism in the Eastern Han Dynasty, particularly through the spiritual world constructed by the Taiping Dao 太平道 in the Taiping Jing 太平經, this concept was most prominently embodied. In a recent study, Feng Yujie pointed out that the spiritual world of the Taiping Dao, much like the Han Empire’s institutions, drew ideological resources from Han Dynasty politics and coalesced into a form of religious utopian practice (Feng 2024, pp. 192–98). By the Han Dynasty, this conception of order had become increasingly reinforced, ultimately transforming the afterlife into a political–theological religious utopian imagination.

In summary, prior to the introduction of Buddhism to China, traditional Chinese thought had already developed a systematic imagination of the afterlife. The conceptualization of the posthumous world during this period was characterized by a strong interweaving of natural philosophical order and political–theological order. The afterlife was not only the absolute boundary of the world of the living but was also governed by the order of tian 天 [Heaven], much like the world of the living. Consequently, in a certain sense, the posthumous world became a continuation and variation of the world of the living, evolving into a political–religious utopian imagination. This, in turn, provided a form of ethical norm for earthly life.

Following the “Buddhist Conquest of China” (cf. Zürcher 2007, pp. 288–320), the concept of hell derived from Buddhist teachings began to proliferate widely. As Pu Wenqi summarized, “The Buddhist conception of hell, gradually disseminated during the Six Dynasties, had become deeply ingrained in the populace by the Tang Dynasty and increasingly exhibited tendencies of localization” (Pu 2021, p. 12). In the earlier described pre-Buddhist imagination of the afterlife rooted in original Confucian–Daoist thought, although the worlds of the living and the dead were distinctly bifurcated, they were interconnected through the orders of natural philosophy and political theology. There existed a spiritual bond between deceased ancestors and their living descendants, anchored in such orders. The Buddhist conception of hell, however, was markedly different. Its doctrines of karmic retribution and the cycle of the six paths of rebirth directly impacted the living, and no living being could escape the effects of karma. The Buddhist view of hell transformed the sacred spiritual link between the living and the dead into a constraining force (Verbindllichkeit) acting upon the living themselves. Hell was not merely a replica of human society but became the criterion for judging the good and evil deeds of individuals during their lifetimes, thus constituting the ultimate source of human morality and ethics. The karmic retribution emphasized in the concept of hell was not some transcendent sacred order; over centuries of popular dissemination, it gradually shed its meanings of natural philosophy and political theology, becoming a simple self-relation acting upon the individual. This transformation implies two significant threads in intellectual history: the disintegration of the sacred order of the traditional Chinese empire and the consequent awakening of a “new” individual consciousness.

Attitudes towards the afterlife, as well as the subterranean realm, and views on the issue of life and death most vividly reflect this newly sprouted individual consciousness pondering the foundation of its own existence. The most concentrated manifestation of this “modernization” process is the significant transformation of Buddhism and its concept of hell during the Tang and Song dynasties. Under the influence of folk dissemination and the dual impact of Confucianism and Daoism, Buddhism began its historical process of Sinicization, specifically embodied in the “victory of Chan Buddhism and the failure of (orthodox) Buddhism” (Ge 2018, p. 35).

the aim of Buddhism is salvation for the souls of all human beings. What it is concerned with is not only metaphysical issues, question about the legal system of society or people’s basic needs for food, housing and so on. It is rather concerned with questions of ultimate significance that have an effect on both human life and the transcendence of that life. From the beginning, Buddhism held out a vision of a brilliant and everlasting ultimate realm that it called the realm of the Buddha-nature. Its intention was nothing less than to lead the faithful to escape from their actual, transitory, wretched world full of suffering. Ultimately, Buddhism also presented its believers with an ordinary and effortless realm that could only be actualized in their minds. It came to regard the world of everyday life as the ultimate realm of religion, the character and dispositions that all human beings have (human nature), as the much sought after Buddha-nature, and people’s ordinary state of mind as a sacred mental realm. At that, Buddhism finally completed its transformation from an Indian religion to Chinese Chan Buddhism.

(Ge 2018, p. 60)

Ge Zhaoguang points out that an important marker of the rise of Chan Buddhism is the “secularization” of Buddhism itself, or, more strictly speaking, its “de-metaphysicalization”. Throughout the centuries of Buddhist propagation from the Eastern Han to the Tang and Song dynasties, neither Chinese literati nor ordinary adherents showed much interest in the profound doctrines of Buddhism. The Buddhist advocacy of using self-nature to eliminate distractions and achieve a state of emptiness transcending the present world was also not compatible with the Chinese literati class, long nurtured by Confucianism. What Chinese literati valued was finding a path of cultivation from the self-concern or self-caring promoted by Buddhism, thereby elevating the individual’s spiritual realm. Consequently, the intellectual resources of Buddhism penetrated Chinese aesthetics and speculative thought, forging a highly unique “metaphysics without metaphysics”.

Such a “de-metaphysicalization” of Buddhism inevitably accompanied the disenchantment of the Buddhist idea of hell. The disenchantment extends not only to the concept of hell but also to the entire sacred order behind it. As Peter K. Bol observes, “but the turn away from heaven, the patterns of cosmic process as the ultimate grounds for moral life, also made for a more uncertain world, where normative models were at best provisional and the intentions of the sages were a matter of interpretation” (Bol 1992, p. 2). What was presented to China in the Song Dynasty was a world of uncertainty and contingency. How could this uncertainty as well as contingency be overcome? The common response from Song intellectuals (especially Neo-Confucian scholars) was to restore the order, whereas Su Shi’s answer was to take the opposite approach. In the next section of this paper, we will focus on examining the political, social, and cultural background of Song Dynasty thought, as well as Su Shi’s attempt to construct a completely new philosophy of individuality.

3. Su Shi’s Spiritual Odyssey

The Chinese intellectual history during the Tang–Song transition underwent profound transformations. As noted by scholars (cf. Bol 1992; Liu 1988), Song thought exhibited a distinct ethos markedly different from that of the Tang, while Tang literati eclectically drew from multiple ancient cultural traditions, their Song counterparts resolved to “turn inward”, seeking to reconstruct—or more precisely, to innovatively construct under the guise of ancient sages—a unified cultural framework. Song Neo-Confucianism epitomized this tendency. Neo-Confucian thinkers, whom James T. C. Liu termed “transcendental moralists”, asserted the primacy of inner moral life over practical political or social engagement, advocating introspection to establish a new moral foundation (cf. Liu 1988, p. 135).

While this study does not focus on this broader intellectual trend, it is critical to contextualize the Song imperial court and literati’s shared predicament: they confronted a landscape of comprehensive reconstruction. The political–social–religious–cultural order inherited from the medieval era had collapsed entirely following the chaos of the late Tang and Five Dynasties. Song China demanded all things “new”, with the foremost task being the formulation of a new ideological system. Yet, this imperative also meant that, once such a system coalesced, it would permeate the fabric of the nascent society with unparalleled ubiquity.

It is in this sense that this paper invites readers to pay attention to Su Shi’s philosophical innovation. Following the political restructuring of the early Northern Song, the politics of the 11th century Song Dynasty became increasingly mired in intense factional struggles, where conflicts in political ideologies were often inseparable from factional rivalries. Neo-Confucian scholars gradually established influence within the imperial court, and their moral teachings became a political reality.²

Although Su Shi was born into a distinguished scholarly family and had a promising start to his official career in his youth, he did not become a staunch defender of Confucian orthodoxy. Of course, like the Neo-Confucians, he believed that the intellectual landscape of the Song Dynasty should undergo a revitalization. However, unlike the Neo-Confucians, Su Shi did not advocate for the integration of politics and scholarship. He had no interest in this overarching political–academic system, nor did he believe that the meaning of life was solely found in the pursuit of the “Dao”. For Su Shi, the primary intellectual mission was to reconstruct a sound individuality—a being with the capacity for “disposition”, capable of achieving inner spiritual freedom and spontaneity. Only when such an individual perceives the ontological significance of their own existence does further political or moral discourse become meaningful. This can be glimpsed in Su Shi’s attitude toward the deceased. His views on life and death most clearly reflect how this newly emerging individual consciousness engages with the foundational questions of its own existence.

In his famous ci lyric 江城子·乙卯正月二十日夜記夢 [Jiangchengzi: Written on the Night of the Twentieth Day of the First Month, Yimao Year (1075), to Record a Dream], written in mourning for his late wife, Su Shi expressed his longing for his wife who passed away prematurely.

For ten years the living of the dead knows nought. Should the dead be forgot, and to mind never brought? Her lonely grave is a thousand miles away. To whom can I my grief convey? Revived e’en if she be, could she still know me? My face is worn with care, and frosted is my hair.

Last night I dreamed of coming to my native place: At the window with grace, she’s making up her face. We gazed at each other hushed, but tears from our eyes gushed. When I am woken, I fancy her heart-broken, where only the moon shines, on the mound clad with short pines.

十年生死兩茫茫，不思量，自難忘。千裏孤墳，無處話淒涼。縱使相逢應不識，塵滿面，鬢如霜。

夜來幽夢忽還鄉，小軒窗，正梳妝。相顧無言，惟有淚千行。料得年年腸斷處，明月夜，短松岡。

(Su 2016, p. 141; 2007, pp. 98–99)

Unlike conventional elegiac poetry, Su Shi paints a picture of solitude and desolation in the first stanza, seemingly inheriting the Han Dynasty’s understanding of the eternal separation between the human world and the afterlife. From Su Shi’s verses, we can also discern the terror and despair embodied in the Buddhist concept of hell. If the poem had stopped there, it would not have differed much from previous elegiac works. The key lies in the second stanza, where Su Shi shifts to depict a reunion with his deceased wife in their hometown through a dream. There are no words, only endless longing and an outpouring of boundless disposition.

Su Shi’s dream reunion with his deceased wife is devoid of eeriness, instead presenting a tender reconfiguration of quotidian marital intimacy: the husband gazes upon his wife as she applies makeup, their boundless affection and longing crystallized within this confined vignette. Though the chasm between life and death irrevocably separates them, the surging dispositional resonance transcends this boundary, transmuting into a wellspring of spiritual sustenance that anchors Su Shi’s waking existence. As Stephen Owen points out: “the more he [Su Shi] tries to assert distance, the more persuasively he conveys a depth of feeling” (cf. Owen 2019, p. 216).

In the concluding line, Su Shi employs the imagery of the “bright moon”—a symbol that resonates with his renowned ci lyric Shuidiao Getou 水調歌頭 [Prelude to the Water Melody], where the line “May we live long and share the beauty of the moon together, though a thousand miles apart” 但願人長久，千里共嬋娟 evokes both reunion and separation, longing and remembrance (cf. Su 2007, p. 105). Here, the “bright moon” also embodies Su Shi’s boundless yearning for his departed wife. As for “the short pine-covered mound”, it signifies not merely the decade since her passing, during which pines have grown over her tomb, but also the brevity of their shared bond. The word “short” (duan 短) captures the Su Shi’s grief over his beloved’s untimely death and the ephemerality of their cherished dreams.

Through the articulation of qing 情 [dispositions], Su Shi accomplished a demystification of the afterlife, reframing individual disposition as the affective nexus bridging the realms of the living and the deceased. This transfiguration dissolves the ontological dichotomy between these spheres, recasting them as interdependent dimensions for the existential self-cultivation of the individual spirit.³

It is also noteworthy to consider the historical context of this poem: Su Shi wrote it in 1075, during a time when he was deeply embroiled in the factional strife between the old and new parties of the Shenzong 神宗 court, and his political career was obstructed. Yet, in this poem, Su Shi makes no mention of his own circumstances; his longing for his late wife transcends the limitations of time and space, breaking through the political situation of the moment, and thus this disposition is free and spontaneous. This disposition even transcends the boundary between the worlds of the living and the dead through the medium of a dream. Through qing as such, Su Shi achieves a kind of timeless eternity. Supported by this eternal “disposition”, the world inhabited by the deceased is no longer terrifying and despairing, but filled with intense disposition and longing, which then flows into the life of this world. Through the individual’s “disposition”, Su Shi dissolves the terror and transcendence of the afterlife, transforming it into a part that connects with this world’s life through dreams.

In the face of the deceased, Su Shi transcends the boundary between life and death with “disposition”, achieving a disenchantment of the traditional concept of the afterlife. In the face of the living, Su Shi repositions the individual’s foothold in this world through the dialectic between finitude and infinity: neither submitting to infinity nor being confined by finitude, the individual attains an intrinsic leap in self-possession, thereby realizing true spiritual freedom.

In Su Shi’s timeless masterpiece 赤壁賦 [First Ode to the Red Cliff], he exemplifies this reflection vividly:

The guest said, “‘The moon is bright, the stars are sparse, the crows and magpies fly south.’ Is this not the poem of Cao Mengde? Looking west to Xiakou, and east to Wuchang, where the mountains and rivers intertwine, lush and verdant, is this not where Mengde was trapped by Zhou Lang? When he conquered Jingzhou, took Jiangling, and sailed east with the current, his fleet stretched for a thousand miles, banners blotting out the sky, he poured wine by the river, wielded his spear, and composed poetry. Truly, he was a hero of his age, but where is he now? Moreover, you and I, fishing and gathering firewood on the river islets, befriending fish and shrimp, and companions to deer; we sail a small boat, raising our gourd cups to toast each other. We are like mayflies in the vastness of heaven and earth, a tiny grain in the immense sea, lamenting the brevity of our lives, envious of the endless flow of the Yangtze River. We wish to roam with flying immortals, to embrace the bright moon and live forever. Knowing that this cannot be quickly attained, we entrust our lingering echoes to the sorrowful wind”.

Su Shi replied, “Do you also understand the nature of water and the moon? What passes away is like this, yet it never truly departs; what waxes and wanes is like that, yet it never truly diminishes. If we observe from the perspective of change, then heaven and earth cannot last even a moment; if we observe from the perspective of constancy, then all things and I are infinite, so what is there to envy? Moreover, between heaven and earth, everything has its owner. If it is not mine, I will not take even a hair. Only the clear breeze on the river and the bright moon among the mountains, which we hear as sounds and see as colors, are inexhaustible treasures of creation, and you and I can enjoy them together”.

客曰：“‘月明星稀，烏鵲南飛’，此非曹孟德之詩乎？西望夏口，東望武昌，山川相繆，鬱乎蒼蒼，此非孟德之困於周郎者乎？方其破荊州，下江陵，順流而東也，舳艫千裏，旌旗蔽空，釃酒臨江，橫槊賦詩，固一世之雄也，而今安在哉？況吾與子，漁樵於江渚之上，侶魚蝦而友麋鹿；駕一葉之扁舟，舉匏樽以相屬。寄蜉蝣於天地，渺滄海之一粟，哀吾生之須臾，羨長江之無窮。挾飛仙以遨遊，抱眀月而長終。知不可乎驟得，托遺響於悲風。

蘇子曰：“客亦知夫水與月乎？逝者如斯，而未嘗往也；盈虛者如彼，而卒莫消長也，蓋將自其變者而觀之，則天地曾不能以一瞬；自其不變者而觀之，則物與我皆無盡也，而又何羨乎？且夫天地之間，物各有主，苟非吾之所有，雖一毫而莫取。惟江上之清風，與山間之明月，耳得之而為聲，目遇之而成色，取之無禁，用之不竭，是造物者之無盡藏也，而吾與子之所共適。”

(Su 1986, pp. 5–6)

In this ode, Su Shi and his guest boat along the river, passing by the ancient battlefield of the Red Cliff from the Three Kingdoms era. The guest, moved by the heroic deeds of the Three Kingdoms that have been eroded by time, laments how finite and insignificant humans are in the face of the eternity of the universe and the rivers. The guest’s sentiments reflect the conventional Chinese thought on finitude and infinity: the recognition of one’s own finitude and mortality in the face of true infinity and immortality, and the consequent awe for the infinite and immortal, is precisely the foundation of the traditional Chinese view of order (whether philosophical, religious, or political).

Su Shi’s attitude, however, is quite the opposite: he believes that both the individual and nature are in constant flux and thus immortal (cf. Cheang 1998, p. 152). Everything has its owner, and one only needs to cultivate oneself and enjoy the eternal treasures of the creator to attain eternal freedom. This is the first time Su Shi explicitly proposes that any worldly individual has ontological significance and should care for and protect their own spiritual freedom. In comparison with the infinite and the immortal, the finite individual does not obliterate themselves but rather highlights the significance of their own existence. In the history of Chinese thought, Su Shi is the first literati to clearly articulate the metaphysical value of individuality. Through this individual-based, timeless spiritual freedom, Su Shi disenchants all worlds that were once sacred (with the afterlife being the foremost) and thereby constructs the ontological significance of the individual.

It is even more noteworthy that Su Shi’s circumstances at the time of writing this piece (1082) were far worse than when he composed the poem mourning his late wife. Su Shi had been arrested and imprisoned due to the 烏臺詩案 [Wutai Poetry Case], narrowly escaping death, and was subsequently exiled to Huangzhou黃州, after a fortunate pardon. However, Su Shi’s spirit remained entirely unaffected by these political events. Perhaps it was precisely through the trials of this world that Su Shi turned to the pursuit of inner spirituality, thereby establishing the ontological value of the individual.

In the ci lyric 念奴嬌·赤壁懷古 [Niannujiao: Chibi Nostalgia] written in the same year, Su Shi laments his own unfulfilled circumstances by eulogizing the heroes of the Three Kingdoms era (the very ones his guest grieved for).

Should their souls revisit this land, sentimental, his bride would laugh to say: Younger than they, I have my hair turned grey. Life is but like a dream. O Moon, I drink to you who have seen them on the stream.

故國神遊，多情應笑我，早生華髮。人間如夢，一尊還酹江月。

(Su 2016, pp. 398–99; 2007, pp. 166–67)

At this point, no intermediary of dreams is necessary; Su Shi directly achieves a spiritual convergence with the heroes of the Three Kingdoms period. The afterlife is no longer a place of terror but a space for dialogue with the great souls of the past. Su Shi faces the souls of the eternal heroes with duoqing 多情 [vast disposition]. Therefore, the phrase 人間如夢 [life is but like a dream] is by no means a nihilistic attitude towards life; rather, it is an enlightened and serene perspective gained from insight into the finitude of this world. With the reference of eternal heroes, Su Shi, through qing 情 [disposition], achieves an “awakening” to this world, thereby firmly grounding his own individuality.

Qing becomes the means through which xing 性 [innate nature] realizes itself; in terms reminiscent of Kant, qing functions as the “transcendental condition” of xing. This suggests that Su Shi regards qing as an ontological principle inseparable from xing. Su Shi’s philosophical inquiry into the foundational role of qing unfolds within the broader intellectual history during the Tang–Song transition. These discussions can be traced back to the Guwen Yundong 古文運動 [Ancient Prose Movement] of the mid-Tang period (9th century).

In the 9th century, literati represented by Han Yu 韓愈 (768–824) advocated for a literary revolution. This movement was not merely a reform of literary form—rejecting pianwen 駢文 [the parallel prose] style that had been popular since the Wei and Jin periods in favor of sanwen 散文 [the classical prose] style of the Qin and Han dynasties—but also a call for authors to infuse their texts with greater personal dispositions, stylistic individuality, and even political convictions. Literature, under the banner of “restoring innate nature”, effectively became a medium for the expression of individuality. In this context, the philosophical significance of qing became increasingly prominent. For the reformist scholars of the mid-Tang period, qing was an indispensable manifestation of xing. Han Yu himself, in his Yuan Xing 原性 [Philosophical Reflections on Xing], placed considerable emphasis on the role of qing:

Innate nature is that which is born with life. Dispositions are those which arise in response to external things.

性也者，與生俱生也。情也者，接於物而生也。

(Han 2010, p. 47)

For Han Yu, qing is the activity of xing triggered by external objects and can therefore be regarded as an expression of xing. His follower, Li Ao 李翱 (772–841), further argued in his Fu Xing Shu 复性书 [Treatise on the Restoration of Xing] (802) that xing and qing constitute an inseparable whole: qing arises from xing, while xing is realized through qing.

Xing and qing are not mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, without xing, qing would have no source. Thus, qing arises from xing—qing does not exist by itself but is made possible by xing; likewise, xing does not exist in isolation but is illuminated through qing.

性與情不相無也。雖然，無性則情無所生矣。是情由性而生，情不自情，因性而情，性不自性，由情以明。

(Li 2021, p. 13)

Both Han Yu’s and Li Ao’s positions can be seen as responses by Tang-dynasty literati to the flourishing Buddhist thought of their time. The holistic ontology formed by xing and qing stands in opposition to the Buddhist notion of zixing 自性 [svabhāva, intrinsic nature]. For the reformist scholars of the mid-Tang period, xing gains meaning only through its expression in qing. Thus, qing is not merely contingent or derivative; rather, it is ontologically fundamental. The qing of the individual already embodies the ontological significance of individuality itself.

Han Yu’s position had a profound influence on Su Shi two centuries later. The qing that Su Shi pursued was not merely the transient emotions of an individual in the present moment but rather a subject–object unity that transcends time and space. In 1092, when Su Shi composed an epitaph for Han Yu, he praised Han Yu’s philosophy for embodying the ontological significance of individuality:

[Han Yu’s] writings revived the literary decline of the past eight dynasties, and his Dao rescued the world from its state of confusion. His loyalty defied the ruler’s wrath, and his courage surpassed that of the commanders of armies. Is he not one who partakes in the workings of Heaven and Earth, stands at the juncture of rise and decline, and remains vast and enduring in solitude?

文起八代之衰，而道濟天下之溺，忠犯人主之怒，而勇奪三軍之帥。豈非參天地，關盛衰，浩然而獨存者乎？

(Su 1986, p. 509)

Thus, Su Shi not only inherited the Tang literati’s advocacy for a return to ancient literary forms in a literal sense but also revitalized this tradition in a deeper, more innovative way. Although expressions such as “life is but a dream” may suggest Buddhist influences, Su Shi did not fully embrace Buddhist doctrines. Unlike the Tang reformist literati, who explicitly opposed Buddhism and Daoism while advocating Confucianism, Su Shi was not overtly critical of these traditions. However, as evident in the epitaph he composed for Han Yu, he deeply affirmed Han Yu’s vision of individual self-realization and self-cultivation. His philosophy of individuality can still be situated within Confucian intellectual history. Yet, like Han Yu, Su Shi was a politically marginalized figure. Unlike later Neo-Confucian scholars, who sought to integrate politics and scholarship into a unified system, Su Shi’s political thought remained highly concealed, particularly during his periods of exile. Rather than formulating an overt political ideology, he articulated his vision of politics primarily through the full realization of the ontological significance of the individual. He integrated the innate nature and dispositions, reinterpreting them as the free expression of the inner spirit, a process of self-realization and self-cultivation.⁴

As Yang Zhiyi has pointed out, the poetry and prose Su Shi wrote under the political disillusionment reflect a kind of “return to an inner utopia”. “His journey of no-return into the ever-farther south was transformed into a journey of returning ‘home’—that is, an inner realm of spontaneity” (Yang 2015, p. 121). Su Shi’s pursuit of inner spiritual freedom throughout his unfulfilled life represents a pinnacle moment in the Chinese intellectual history, comparable to the great journey of Odysseus’s return home. Through Su Shi, the cultural spirit of China completed its own Odyssey, undergoing a transformation that integrated the resources of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism within Chinese thought, thereby laying the philosophical foundation for the individuality of the “proto-modern” era.⁵

4. Disposition Against Principle: Ways of Parting Between Su Shi’s and Neo-Confucianism

As previously established, the reconstruction of political–socio–religious order in Song China necessitated the gradual ascendancy of Neo-Confucianism, which transcended mere metaphysics to become a synthesized doctrine integrating metaphysical inquiry, ethical norms, political doctrines, and even quotidian behavioral codes. This transformation reflected a broader recalibration of political logic in Song China.

However, Su Shi was undoubtedly an anomaly in Song thought. Su Shi, whose intellectual ethos celebrated spontaneity and existential authenticity, inherently stood at odds with Neo-Confucian orthodoxy. Beyond factional politics, their philosophical divergence was foundational. Su Shi championed an ontological stance oriented in qing 情 [disposition], positing that the cultivation of idealized personality relied on the uninhibited expression of human freedom and innate spontaneity. In contrast, his critics—notably Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107) and Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), the latter being Cheng’s intellectual heir and a systematizer of Southern Song Neo-Confucianism—insisted on the absolute identity of Heaven and humanity, as well as the hierarchical subordination of renxin 人心 [the human mind] to daoxin 道心 [the mind of the Way]. This conflict crystallized in their opposing valuations of qing. Cheng Yi, declaring xing ji li ye 性即理也 [human nature is identical with cosmic principle] (Cheng and Cheng 1981, p. 292), relegated qing 情 [dispositions] to a derivative and contingent manifestation of xing 性 [innate nature], thus denying its ontological primacy, a stance later codified by Zhu Xi’s doctrine of li yi fen shu 理一分殊 [the unity of principle and its manifold manifestations] (cf. Zhu 1986, p. 2521). Zhu Xi’s articulation inherits directly from Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1077), a foundational Northern Song Neo-Confucian whose cosmological framework laid the groundwork for later lixue 理學 [School of Principle] syntheses.). Su Shi, however, argued for the inseparability of xing 性 [innate nature], ming 命 [cosmic destiny], and qing 情 [dispositions], asserting that only through the full realization of one’s authentic disposition could individuals achieve existential coherence.

Qing (concrete dispositions) arises as the dynamic manifestation of xing (inherent nature). Ascending to its primordial source, it reaches ming (cosmic destiny); descending through its particularized expressions, it manifests as qing—all are integral dimensions of xing. Between xing and qing lies no dichotomy of good and evil; when the undifferentiated nature disperses into active particularization, we denominate it qing. Ming and xing admit no division between heavenly principle and human reality; at the point of their unified actualization beyond subjective selfhood, we apprehend it as ming.

情者，性之動也，泝而上，至於命；沿而下，至於情，無非性者。性之與情，非有善惡之別也，方其散而有為，則謂之情耳。命之與性，非有天人之辯也，至其一而無我，則謂之命耳。

(Su 1989, p. 5)

This, however, does not imply that Su Shi entirely denied the existence of a transcendent “Dao” or an ultimate ontological ground. He acknowledged the reality of li 理 [cosmic principle] as an absolute and unified foundation, yet insisted that finite human individuals possess no capacity to fully comprehend or master it. Consequently, any attempt to grasp the ultimate li through individual cognition is inherently futile. Instead, Su Shi advocated for a self-adjusting posture in navigating the relationship between Heaven and humanity—that is, between infinity and finitude. By embracing their inherent limitations, individuals paradoxically attain boundless freedom to navigate the infinite, thereby fully actualizing their latent potential within the cosmic order. Su Shi’s cosmological position, as articulated in his Dongpo Yizhuan (1097), asserts

The principles underlying all things are inherently unified, yet this unity cannot be rigidly grasped. To comprehend this inherent oneness without clinging to it is to approach the Way.

天下之理未嘗不一，而一不可執。知其未嘗不一而莫之執，則幾矣。

(Su 1989, p. 122)

It thus becomes evident that Su Shi advocated for an intimate apprehension of the Way through individual agency—achieved via free cultivation and self-adaption. Rather than positing a rigid hierarchy of subordination between the self and cosmic Dao, he conceived their relationship as a fluid interplay of dynamic equilibrium, a state he termed “attaining the essential dispositions of all things”.

What humans trust are their hands, feet, eyes, and ears. Eyes discern quantity; hands gauge weight. Yet none measure by hand or calculate by sight alone—they inevitably resort to calibrated standards and precise measures. Does this not mean we forsake self-reliance to trust external tools? Only by transcending subjective intentions and ego may one comprehend the essential dispositions of all things.

人之所信者，手足耳目也。目識多寡，手知重輕。然人未有以手量而目計者，必付之於度量與權衡。豈不自信而信物，蓋以為無意無我，然後得萬物之情。

(Su 1986, p. 562)

This stance stands in stark contrast to the rigid hierarchical order of the cosmic Dao espoused by Neo-Confucianism. Zhu Xi explicitly invoked Cheng Yi’s dictum—zaitian yueming, zairen yuexing 在天曰命，在人曰性 [in the cosmic order, it is designated as cosmic destiny; in human beings, it is designated as innate nature]—to legitimize this stratified relationship between heaven and humanity (cf. Zhu 1986, p. 2430). Such philosophical divergence ultimately manifested in their political visions: Su Shi championed an individuality realized not through adherence to political rationality, but through aesthetic engagement with the natural world. For Neo-Confucians, however, individual significance was contingent upon integration into the political framework, wherein qing required calibration—if not correction—by social norms.

This systematic philosophical divergence ultimately permeated their respective approaches to existential questions of life and death. The sacredness of the afterlife during the Qin and Han dynasties was due to the concentration of political, religious, and cultural authority in the person of the emperor. The Qin and Han empires possessed a political–theological character, and thus their political, religious, and cultural orders were imbued with sacredness. Since the Wei and Jin dynasties, with the collapse of political authority, the religious and cultural orders also disintegrated. The afterlife gradually transformed from a continuation of the sacred order into a mere ethical doctrine within the Buddhist concept of hell. Therefore, the primary task of Song Dynasty literati was to “restore the sacred order”, to reconstruct a truth doctrine based on a universal principle, and to revive the trinity of political–religious–cultural order, which is also the intellectual historical foundation for the emergence of Song Dynasty Neo-Confucianism and Daoism (cf. Ge 2018, pp. 96–104). This also explains why Song Dynasty Neo-Confucianism opposed the doctrine of individuality. Song Dynasty Neo-Confucianism also denied the transcendence and sacredness of the afterlife. As Daniel Gardner pointed out, Neo-Confucian scholars represented by Zhu Xi denied the independence of the spirit world, believing that so-called spirits were nothing but different manifestations of li 理 [principle] (cf. Gardner 1995, pp. 598–611). Under the domination of this absolute monistic view, the afterlife and the underworld were not disenchanted but were completely obliterated by such “absolute identity”.

Su Shi had a feud with the Cheng brothers, and his memorial to the throne always detested the deceit of Cheng Yi, which is why the Song–Ming Neo-Confucian tradition habitually negated Su Shi. For instance, Zhu Xi often told his disciples that “the teachings of the Su family corrupt the mind and morality, and should be especially banned in schools” (cf. Luo 1983, p. 33). Su Shi’s philosophical reflections have always been outside the purview of Neo-Confucianism, and Neo-Confucian scholars often directly regarded the individuality advocated by Su Shi as a corrupt form of individuality. For example, the Ming Dynasty Confucian scholar Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 once vehemently criticized Su Shi’s concept of disposition as a corrupt doctrine.

The Su brothers augmented their discourse with the breadth of miscellaneous records and adorned it with the talent of clever wisdom, drifting among the six arts and indulging in heterodox teachings. They advocated a doctrine saying, “Following our nature is the Way; indulging our dispositions is our nature”. They drew in Qin Guan and Li Zhi, young men of unscrupulous conduct, as their followers, and mixed in the seemingly profound but ultimately shallow talk of Buddhists and Daoists as their conversational aids. With seductive youths on the left and wandering courtesans on the right, they ran wild beneath the flowers and the moon. They superficially interpreted the profound meanings of the “Great Changes” (the I Ching) and skimmed the surface of the “Analects”, using the shadows and traces of human nature and the one-sided aspects of governance to justify their indulgence in wine, lust, and the pleasures of idle wandering and feasting.

軾兄弟益之以氾記之博，飾之以巧慧之才，浮游於六藝，沉湎於異端，倡為之說曰：”率吾性，即道也；任吾情，即性也。”引秦觀、李廌無行之少年為之羽翼，雜浮屠黃冠近似之卮言為之談助；左妖童，右遊妓，倡狂於花月之下。而測大易之旨，掠論語之膚，以性命之影跡，治道之偏端，文其耽酒嗜色、佚遊宴樂之私。

(Wang 1964, p. 227)

But just as Socrates was once accused of corrupting the youth of Athens, Su Shi’s so-called “corruption” precisely contains something entirely new within traditional Chinese thought. As mentioned above, what Su Shi used to break through the stark boundary between the worlds of the living and the dead was precisely the disposition he harbored. This approach diverges significantly from the Song Confucians, especially the Neo-Confucian tradition. Through disposition, the individual penetrates the absolute boundaries between the living and the dead, the finite and the infinite, the mortal and the immortal, and further internalizes the otherworldly realm into a spiritual homeland of this world, becoming the driving force for the spiritual pursuit of self-building individuality. Through disposition, individuality gains clear self-consciousness and spiritual freedom. Such an individual is inevitably unwilling to submit to the domination of this “absolute identity”.

However, this does not mean, as some scholars suggest, that Su Shi’s philosophy became a form of “naturalism” in opposition to Neo-Confucianism (cf. Fan 2009). Su Shi’s idea of “attaining the disposition of all things” or the unity of self and the world does not imply the dissolution of the individual; rather, on the contrary, it is through the ongoing self-adjustment and self-cultivation in relation to the realm between heaven and humanity that the individual can establish their ontological significance. While Su Shi often found himself in opposition to Neo-Confucian scholars, they shared a common pursuit in exploring the ontological meaning of individuality. As Peter K. Bol and Yang Zhiyi have pointed out, Su Shi’s philosophy of individuality does not imply an isolated individual, but rather an “organic” individuality that establishes a “dialectical” relationship between heaven and humanity, infinity and finitude, the self and the world, the whole and the individual (cf. Bol 1992, p. 254; Yang 2015, pp. 193–201).

However, the individuality that Su Shi pursued was not equivalent to the Chan Buddhist notions of zixing 自性 [svabhāva, intrinsic nature] or emptiness 空; rather, it was a concrete, self-cultivating spiritual activity. Although Su Shi, having endured multiple exiles, appeared to maintain a certain detachment from political realities and seemed inclined toward the Chan ideal of transcendence from worldly affairs, chushi 出世, his philosophy of disposition remained aligned with the intellectual spirit inherited from Han Yu. He advocated an active engagement with the world, rushi 入世 as a path to self-realization.⁶ As Su Shi expressed in a poem written during his late exile in Huizhou 惠州 (1094–1097), his ideal personality was a synthesis of the Chan Master Huineng 六祖慧能and Han Yu.

In my past life, I was indeed a practitioner like Lu Xingzhe (Huineng); now, in this life, my disciples call me Han Tuizhi (Han Yu).

前生自是盧行者，後學過呼韓退之。

(Su 1982, p. 2151)

In Su Shi’s view, there is no need to reconstruct a transcendent absolute truth as the Neo-Confucians did. As Chan Buddhism often says, 莫向外求 [Do not seek outside], the state of clarity achieved through the fulfillment and freedom of the individual’s innate nature is the new life that grows from the corpse of the collapsed sacred order of the old Chinese empire.

5. Conclusions

Overall, this paper explores Su Shi’s novel approach to the afterlife and the philosophy of individuality he developed in response, proposing a new thesis distinct from previous research: Su Shi’s philosophy of individuality is a utopian spiritual doctrine based on “disposition” as its ontological foundation, embodying a new possibility in Chinese intellectual history that has not been fully explored. The second section examines the evolution and disenchantment of the concept of the afterlife in pre-Song Chinese thought and the impact of the systematic political, religious, and cultural transformation of the Song Dynasty on this concept. The third section, set against Su Shi’s political and academic background, investigates how Su Shi creatively transformed and disenfranchised the idea of the afterlife in his poetry and prose during a period of political frustration, highlighting his construction of an individuality that seeks inner spiritual freedom. The fourth section situates Su Shi’s philosophy of individuality within the intellectual context of the rise of Neo-Confucianism in the Song Dynasty, revealing through an examination of Su Shi’s complex relationship with Neo-Confucian scholars (and, by extension, their political stances) the final conclusion of this paper: Su Shi’s philosophy of individuality, grounded in “disposition”, allows the individual to achieve inner spiritual freedom and spontaneity through “disposition”, traversing the realm between heaven and humanity, internalizing infinity into a utopian spiritual homeland, thereby achieving self-adjustment and self-cultivation—thereby articulating a “proto-modern” individuality unparalleled within the Chinese intellectual tradition. The formation of this individuality represents a new possibility for understanding Chinese intellectual history since the Song Dynasty, beyond the Neo-Confucian tradition.

Martin Heidegger once described the existential condition of the modern Being-in-the-world as “being-toward-death” (cf. Heidegger 1962, p. 277). In contrast, Su Shi’s concept of individuality based on disposition goes a step further: the self-conscious individual is “living-with-death”. Death is no longer terror, despair, or the end of life; death is an indispensable part of life. The individual’s attitude towards death is no longer one of angst, but of equanimity 達觀 and composure 從容, of 多情 [vast disposition]. The individual attains immortality and fulfillment through the encounter with death.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, S.X. and Y.N.; methodology, S.X. and Y.N.; investigation, S.X. and Y.N.; writing—original draft preparation, S.X. and Y.N.; writing—review and editing, Y.N.; project administration, Y.N. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Footnotes

Notes

1. The concept of qing 情 in Chinese philosophy carries multiple meanings. In English, qing is often translated as emotion, affection, desire, or even “the genuine in us”. However, in the context of Su Shi’s philosophy, this paper renders qing as “disposition” to highlight the underlying spiritual activity of self-realization and self-cultivation that is central to Su Shi’s interpretation. For discussions of this concept within the broader Chinese philosophical tradition, see: (Graham 1990, pp. 59–65; Bruya 2001, pp. 151–76; Egan 1994, pp. 197–206).

2. Peter Bol points out that the reform of the imperial examination system in the Song Dynasty brought about a significant shift in the composition of the scholar-official class compared to the Tang Dynasty. While Tang Dynasty scholars still valued aristocratic backgrounds, the reform of the Song imperial examination system enabled a large number of middle-class local families to participate in imperial politics. (Of course, behind this lies the broader socio-economic transformation from the Tang to the Song). This change led to three key outcomes: the politicization of learning, the continuous undermining of the ideological foundation of empire, and the imposition of an ideological program on government. See (Bol 2008, pp. 7–44).

3. Stephen Owen observes that prior to Su Shi, almost no one had used the ci form for elegiac poetry, as ci were typically performed in social settings and served a primarily social function. Su Shi, however, disregarded this conventional constraint, expressing his dispositions through ci. This demonstrates Su Shi’s commitment to an disposition-centered (qing-based) poetic stance. See: (Owen 2019, p. 217).

4. For discussions on the intellectual connections between Su Shi and the literati of the Tang dynasty, see: (Wang 2025).

5. The term “modern” used here is a highly contentious expression. In what sense can Song China be considered “modern”? This is closely tied to the famous “modernization question”. The political reforms, urbanization, development of a commodity economy, civil service examination system reforms, and class mobility in the Song dynasty all marked the emergence of a societal structure that resembles “modern” society. For example, Peter Bol points out that the key to the “modernization” of the Song dynasty lies in the “localist turn” and the formation of local political and social systems brought about by the Tang–Song transition. However, this paper does not engage with “modern” from such a grand perspective. Instead, its aim is to excavate the potential of Chinese intellectual history through Su Shi’s philosophical concern with individuality, pointing out that Su Shi’s emphasis on individuality and self-consciousness reached a level comparable to the early modern European philosophy five centuries later. Of course, this philosophical shift was closely linked to the broader social transformation of the Song dynasty. For discussions on the emergence of the concept of individuality and self-consciousness in modern European philosophy, see: (Thiel 2014, pp. 5–30). For discussions on the “modernization question” and the “localist turn” in Song China, see: (Bol 2003, pp. 1–50).

6. The intellectual relationship between Su Shi and Chan Buddhism is highly complex. Due to the limitations of the topic and scope of this paper, only a brief discussion can be offered. For related studies, see: (Zhang 2018).

Footnotes

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