A Temporal Metaphysics for Affective Attitudes

This thesis endeavours to achieve two things: first, it exposits a version of presentism, the doctrine that only present concrete entities exist, that is enriched with haecceities, the non- qualitative, essential properties of entities that characterise their essences. I argue that haecceity presentism provides strong responses to problematics traditionally faced by presentism (providing ontology for singular propositions, truthmaking, and cross-temporal relations and causation) without violating any of presentism’s strictures. I also distinguish my version of haecceity presentism from other versions, and argue my version is the strongest. Second, I deploy haecceities to mount novel lines of attack on critical elements of the B- theory: eternalism, perdurance, and stage theory. These attacks say that each of these tenseless theories of time and persistence cannot adequately rationalise and vindicate the importance of emotions in our lives, and how they contribute to crucially important projects such as rehabilitation. Further, these tenseless theories generate critical problems with some of our moral practices, such as blame, as well as generating radically alienating consequences for it. Consequently, tenseless theorists should either acknowledge the importance of emotions and reject their theories, or be honest and transparent in accepting that they cannot rationalise or vindicate emotions.