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Keywords Equal opportunities, Philosophy, Economics
Abstract Perceiving discrimination and unequal treatment as a problem implies an underlying value of human equality. Argues that such prescriptive equality is more powerful and more persuasive to the extent that it is built on a presumption of descriptive human equality. Explores the philosophical prerequisites -for holding the presumption of actual equality. In the last part, surveys critically the general stance of economics regarding an affirmation of descriptive equality.
Introduction
Equality of treatment is an important issue in a social economy, and so is the social value of equality. Most of us agree that discrimination is a serious social problem that needs to be addressed and, if possible, eliminated. Such normative attitude also colors the very definition of economic discrimination; the Encyclopedic Dictionary of Economics, for example, tells us that "economic discrimination occurs in a market where individuals face terms of trade that are determined by personal characteristics that do not appear to be directly relevant to the transaction" (Cole, 1991), and further specifies that "most concern has centered on differential treatment by race, ethnic group or sex" (Cole, 1991). In asking why considerations of race, gender, ethnic group or age are to be deemed irrelevant, one soon detects an underlying value judgment of human equality and the norm of non-discriminatory treatment for the economy and elsewhere.
Economists, usually preoccupied with efficiency and liberty, have not spent much time in discussing the philosophy of human equality. To the extent that they have, the thinking seems to have focused almost exclusively on the idea of prescriptive equality, i.e. making people more equal in terms of welfare, access to resources and, more recently, equalizing individual capacities to achieve a certain level of functioning (Sen, 1992). More often than not, equality is treated as instrumentally valuable in fighting poverty and destitution, and as necessary to self-respect, collaboration, solidarity and community. All this notwithstanding, discrimination, legally understood as "a failure to treat all persons equally where no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored" (Black, 1979, p. 420), supposes first and foremost a general presumption of equal treatment of persons.
The goal of equal treatment of people manifests a deep-seated and widespread belief grounded in the popular...