Ownership structure,perks and enterprise performance:empirical evidence from chinese listed companies

Translation from original language as provided by author

The principal-agent and incentive problem of the listed company executives has been a hot issue of corporate governance research.According to the principal-agent theory, shareholders and managers have different utility function,so it will inevitably leads to many inconsistencies in their interests.Perks is the most common behavior.In consideration of their own interests, managers often misappropriate company interests.In recent years,with the continuous improvement of China's listed company information disclosure system,the on-the-job consumption problems of managers has become the focus topic of social public and triggers the scholars' attention.Besides, the relationship between perks and corporate performance also has been one of the important propositions in corporate governance research.At the same time, along with the non-tradable share reform in China,the shareholding structure arrangement of enterprise changes a lot.So in China where state-owned economy still plays a leading role,from the angle of the ownership structure arrangement,it is of realistic significance to study the impact of ownership structure factors on the relationship between perks and enterprise performance. Based on the related theory and previous studies as the guide,this article further explored perks and corporate performance.What's more,from the ownership structure factors for study angle,we discussed the influence of the factors such as proprietary nature,the concentration of ownership structure and share ownership's balance degree on the relationship between perks and corporate performance.In the study,with the help of listed companies' data from 2007 to 2009 and combining empirical method,we launched a probe and the inspection of related issues. In the research,we found there is a significantly negative correlation between perks and enterprise performance.Compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the state-owned enterprise executives' perks will make more serious and negative impact on enterprise performance.What's more,we found the higher the ownership concentration is,the weaker negative effect will be.However, the higher the ownership balance ratio is,the more serious negative effect will be.The research on these issues will have great significance to study the influence factors of perks and its economic consequences.At the same time, this study provides some empirical evidence to reasonable equity structure arrangement,optimization of corporate governance and the restraint to management agency