Content area
Abstract
How do a people experience their country’s foreign policy statements? This thesis explores the projection of publicly stated foreign policy and how it is constructed by the media. The existing research literature rarely covers in any depth this fundamental aspect of modern foreign policy. That said, analysing the relationships between governments, media, and peoples in a comparative context offers essential insights into the way these connections work. Choosing Britain and America, both liberal democracies facing similar challenges in the international landscape, provides the lens to explore the intricate processes of policy projection.
The approach of this thesis falls within the methodological ambit of International History with its emphasis on insights gained from comparative studies and its liking for ‘borderlands’ and suggestive conclusions. The thesis has two parts. Part 1 is thematic and contextual in approach. It explores three determinants - national political structures and belief systems, the importance of the personal assumptions of policy makers, and role of the media - looking at foreign policy between 1929 and 1938 for illustrative material. Part 2, using the years 1939, 1940 and 1941, examines how these three determinants buttressed government and public reactions to the expanding war. The voices in this thesis are the human voices of the players of the time not the voices of later historical judgement. They are found in speeches, diaries, letters, and commentary in the media.
These are the broad questions asked of the research: How resistant were underlying beliefs and assumptions - the determinants of Part 1 - to the stresses of wartime events? How deliberate were policy makers in organising statements for the media? Did public reaction influence policy? The analysis shows the strong persistence of established structures and assumptions as the context for the projection of wartime foreign policy in both countries. It shows media commentators consciously adjusting to perceptions of their own country’s national needs and constraints as they reported the war. As far as changing stated foreign policy, the reception in the media seemed only to influence timing and strategies for implementation as events unfolded rather than policy itself.
Details
