Content area
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Date of publication in the EIoP: 30 Dec 2008
Keywords: Ideas; institutionalisation; non-majoritarian institutions; regulatory politics; risk regulation; democratization; governance; expert committees; European Commission; European Agencies; European Food Agency; EFA
Abstract
This article contributes to the debate on technocratic governance in the European Union. It examines the relationship between scientific expertise and policy-making in the foodstuffs sector and scrutinises the hypothesis that the European Commission follows a technocratic model in the food safety regulation, and that this model is applied to the new European food law. To this end, a typology is developed to distinguish between decisionist, technocratic and reflexive governance. Interestingly, the findings of this article suggests that there is not only a shift from technocratic toward decisionist but also to reflexive governance. To some extent, this change can also be observed in the general debate on European governance. In conclusion it is argued that tensions arise between the three ideal-type models of scientific expertise for policy-making, and that the European model is contested by the international level.
"What I see is that the Commission never ignored any of the scientific recommendations" (President of the European Commission Jacques Santer 1997)
"The scientific advice provided by the European Food Safety Agency is of high quality" (European environment commissioner Stavros Dimas 2008)
Introduction (1)
At a meeting in Luxembourg in June 2008 the EU environment ministers agreed that the risk assessments of genetically modified organisms (GMO) carried out by the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) are insufficient (Phillips 2008). The member states called for a reform of the scientific advice provided by the EFSA and France announced to formulate a proposal during its presidency in the second half of 2008. In this context the German environmental minister Sigmar Gabriel said that it should be clarified whether the European approval procedure is essentially a scientific or a political question (Associated Press 2008). These statements refer to two questions: firstly which principles could guide a reform of the EFSA and secondly whether collective binding decisions in risk controversies should be made by experts or politicians.
In the eyes of the European public the policy-making of the European Union is mainly technocratic and there are some arguments from the social sciences that support this view. This applies particularly...