Content area
Com texto completo
Introduction
International economic crises require international organisations to respond appropriately lest they lose legitimacy. During the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided loan conditions to East Asian and Southeast states that generated a great deal of ill will. The IMF's role in the 'discursive demolition' of the East Asian model (Hall 2003) backfired in the aftermath of the crisis. The image of the IMF's then Managing Director Michel Camdessus peering cross-armed over Indonesian President Suharto while he signed a loan agreement lingered within the region's collective consciousness as an example of bully tactics. These acts also confirmed a view that the IMF imposes a 'one-size-fits-all' model of economic governance that is short on consultation and deliberation and long on domination and imposition. Since then a number of scholars have argued that the IMF imposes a 'standard of civilisation' (Best 2006a) and that the IMF represented a 'Wall Street-Treasury-IMF Complex' (Wade and Veneros 1998). Others have suggested that the IMF has embarked on a programme to impose 'transparency' and 'ownership' upon its member states that harks back to older arguments on a standard of civilisation (Best 2006a; Abdelal 2007).
These arguments hold water. They especially do so when it comes to the IMF's policy proclamations -- public announcements and documents establishing the IMF's position on governance and conditionality. But conventional arguments about the IMF do not tell us much about IMF policy practices; the processes on the ground and the techniques deployed by staff; or how the organisation seeks to enforce the standards it creates.
While the IMF is typically viewed as an institution that enforces global standards for economic governance through the imposition of quantitative targets and loan conditions, its use of benchmarking tools through the generation of financial data potentially serves as a comparative policy learning tool. As such, we should wonder if the IMF's programme practices differ from their policy proclamations on the need for universal standards and transparency. Seen through a pragmatist lens, we can consider whether the IMF seeks to generate policy learning with member states within its broader international political and economic constraints. On the face of it, this is highly unlikely given that the IMF is known for its tight command structure and...