THE EVOLUTION OF WARFARE FROM CLASSIC TO HYBRID ACTIONS

Abstract

In the classic sense, war meant a number of military campaigns in which at least two parties consisting of large masses of people and fighting equipment were in opposition on issues of sovereignty, territory, resources and power and clashed directly in order to impose will or a certain behavior by force. After the Peace of Westphalia, warfare has passed through several stages of evolution and now we witnesses 4th generation and even 5th generation warfare. The Revolution in Military Affairs has generated new forms of combat, new weapon systems and equipment, new military techniques and technologies and requires a permanent revaluation of military doctrines and operational concepts. Although war tended towards a non-violent confrontation, characterized by high-tech and information, between two or more entities in order to meet economic interests, the emergence of hybrid war put back on the agenda the territorial defense and classic action combined with unconventional means and techniques which have a strong psychological impact on the public opinion.

Headnote

In the classic sense, war meant a number of military campaigns in which at least two parties consisting of large masses of people and fighting equipment were in opposition on issues of sovereignty, territory, resources and power and clashed directly in order to impose will or a certain behavior by force. After the Peace of Westphalia, warfare has passed through several stages of evolution and now we witnesses 4th generation and even 5th generation warfare.

The Revolution in Military Affairs has generated new forms of combat, new weapon systems and equipment, new military techniques and technologies and requires a permanent revaluation of military doctrines and operational concepts.

Although war tended towards a non-violent confrontation, characterized by high-tech and information, between two or more entities in order to meet economic interests, the emergence of hybrid war put back on the agenda the territorial defense and classic action combined with unconventional means and techniques which have a strong psychological impact on the public opinion.

Keywords: generation of warfare, Revolution in Military Affairs, doctrine, hybrid threat, hybrid war.

1. Generations of Warfare - Short History

The concept of the generation of warfare was introduced and defined in 1989 by US military specialists1. Since the Peace of Westphalia there occurred five generations of warfare and now we witness the peak of the 4th generation warfare and the beginning of the 5th generation warfare.

In addition to classic fighting actions, usually waged by states, the specific war of the XXIst Century brings more strongly in the light the asymmetrical, unconventional and hybrid actions, usually waged by non-state actors.

After the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the knowledge and conduct of war phenomenon has passed from mass manpower (1stGW) to concentration of firepower (2ndGW), to maneuver warfare (3rdGW), to insurgency and terrorism (4thGW)2 and, more recently, to non-contact warfare (5thGW).

First Generation Warfare (1stGW)

The 1stGW refers to the early stages of the organized war with armed forces under state control3and is defined in terms of "mass warfare" or "line and column warfare". 1stGW peaked in 1914-1918 during the First World War.

The main characteristics of this type of warfare are:

* battles are fought by organized military forces of nation states;

* numerous forces are disposed in fighting lines and columns;

* in the last stage of 1stGW, fighting tools evolved from poor military technology and individual weapons such as sword and shield, bow and arrows, spear and eventually musket to bayonets, hand grenades, machine guns, cannons and artillery.

Second Generation Warfare (2ndGW)

The 2ndGW is defined in terms of "trench warfare" or "linear fire and movement warfare" and corresponds to the industrial age. The 2ndGW developed until the period of the Second World War.

The main characteristics of this type of warfare are:

* battles continue to be fought by organized military forces of nation states;

* war increasingly rely on firepower and maneuver, on coordinated operations of indirect fire to support the advance of the battle lines, and on cavalry maneuvers;

* armored vehicles and airplanes are developing, restating rapid actions in the theater and requiring the motion warfare.

Third Generation Warfare (3rdGW)

The 3rdGW is defined in terms of "maneuver warfare" continuing philosophy of blitzkrieg from the Second World War. The 3rdGW developed until the period of the wars in Korea and Vietnam.

The main characteristics of this type of warfare are:

* battles continue to be fought by organized military forces of nation states;

* sea, land and air maneuverability becomes more sophisticated, due to mechanization and new technological capabilities for maneuver: in the maritime environment - ships; in the land environment - tanks, trucks, jeeps, etc.; in the air environment - airplanes, helicopters, jets etc.;

* doctrine evolves to the new tactics such as attacking enemy from the back by bypassing the front line.

Fourth Generation Warfare (4thGW)

The 4thGW is defined in terms of "insurgency warfare", "asymmetric warfare" or even "unconventional warfare" and corresponds to the era of information and high technologies. The most important features of this type of warfare are:

* the decreasing involvement of the nation states and the emergence of non-state actors implies for the first time that a belligerent does not necessarily comprises organized military forces of a state;

* armies become professionalized and eliminate the conscription;

* using of asymmetric tactics, techniques and procedures on long periods of time in order to reduce superiority and strengths of the opponent so that he cannot defeat using traditional or conventional methods and techniques (increasing low-intensity conflicts, insurgency and use of terrorist tactics);

* influencing decision makers in order to change their political attitude to own advantage and destruction of fighting spirit and morale of adverse troops.

Specialists consider that some concepts of the 4thGW may be encountered in the 30s during the civil war in China. The essence of the strategy applied by Mao Zedong was to avoid military engagement while the balance of forces was unfavorable and choose those forms of military actions leading to the erosion of adverse troops. According to some experts4, the 4thGW is the only kind of warfare in which a major power was defeated: the United States in the Vietnam War and the Soviet Union in the Afghanistan campaign.

Fifth Generation Warfare (5thGW)

Currently, we speak about the 5thGW, what nuances the specific problems of previous generation warfare. In 2007, Thomas X. Hammes forecasts that political, economic and social trends will result in emergence of very strong leaders in small groups coagulating rather to a cause than a nation. In this context, 5thGW will be characterized by the growth of small entities and the expansion of bio-technology.

The 5thGW still lacks a clear definition, but referring to terms such as unrestricted warfare, compound warfare or irregular warfare.

Unrestricted warfare is a type of war in which one part uses all means available - means which involve or not forces and weapons, means which involve or not military power, means which involve or not victims - in order to compel the opponent to serve certain interests5.

Compound warfare is the simultaneous use of a regular or main force and an irregular or guerrilla force against an enemy. In other words, the military leverage is increased by applying both conventional and unconventional force at the same time6.

Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. This type of war favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will7. Such modern wars imply the emergence of powerful individuals or groups who have access to latest knowledge, technology and resources to conduct asymmetrical and hybrid actions to promote their own interests.

According to specialists8, the most important features of 5thGW are:

* it is a war against non-state actors, where the mass and "center of gravity" that can be hit are vanishing;

* it is an extension of asymmetrical and insurgent warfare, whereby the enemy uses all means - both conventional and unconventional military tactics and weapons;

* it includes political, religious and social causes;

* implies spontaneous and anonymous attacks from terrorists against random targets (civilians and military personnel) in order to create confusion and fear;

* it incorporates nonlethal actions as global strategic information operations campaigns (through the Internet and 24 hours news cycle);

* it can be conducted by organized or unorganized groups;

* it may be nation state led or non-state state led - to disrupt or defeat opponents superiority in order to achieve their own interests.

This concept is not yet fully developed, but it is obvious that it is a product of new technology, of the contemporary stage of the revolution in military affairs.

2. The Current Revolution in Military Affairs

Thomas J. Welch, Deputy Director of the US Office for the Network Evaluation, opined that "history proves that, from time to time, technological innovation leads to new military organizations, using new operational concepts. We need to study these periods. Operational and organizational changes in the past have led to more effective military capabilities..."9.

The American concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) appeared in a strategic context marked by a double revolution, the informatics and globalization. "Joint Vision 2010"10, prepared under the direction of John M. Shalikashvili, emphasizes that total domination over the entire range of military operations of potential enemies will be carried out through four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics.

By using more advanced technologies and less weapons desired effects can be reached much faster and easier, but the fact that physical presence of troops and weapons remains a prerequisite for military success is not to be ignored.

The technological revolution emerged a few years ago by high-precision weapons, intelligent munitions, powerful explosives, space programs is consolidate today by the openings generated by computers in collecting and transmitting data and information, communications, nano-technology, bio-technology, energy sources and energy management, new materials and advanced manufacturing techniques, sensors and networks, etc. There is no human activity that is not influenced by these openings underused yet. Thus, there was given the opportunity of combining lethal military products, usually subject to restrictions in non-military environments, with high technologies, which are easily accessible.

The high-tech content and nature of future wars will increase, taking into account the development of high technology, especially information technology and its widespread application in the military field as follows.

* New forms of struggle - future armed conflicts will include new forms of military action such as information warfare, the prevalence of air attacks and a significant increase in strikes carried out by air and ground drones, missile defense and more sophisticated forms of electronic warfare with a solid cyber component.

* Development of weapons systems and other equipment - the focus will be on developing intelligent digital equipment with new technologies, long-range capabilities and high precision strikes.

* Structural organization - the trend is towards joint and combined forces, diversified in terms of capabilities, supple, flexible, rapidly deployable and low in numerical terms. In the command and control field, we will see widespread application of C4I and C4ISR systems keeping administrative levels to a minimum with improved efficiency in decision-making and information.

* Combat support - there will be a greater emphasis on the use of modern digitized technical means in order to provide an accurate, rapid, qualitative and timeliness support of combat troops.

In our opinion, the development of information technology is the catalyst of the current RMA, because information superiority gives significant competitive advantages. Information warfare and information operations have become a crucial element of military and non-military conflicts. The future conflicts will be to fight for information, with information and against hostile information systems while own systems are protected.

The addition of specific information technology in current RMA enables networking and integration of all systems (weapons, sensors, command and control), in essence the informational integration of war means. RMA becomes a revolution in warfare if the informational integration implies changing the balance between attack and defense, maneuver and fire, space and time11.

RMA is based on the development of military equipment and technology, which accelerated in the last decade. This emerging revolution is closely linked to general social changes, especially information and technology. Military capabilities turns because the main trends of evolution in different areas: awareness and connectivity, coverage and strength, precision and miniaturization, speed and undetectability, automation and simulation. The transition to future war will be based on four strategic oppositions: between anti-access capabilities or zonal interdiction and new forms of forces projection; between hide and detection technologies; between invisible attack capabilities and air defense missiles; between informational/biological attack and defense12. Thereby, the threat of anti-access strategy will strongly increase in the next twenty years, the ability to identify enemy forces will develop leading to new hiding techniques, the information warfare capabilities will become more valuable because of increasing importance of information infrastructures, and the progress in molecular biology will foster offensive, not defensive. Finally, the advances in quantum technology could generate major changes in information processing and encryption or use of sensors.

Two and a half decades ago, the US military experts13 identified four areas of the new war tendencies that still retain their topicality and continue to be developed and refined.

* Long-range precision strike is the ability to locate important and/or mobile targets, to destroy them and to carry out the operation on time and with minimal losses. Such systems based on precision strike still appeared in the 70s and continues to develop rapidly.

* Dominant maneuver refers to the positioning of forces - combined with precision strike, space warfare and information warfare - in order to attack decisively, to defeat the "center of gravity" of the enemy (command, organization, resources, transportation, etc.) and to achieve the campaign or war objectives.

* Information warfare is defined as another area of the new war, concerning the imposition of political will by creating an impenetrable, active and offensive information system, able to ensure an ongoing information dominance14 and involves gathering tactical information, ensuring the validity of information, using of propaganda and disinformation to demoralize or manipulate the enemy and the public, undermining the quality of information of the adverse party and preventing gather information by it. Data collection systems - such as reconnaissance systems and early warning satellites -, various (un)piloted air systems and other modern systems provide a large amount of data that can be sorted and channeled to advanced information dissemination. Information warfare goes beyond the line between conventional and unconventional, taking into account that troops, tanks, airplanes, submarines, missiles and other conventional weapons are replaced with digital binary code resulting a digitization of battlefield.

* Space warfare is about the military importance of the space in the context of space systems integration in military operations. The utility of space systems for communications is well known, but their use for surveillance, reconnaissance and real-time strike is more recent. Also, these systems provide accurate navigation and supply of meteorological data. In the future space transport systems, anti-satellite weapons, defensive missiles and even space systems for land attack could play a leading role in conduct the military operations.

Therefore, the landmarks of the current RMA are: observation (ability to detect accurately, in real time, of everything happening in theater by satellites and terrestrial radars), firepower (guided and cruise missiles, drones, ballistic systems), protection (anti-aircraft and antimissile weapons, cyber defense), C3 - command, control, communications (facilitating cooperation and exchange at all levels and in real time of the information required for the conduct of fight).

It is not difficult to conclude that these means makes the military and non-military actions can be conducted simultaneously, without direct contact between opponents.

However, most experts agree that only technological innovation is insufficient to trigger a real revolution in military affairs. Along with the development of military technology, the revaluation of doctrines and operational concept is also required.

3. Hybrid Warfare between Doctrine and Revolution in Military Affairs

Carl von Clausewitz believes that every age has its own type of war, its own limitations and perceptions15 and, therefore, the conflicts and wars for each era should be analyzed in terms of its features.

The current RMA aimed mainly three aspects: technological (integration of new information technologies in existing weapon systems and integration of C4ISR); doctrinal and operational (experimentation of technology and implementation of its effects in concepts, theories, and actions); organizational (forces deployment, joint and multinational interoperability, civilmilitary integration, mobility, modularity, decentralization, etc.). The synergy of these elements defines a new manner of conduct of war, ensuring the originator a considerable advantage over its potential enemies.

Changes tend to occur both in the manner of war conduct and the means with which it is worn. The manner of conduct relates to issues such as: who participates, what doctrine is used, what type of campaign and under what strategic concept. The features of war is changing as composition of military is changing, because there are significant differences between a tribal force, local or territorial militia, regular army, mercenaries, guerrilla force, regular forces without insignia, terrorist network or a strong leader. Each one conducts war in a different manner. A regular force which has to deal with guerilla actions will have difficulties that they wouldn't have if they faced a regular army. All this issues produce changes in the general characteristics of war.

Although it is not yet fully accepted by military planners because it is a non-doctrinal term, hybrid warfare best reflects these changes given that state and non-state actors engaged in this form of conflict exploit all modes - conventional, irregular, terrorist, disruptive, or criminal - to destabilize an existing order16. As we can see in Figure no. 2, this type of warfare involves the combination and use of multiple conventional and unconventional tools which are specific to latest generations of war (4thGW and 5thGW).

Supporters of the hybrid warfare concept are using the term to describe the area where regular warfare and irregular warfare intersect and combine, creating a new form of war17. The specific components, tactics, techniques and procedures of both sides of the war converge on a new kind of threat, the hybrid one. According to Hofmann, hybrid threats may incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts, including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder18.

Opponents believe that this type of war is not new, but its tools are more sophisticated and destructive, requiring a response of the same nature. Experts, like Huber, Murray and Knox19 consider that hybrid warfare is nothing else but a manifestation of a type of conflict that occurred periodically in history, the only differences being that it does not require two distinct forces, one of military action because it combines conventional warfare with the irregular warfare and cyber warfare. Moreover, hybrid warfare is a combination of symmetrical and asymmetrical war in which intervening forces conduct traditional military operations against enemy military forces and targets while they must simultaneously - and more decisively - attempt to achieve control of the combat zone's indigenous populations by securing and stabilizing them (stability operations)21. Therefore, hybrid actions will be a simultaneously mixture of all types of war (conventional, asymmetric, terrorist) and corresponding tactics22.

We believe that it is important to consider conventional and unconventional, and does not imply20two types of war, regular and irregular, but an effective combination of tactics specific to both types of war.

Hybrid warfare is the most obvious example for the impossibility to clearly delimit the conventional dimension by unconventional if hybrid warfare can be mentioned in the 4th or 5th generation warfare. Through various tactics, techniques and procedures that could be used, as can be seen in Figure no. 2, we could say that it is a 4th generation warfare. But this statement can be misleading, since the 4th generation warfare is a return to warfare before nation-states existed23, when the various religious, cultural and racial entities concentrate on promoting a persuasive message, rather than on destroying the material power of their enemy. In other words, 4thGW practitioners choose targets with a moral and psychological impact on the political will of their enemies in order to induce them to give up their strategic objectives. In contrast, hybrid warfare means a convergence of categories, a blurring of neat distinctions between conventional and irregular, combat actions and nation-building, terrorism and sabotages24. Moreover, state and non-state actors who share the same strategic interests can undertake hybrid actions and a war against them will become extremely complex and difficult to solve.

Another issue is that the hybrid warfare is a result of current Revolution in Military Affairs. As demonstrated in his paper25, Thomas Bjerregaard believes that the tactics used by Hezbollah in the Lebanon war (2006) are compatible with hybrid warfare, but have little to do with RMA. The fighting carried near protected civilian infrastructure, such as churches, hospitals and schools, unable Israelis to unlimited use of power. This way of denying the enemy which is advantaged by capacity to adapt tactically is not new and is not a result of RMA. Rather, it is a natural asymmetric response of the weakest which seeks and uses any tactics to counter the firepower of a more powerful force. Fighting principles of Hezbollah showed a remarkable awareness of the limits of their capabilities and weaknesses of Israeli force, ensuring that any crimes or human rights violations will be perceived as a result of Israeli actions. We can say that the Hezbollah doctrine is based on specific theories and lessons learned specific to guerilla warfare and irregular warfare.

Hezbollah disturbed the balance of power through the establishment of small tactical units, equipped with modern missile systems capable of coping with threats by land, air and water. However, none of the weapons systems used by this Islamist organization was new, the novelty being that Hezbollah had never carried them before. Although it is specific to hybrid warfare to some extent, the introduction of new weapon systems, which change the balance of power or deny one party the benefit from past conflicts, it is not sufficient to say that hybrid warfare is a result of RMA.

In 2014, the term "hybrid warfare" has come to the forefront with "green men" actions in Ukraine and continues to be studied and analyzed by military and civilian experts. It still has many unknown aspects, but will undoubtedly lead to a revaluation of doctrines and operational concepts as doctrine is an essential element both in terms of planning and execution of military operations. Already, the Joint Committee of Chiefs recognizes in the new U.S. Military Strategy26 the existence of hybrid conflicts that combines conventional and irregular forces to create ambiguity, seize the initiative and paralyze the adversary and may include use of both traditional military and asymmetric systems. This type of conflict is likely to persist well into the future, as it ensures certain advantages to adversary by complicating the process of decision-making and slowing the coordination of effective response.

Doctrine is a vital and indispensable tool for nations and armed forces around the world, which provides guidance on conduct of war and how and when military force is used and for what purpose. Warfare tools, especially technological advances, definitely depend by doctrine. As noted above, an actor may have the most advanced technology in the world, but do not get the victory because of failure to use effective and in time this advantage. But the doctrine can be decisive in a situation where parties have similar technology.

Doctrine is a set of "fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application"27. It is directly linked to the type of force that carrying the war. For example, the military theory on how the regular forces should fight is very different from that on the guerrillas. The doctrine reflects the resources available and the most expected situations that might confront that force. It changes to reflect the change of circumstances, for example some older or newer tactics, techniques and procedures which are specific hybrid warfare.

Conclusions

The characteristic wars of the current era are highly technological and digitized, which is specific to the 4thGW and the beginning of the 5thGW. Basically, alongside classical combat actions carried by states or in combination with these actions there are manifested more strongly asymmetrical, irregular and hybrid actions carried by non-state actors. New types of war, as "insurgency warfare", "asymmetric warfare", "unrestricted warfare", "irregular warfare" or "hybrid warfare", continued to develop the tactics, techniques and procedures of previous generations warfare.

The contemporary phase of Revolution in MilitaryAffairs has led to the development of more effective military capabilities, which combined with high technologies ensures much faster and easier the objectives achievement. Information technology is the engine of the current RMA, information warfare and information actions are a mandatory step to conduct any type of modern conflict. Also, the informational integration of war tools ensures major advantages in at least four areas: observation, firepower, protection, C3 - command, control and communications.

The current RMA aim mainly three areas - technological, doctrinal and operational, organizational - those synergy defining a new way in conduct the war. One example is hybrid warfare. Although it is not new in the evolution of war, the hybrid actions reveals a new way of combining and using of conventional and unconventional tactics and tools specific to the latest generations warfare.

Hybrid warfare is still not fully accepted by military experts because is a non-doctrinal term. It still has many unknown aspects, which have to be further studied and analyzed.

There is no doubt that this type of warfare and all that it implies will quickly lead to the revaluation of the current doctrine and operational concepts, so that nations and their armed forces to be prepared to counteract and respond effectively to hybrid tactics, techniques and procedures.

Footnote

1 William S. Lind, Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, Garz I. Wilson, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation", in Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 73, No. 10, October 1989, pp. 22-26.

2 Stan Anton, "Razboiul asimetric sau actualitatea trecutului", in Buletinul Universitatii Nationale de Aparare "Carol I", nr. 1, 2007, pp. 45-46; Stan Anton, Atypical conflicts of XXIth century, lecture at National Military Palace, 13 May 2015.

3 Adapted from Boundaries for the Fourth Generation , 26 December 2006, URL: http://fix4rso.com/category/ warfare, accessed on 11 May 2015

4 Thomas X. Hammes, "War Evolves into the Fourth Generation", in Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 26, No. 2, August 2005.

5 Thomas X. Hammes, "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges", in Military Review, Vol. LXXXVII, No. 3, May-June 2007.

6 Thomas M. Huber, "Compound Warfare: A Conceptual Framework", p. 1, in Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot, Thomas M. Huber (general editor), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2002.

7 G. Kurt Piehler, Encyclopedia of Military Science , SAGE Publications, 2013, p. 1385.

8 Stanton S. Coerr, "Fifth-Generation War: Warfare versus the Nonstate", in Marine Corps Gazzete, Vol. 93, No. 1, January 2009, p. 63; Generation Warfare Educational Institute, What is 5GW, URL: http://www.5gwinstitute. com/webfiles/whatis, accessed on 10 June 2015.

9 Thomas J. Welch, " Revolution in Military Affairs: One Perspective?", in Strength Through Cooperation: Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region, Frances Omori and Mary A. Sommerville (eds.), National Defense University Press, Washington D.C., 2000.

10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Vision 2010, URL: http:// www.dtic.mil/jv2010/jv2010.pdf?, accessed on 4 May 2015.

11 Teodor Frunzeti, "Changes in the space-time dimension of military actions in a globalized society", , in Strategic Impact, no. 2, 2010, p. 37.

12 Cristian Bahnareanu, Razvan Beschea, "Revolutia în domeniul militar", in Lumea 2011. Enciclopedie politica si militara (Studii strategice si de securitate), Teodor Frunzeti, Vladimir Zodian (coord.), Editura CTEA, Bucuresti, 2011, pp. 595-611.

13 Jeffrey Mckitrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage, George Kraus, Richard Blanchfield, Dale Hill, "The Revolution in Military Affairs", in Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E. GRINTER (eds.), Air War College: Studies in National Security No. 3, Revised Edition, Air University Press, September 1998, pp. 65-97.

14 Teodor Frunzeti, "Conventional and unconventional in military actions", in Strategic Impact, no. 4, 2012, p. 11.

15 Carl von Clawsewitz, On War, Princeton University Press, Reprint Edition, New Jersey, 1989, p. 593.

16 Frank G. Hoffman, "Wars Like No Other" briefing slides, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, 21 April 2008, apud Steven C. Williamson, From fourth generation warfare to hybrid war, USAWC Strategy Research Project, 26 March 2009.

17 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, Virginia, December 2007, p. 5.

18 Idem, p. 8.

19 Thomas M. Huber (general editor), op. cit., 2002 and MacGregor KNOX, Williamson MURRAY (eds.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050, Cambridge University Press, 2001.

20 Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Report 2015: Collapse in Order, Reluctant Guardians?, 2015, p. 35, URL: http://www.eventanizer.com/MSC2015/ MunichSecurityReport2015.pdf, accessed on 21 May 2015.

21 John J. McCuen, "Hybrid Wars", in Military Review, Vol. LXXXVIII, No. 2, March-April 2008, p. 108.

22 Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges", in Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 52, 1st Quarter 2009, p. 35.

23 William S. Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare", in Military Review, Vol. LXXXIV, No. 5, September-October 2004, p. 13.

24 Chong Shi Hao, "A Swift and Decisive Victory: The Strategic Implications of What Victory Means", in PRISM, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2014, p. 106.

25 Thomas Bjerregaard, Hybrid Warfare: A Military Revolution or Revolution in Military Affairs?, Master's Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, February 2012, pp. 67-69.

26 Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, June 2015, p. 4.

27 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010 (as amended through 15 March 2015), p. 71.

References

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