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Abstract
This dissertation examines the relationship between deceptive and near-deceptive rhetorical structures (such as secrets, lies, and fiction) and the process of individuation in Rousseau's autobiographical works. Individuation starts as a realization of the separation that exists between the mind of a subject and the minds of other social agents. This cognitive ability is called separation of consciousness: it is the belief that our own mind and inner-self are not readily available to others. The opposite of this belief is the illusion of transparency. In Rousseau's texts, deception is often impelled by separation of consciousness, which is a fundamental step in the process of formation of the self. The ability to deceive depends on how well a person can realize the separation of consciousness and also how well one can manipulate symbolic representations.
Chapter One and Two analyze individuation grounded in the principle of transparency and the way in which Rousseau's autobiographical project conveys a new idea of individuation based on the notions of separation and difference. Chapter Three describes in detail the different situations in Rousseau's self-referential texts in which self-individuation does or does not take place. Chapter Four brings together two perspectives — the social and cognitive phenomenon of self-individuation and the issues of representation — in order to expose how self-individuation relates to the abilities to keep secrets, lie, and fictionalize oneself. This dissertation studies the relationship between deception and self-individuation in works that were among the first self-referential texts to actualize this link: Rousseau's autobiographical texts, primarily Les Confessions (1764-1770), Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques (1772-1775), and Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire (1776-1778).
