Tussen-Menslike Verhoudings by Levinas En Marcel

Abstract

Hierdie studie is daarop gemik om 'n ondersoek van tussen-menslike verhoudings te maak. Dit word gedoen by wyse van 'n ontginning van die filosofie van Emmanuel Levinas en Gabriel Marcel. Die onderskeie gesigspunte wat hierdie twee denkers op die onderwerp bied en evaluerings van hulle ooreenkomste en verskille word aangebied teen die agtergrond van die debat oor die verhouding tussen ontologie en etiek. Hierdie werkswyse laat ook nadenke oor die gepaste filosofiese benaderings tot die onderwerp toe.

Levinas ontwikkel sy filosofie veral in gesprek met Heidegger. Hy probeer om aan te toon dat die Heideggeriaanse ontologie noodwendig daartoe lei dat die totale werklikheid in die synsverstanende projek van die selfgeinkorporeer word, en dat die partikuliere, voor-verstaande syndes en die andersheid van die ander daardeur geweld aangedoen word. Levinas stel dan 'n ander perspektief op die self voor. Die self is 'n oomblik van bemeestering van die vloei van Wees. Die aaneenryging van sulke oomblikke konstitueer die bestaan van die selfop sy eie, van die selfwat verkeer onder die las daarvan om homselfte wees. Vanuit hierdie perspektief kan die selfin interaksie met die andersheid van werklikheid probeer tree. In die dood tref die self 'n volkome andersheid aan wat nie deurleefkan word nie. In die dinge kom die selfandersheid tee wat nie opgewasse is teen die vermoe van die selfom dit wat anders is in die self(de) tuis te maak nie. Dit is in kontak met ander mense dat die self die andersheid van die ander, die pluraliteit van die werklikheid, kan ontmoet. Dit gebeur in eros en ouerskap, maar ook in die konfrontasie met die gelaat van die ander. Laasgenoemde is 'n konfrontasie met die talige teenwoordigheid van die ander wat die vermoens van die selfvoorafgaan en 'n onbeperkte etiese appel tot die selfrig. Die etiese appel ondervang aIle vorme van taal en optrede.

Marcel se nadenke gaan uit van die misterie van my eie lyflike bestaan: my eksistensie gaan my denke vooraf. Deur my lyflike eksistensie geniet ek onmiddellike deelname aan die wereld en aan verhoudings met mense. Die spontane, eerste manier waarop denke hierdie deelname probeer ontgin laat nie reg daaraan geskied nie, omdat dit objektiverend werk; dit hanteer deelnarne as probleem wat opgelos moet word. Bywyse van 'n tweede refleksie kan die deelnarne (gedeeltelik) herwin word, as misterie hanteer word. Paradigmaties vir die hantering vanmisteries is die ek-jy-verhouding, Marcel stel die deelname aan verhoudings voor as iets wat mank gaan aan die objektiverende denke wat ander mense tot hulle eienskappe en funksies degradeer. Eintlik is verhoudings 'n misterie wat gelyktydig 'n appel tot verdere deelname en beskikbaarheid inhou. Die deelname aan verhoudings is agtergrond vir In lewe wat as beproewing geleef word.

Die twee denkers bedink tussen-menslike verhoudings vanuit metafisika's wat tred hou met kontemporere kritiek teen metafisika. Hulle neem wel standpunt in vir 'n gemkarneerde subjek wat die oord van etiese verantwoordelikheid is. Hierdie subjek is wel deur en tot voordeel van die ander gedesentreer. In pas met hierdie verstaan word moraliteit en politiek bedink as terreine waar menslike interaksie radikaal, eties, op die bestaan van die selfinspeel.

Alternate abstract:

This study is aimed at making an inquiry into interpersonal relations. This is done by means of exploring the philosophies of Emmanuel Levinas and Gabriel Marcel. The respective perspectives that are presented by these two philosophers as well as evaluations of their similarities and differences are presented against the background ofthe debate on the relation between ontology and ethics. This approach makes it furthermore possible to reflect on the suitable philosophical approach to the theme.

Levinas develops his philosophy especially in conversation with Heidegger. He attempts to demonstrate that the Heideggerian ontology necessarily leads to the incorporation ofthe whole ofreality into the project ofthe selfofunderstanding Being, and it also leads to violence against the particular, pre-reflexive beings and against the otherness ofthe other. Levinas then proposes a perspective on the self. The selfis an instant of mastering the flux ofBeing. The linking of such instants constitutes the existence ofthe selfon his own, ofthe selfthat is submitted to the weight ofbeing himself. From this perspective the selfcan try to interact with the other. In death the selfis confronted by an otherness that cannot be endured. In the things the self encounters otherness that is not strong enough to withstand the possibility ofthe selfto incorporate the other into the sameness ofhimself. It is in contact with other people that the selfhas a true encounter with the otherness of the other and with the plurality of reality. This happens in eros and parenthood, but also in confrontation with the face ofthe other. The latteris a confrontation with the linguistic presence ofthe other that precedes the possibilities ofthe self, and that makes an unlimited ethical appeal to the self. The ethical appeal underlies all forms of language and action.

Marcel's thought starts off at the mystery of my own bodily existence: my existence precedes my thought. By means ofmy bodily existence I enjoy the immediate participation of the world and of relations with people. The spontaneous, first way of contemplating the participation doesn't do justice to it because of its objectivating functioning; it approaches participation as a problem that should be solved. By means ofa second reflection participation can be recovered (to a certain extent), it can be approached as a mystery. Paradigmatic ofthe approach of mysteries is the I-you relation. Marcel portrays participation of relations as something that is damaged by the objectivating thought that degrades people to their qualities and functions. In reality relations are mysteries that entail an appeal to further participation and availability. Participation ofrelations forms the background ofa life that is lived as a test.

The two philosophers conceive ofinterpersonal relations by means ofmetaphysics that take fully account of contemporary criticism against metaphysics. They take a stand for an incarnated subject that is the domain ofethical responsibility. This subject, though, is decentered by and to the advantage ofthe other. In tune with this understanding, morality and politics are conceived of as areas of human interaction that work on the subject radically and ethically.